From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>,
Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Subject: [PATCH 08/10] perf evsel: Improve EPERM error handling in open_strerror()
Date: Thu, 12 May 2016 17:03:53 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1463083435-12828-9-git-send-email-acme@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1463083435-12828-1-git-send-email-acme@kernel.org>
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
We were showing a hardcoded default value for the kernel.perf_event_paranoid
sysctl, now that it became more paranoid (1 -> 2 [1]), this would need to be
updated, instead show the current value:
[acme@jouet linux]$ perf record ls
Error:
You may not have permission to collect stats.
Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,
which controls use of the performance events system by
unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
The current value is 2:
-1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users
>= 0: Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_IOC_LOCK
>= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
[acme@jouet linux]$
[1] 0161028b7c8a ("perf/core: Change the default paranoia level to 2")
Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-0gc4rdpg8d025r5not8s8028@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
---
tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
index 738ce226002b..a5f339d447cc 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
@@ -2382,12 +2382,13 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct perf_evsel *evsel, struct target *target,
"Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n"
"which controls use of the performance events system by\n"
"unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n"
- "The default value is 1:\n\n"
+ "The current value is %d:\n\n"
" -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n"
">= 0: Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_IOC_LOCK\n"
">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN",
- target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "");
+ target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "",
+ perf_event_paranoid());
case ENOENT:
return scnprintf(msg, size, "The %s event is not supported.",
perf_evsel__name(evsel));
--
2.5.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-05-12 20:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-05-12 20:03 [GIT PULL 00/10] perf/urgent fixes Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-05-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 01/10] perf tools: Use readdir() instead of deprecated readdir_r() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-05-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 02/10] perf script: " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-05-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 03/10] perf thread_map: " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-05-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 04/10] perf tools: " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-05-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 05/10] perf dwarf: Guard !x86_64 definitions under #ifdef else clause Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-05-13 2:14 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2016-05-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 06/10] perf probe: Check if dwarf_getlocations() is available Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-05-13 2:38 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2016-05-13 11:47 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-05-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 07/10] tools lib traceevent: Do not reassign parg after collapse_tree() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-05-12 20:03 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo [this message]
2016-05-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 09/10] perf evsel: Handle EACCESS + perf_event_paranoid=2 in fallback() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-05-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 10/10] perf stat: Fallback to user only counters when perf_event_paranoid > 1 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-05-13 5:36 ` [GIT PULL 00/10] perf/urgent fixes Ingo Molnar
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