[PATCH 4.2.y-ckt 11/93] packet: validate variable length ll headers

[Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>]

4.2.8-ckt9 -stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

---8<------------------------------------------------------------

From: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 9ed988cd591500c040b2a6257bc68543e08ceeef ]

Replace link layer header validation check ll_header_truncate with
more generic dev_validate_header.

Validation based on hard_header_len incorrectly drops valid packets
in variable length protocols, such as AX25. dev_validate_header
calls header_ops.validate for such protocols to ensure correctness
below hard_header_len.

See also http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/401064

Fixes 9c7077622dd9 ("packet: make packet_snd fail on len smaller than l2 header")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
---
 net/packet/af_packet.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index d0f6b03..05a425b 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -1797,6 +1797,10 @@ retry:
 		goto retry;
 	}
 
+	if (!dev_validate_header(dev, skb->data, len)) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
 	if (len > (dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len + extra_len) &&
 	    !packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb)) {
 		err = -EMSGSIZE;
@@ -2207,18 +2211,6 @@ static void tpacket_destruct_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	sock_wfree(skb);
 }
 
-static bool ll_header_truncated(const struct net_device *dev, int len)
-{
-	/* net device doesn't like empty head */
-	if (unlikely(len <= dev->hard_header_len)) {
-		net_warn_ratelimited("%s: packet size is too short (%d <= %d)\n",
-				     current->comm, len, dev->hard_header_len);
-		return true;
-	}
-
-	return false;
-}
-
 static void tpacket_set_protocol(const struct net_device *dev,
 				 struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
@@ -2301,19 +2293,19 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		if (unlikely(err < 0))
 			return -EINVAL;
 	} else if (dev->hard_header_len) {
-		if (ll_header_truncated(dev, tp_len))
-			return -EINVAL;
+		int hdrlen = min_t(int, dev->hard_header_len, tp_len);
 
 		skb_push(skb, dev->hard_header_len);
-		err = skb_store_bits(skb, 0, data,
-				dev->hard_header_len);
+		err = skb_store_bits(skb, 0, data, hdrlen);
 		if (unlikely(err))
 			return err;
+		if (!dev_validate_header(dev, skb->data, hdrlen))
+			return -EINVAL;
 		if (!skb->protocol)
 			tpacket_set_protocol(dev, skb);
 
-		data += dev->hard_header_len;
-		to_write -= dev->hard_header_len;
+		data += hdrlen;
+		to_write -= hdrlen;
 	}
 
 	offset = offset_in_page(data);
@@ -2636,9 +2628,6 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 		offset = dev_hard_header(skb, dev, ntohs(proto), addr, NULL, len);
 		if (unlikely(offset < 0))
 			goto out_free;
-	} else {
-		if (ll_header_truncated(dev, len))
-			goto out_free;
 	}
 
 	/* Returns -EFAULT on error */
@@ -2646,6 +2635,12 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 	if (err)
 		goto out_free;
 
+	if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW &&
+	    !dev_validate_header(dev, skb->data, len)) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_free;
+	}
+
 	sock_tx_timestamp(sk, &skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags);
 
 	if (!gso_type && (len > dev->mtu + reserve + extra_len) &&
-- 
2.7.4