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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
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Subject: [PATCH v4 0/6] LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2016 09:54:39 -0700
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This provides the mini-LSM "loadpin" that intercepts the now consolidated
kernel_file_read LSM hook so that a system can keep all loads coming from
a single trusted filesystem. This is what Chrome OS uses to pin kernel
module and firmware loading to the read-only crypto-verified dm-verity
partition so that kernel module signing is not needed.

-Kees

v4:
- add missing "const" to char * src, joe
v3:
- changed module parameter to "loadpin.enabled"
- add sysctl docs, akpm
- add general use function for enum, zohar
- add gfp_t, joe
- clean up loops, andriy.shevchenko
- reduce BUG_ON to WARN_ON, joe
v2:
- break out utility helpers into separate functions
- have Yama use new helpers too