From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753161AbcGMOrp (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Jul 2016 10:47:45 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:42670 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751531AbcGMOpO (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Jul 2016 10:45:14 -0400 From: Vivek Goyal To: miklos@szeredi.hu, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, pmoore@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: dwalsh@redhat.com, dhowells@redhat.com, viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk, vgoyal@redhat.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 4/9] selinux: Implementation for inode_copy_up_xattr() hook Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2016 10:44:50 -0400 Message-Id: <1468421095-22322-5-git-send-email-vgoyal@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <1468421095-22322-1-git-send-email-vgoyal@redhat.com> References: <1468421095-22322-1-git-send-email-vgoyal@redhat.com> X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.32]); Wed, 13 Jul 2016 14:45:04 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org When a file is copied up in overlay, we have already created file on upper/ with right label and there is no need to copy up selinux label/xattr from lower file to upper file. In fact in case of context mount, we don't want to copy up label as newly created file got its label from context= option. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index c82ee54..4fda548 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3290,6 +3290,21 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) return 0; } +static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) +{ + /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we + * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower + * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs. + */ + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0) + return 1; /* Discard */ + /* + * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported + * by selinux. + */ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + /* file security operations */ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) @@ -6077,6 +6092,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security), -- 2.7.4