From: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 16/54] x86/mm/32: Enable full randomization on i386 and X86_32
Date: Mon, 9 May 2016 17:04:35 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1462838713-31343-17-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1462838713-31343-1-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com>
3.19.8-ckt21 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
commit 8b8addf891de8a00e4d39fc32f93f7c5eb8feceb upstream.
Currently on i386 and on X86_64 when emulating X86_32 in legacy mode, only
the stack and the executable are randomized but not other mmapped files
(libraries, vDSO, etc.). This patch enables randomization for the
libraries, vDSO and mmap requests on i386 and in X86_32 in legacy mode.
By default on i386 there are 8 bits for the randomization of the libraries,
vDSO and mmaps which only uses 1MB of VA.
This patch preserves the original randomness, using 1MB of VA out of 3GB or
4GB. We think that 1MB out of 3GB is not a big cost for having the ASLR.
The first obvious security benefit is that all objects are randomized (not
only the stack and the executable) in legacy mode which highly increases
the ASLR effectiveness, otherwise the attackers may use these
non-randomized areas. But also sensitive setuid/setgid applications are
more secure because currently, attackers can disable the randomization of
these applications by setting the ulimit stack to "unlimited". This is a
very old and widely known trick to disable the ASLR in i386 which has been
allowed for too long.
Another trick used to disable the ASLR was to set the ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE
personality flag, but fortunately this doesn't work on setuid/setgid
applications because there is security checks which clear Security-relevant
flags.
This patch always randomizes the mmap_legacy_base address, removing the
possibility to disable the ASLR by setting the stack to "unlimited".
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Acked-by: Ismael Ripoll Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1457639460-5242-1-git-send-email-hecmargi@upv.es
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reference: CVE-2016-3672
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
---
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 14 +-------------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
index 844b06d..307f60e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
@@ -94,18 +94,6 @@ static unsigned long mmap_base(unsigned long rnd)
}
/*
- * Bottom-up (legacy) layout on X86_32 did not support randomization, X86_64
- * does, but not when emulating X86_32
- */
-static unsigned long mmap_legacy_base(unsigned long rnd)
-{
- if (mmap_is_ia32())
- return TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
- else
- return TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + rnd;
-}
-
-/*
* This function, called very early during the creation of a new
* process VM image, sets up which VM layout function to use:
*/
@@ -116,7 +104,7 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
random_factor = arch_mmap_rnd();
- mm->mmap_legacy_base = mmap_legacy_base(random_factor);
+ mm->mmap_legacy_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + random_factor;
if (mmap_is_legacy()) {
mm->mmap_base = mm->mmap_legacy_base;
--
2.7.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-05-10 0:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-05-10 0:04 [3.19.y-ckt stable] Linux 3.19.8-ckt21 stable review Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 01/54] [3.19-stable-only] Revert "powerpc: Update TM user feature bits in scan_features()" Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 1:40 ` Michael Ellerman
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 02/54] [3.19-stable-only] fix backport "KVM: s390: avoid memory overwrites on emergency signal injection" Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 03/54] USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 04/54] arm: factor out mmap ASLR into mmap_rnd Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 05/54] x86: standardize mmap_rnd() usage Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 06/54] arm64: " Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 07/54] mips: extract logic for mmap_rnd() Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 08/54] powerpc: standardize mmap_rnd() usage Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 09/54] s390: avoid z13 cache aliasing Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 10/54] s390/mm: align 64-bit PIE binaries to 4GB Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 11/54] s390: standardize mmap_rnd() usage Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 12/54] mm: expose arch_mmap_rnd when available Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 13/54] s390: redefine randomize_et_dyn for ELF_ET_DYN_BASE Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 14/54] mm: split ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 15/54] mm: fold arch_randomize_brk into ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` Kamal Mostafa [this message]
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 17/54] ASoC: rt5640: Correct the digital interface data select Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 18/54] ASoC: dapm: Make sure we have a card when displaying component widgets Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 19/54] iio: ak8975: Fix NULL pointer exception on early interrupt Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 20/54] i2c: cpm: Fix build break due to incompatible pointer types Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 21/54] i2c: exynos5: Fix possible ABBA deadlock by keeping I2C clock prepared Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 22/54] efi: Fix out-of-bounds read in variable_matches() Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 23/54] USB: serial: cp210x: add ID for Link ECU Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 24/54] USB: serial: cp210x: add Straizona Focusers device ids Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 25/54] ALSA: hda - Add dock support for ThinkPad X260 Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 26/54] workqueue: fix ghost PENDING flag while doing MQ IO Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 27/54] drm/dp/mst: Get validated port ref in drm_dp_update_payload_part1() Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 28/54] cxl: Keep IRQ mappings on context teardown Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 29/54] drm/i915: Fix system resume if PCI device remained enabled Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 30/54] drm/i915/ddi: Fix eDP VDD handling during booting and suspend/resume Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 31/54] ARM: SoCFPGA: Fix secondary CPU startup in thumb2 kernel Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 32/54] IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 33/54] mm/huge_memory: replace VM_NO_THP VM_BUG_ON with actual VMA check Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 34/54] mm: vmscan: reclaim highmem zone if buffer_heads is over limit Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 35/54] EDAC: i7core, sb_edac: Don't return NOTIFY_BAD from mce_decoder callback Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 36/54] powerpc: Fix bad inline asm constraint in create_zero_mask() Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 37/54] Minimal fix-up of bad hashing behavior of hash_64() Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 38/54] tracing: Don't display trigger file for events that can't be enabled Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 39/54] drm/radeon: make sure vertical front porch is at least 1 Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:04 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 40/54] MAINTAINERS: Remove asterisk from EFI directory names Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:05 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 41/54] ACPICA: Dispatcher: Update thread ID for recursive method calls Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:05 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 42/54] x86/sysfb_efi: Fix valid BAR address range check Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:05 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 43/54] fs/pnode.c: treat zero mnt_group_id-s as unequal Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:05 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 44/54] propogate_mnt: Handle the first propogated copy being a slave Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:05 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 45/54] mm, cma: prevent nr_isolated_* counters from going negative Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:05 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 46/54] x86/tsc: Read all ratio bits from MSR_PLATFORM_INFO Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:05 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 47/54] parisc: fix a bug when syscall number of tracee is __NR_Linux_syscalls Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:05 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 48/54] jme: Do not enable NIC WoL functions on S0 Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:05 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 49/54] jme: Fix device PM wakeup API usage Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:05 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 50/54] batman-adv: Check skb size before using encapsulated ETH+VLAN header Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:05 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 51/54] batman-adv: Reduce refcnt of removed router when updating route Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:05 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 52/54] batman-adv: Fix broadcast/ogm queue limit on a removed interface Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:05 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 53/54] cxgbi: fix uninitialized flowi6 Kamal Mostafa
2016-05-10 0:05 ` [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 54/54] net/mlx4_en: fix spurious timestamping callbacks Kamal Mostafa
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