From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752688AbcFIVF7 (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Jun 2016 17:05:59 -0400 Received: from mail-pf0-f174.google.com ([209.85.192.174]:34759 "EHLO mail-pf0-f174.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751778AbcFIVCa (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Jun 2016 17:02:30 -0400 From: Kees Cook To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook , "James E.J. Bottomley" , Helge Deller , linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Catalin Marinas , Chris Metcalf , Heiko Carstens , James Hogan , Jeff Dike , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mips@linux-mips.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, "Maciej W. Rozycki" , Mark Rutland , Martin Schwidefsky , Michael Ellerman , Paul Mackerras , Ralf Baechle , Richard Weinberger , Russell King , user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, Will Deacon , x86@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 10/14] parisc/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2016 14:02:00 -0700 Message-Id: <1465506124-21866-11-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1465506124-21866-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> References: <1465506124-21866-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Close the hole where ptrace can change a syscall out from under seccomp. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" Cc: Helge Deller Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org --- arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c index 8edc47c0b98e..e02d7b4d2b69 100644 --- a/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -311,10 +311,6 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request, long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { - /* Do the secure computing check first. */ - if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) - return -1; - if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) && tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) { /* @@ -325,6 +321,11 @@ long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) regs->gr[20] = -1UL; goto out; } + + /* Do the secure computing check after ptrace. */ + if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) + return -1; + #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))) trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->gr[20]); -- 2.7.4