From: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 08:25:39 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1479831939.1942.13.camel@perches.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <24973.1479829961@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
On Tue, 2016-11-22 at 15:52 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> wrote:
>
> > > > Small nit, checkpatch usually complains that this should be written as
> > > > 12-character SHA-1 followed by the commit subject, i.e.
> > > >
> > > > 0a637ee61247 ("x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary boot services")
> > >
> > > In this case, checkpatch is wrong.
> >
> > Why do you think so?
>
> Actually, checkpatch doesn't complain about embedded commit IDs anymore, so in
> that case, it's just about acceptable.
checkpatch still emits warnings about the format of
commmit IDs.
What version of checkpatch are yuu using?
> Apart from that, I think we should put in the full SHA-1 commit. The
> probability of a collision in a 12-digit hex number for the >5,000,000 commits
> just in Linus's tree is currently at ~4.5% and gradually increasing. Add in
> all the commits in not-yet-upstreamed trees - which might be another million
> commits, say - then we're over 6%..
Umm, no, that's not correct.
SHA-1 lengths of 12 are unique for quite awhile yet.
https://blog.cuviper.com/2013/11/10/how-short-can-git-abbreviate/
Using Linus' tree today, from commit 3b404a519815
the current output of the git-uniq-abbrev script is:
$ git-uniq-abbrev
5048673 objects
4: 5048673 / 65536
5: 5007413 / 998721
6: 1312496 / 623343
7: 94487 / 47089
8: 6163 / 3081
9: 416 / 208
10: 28 / 14
11: 4 / 2
12: 0 / 0
d597639e2036f04f0226761e2d818b31f2db7820
d597639e203a100156501df8a0756fd09573e2de
ef91b6e893a00d903400f8e1303efc4d52b710af
ef91b6e893afc4c4ca488453ea9f19ced5fa5861
> Oh, yes, and speaking of checkpatch, can you make it so that if it sees:
>
> commit 12345...
> Author: foo <foo@bar>
> Date: blah
>
> Subject line
>
> Description lines
> ...
> ...
> ...
> ...
>
> Signed-off-by-and-suchline-lines
>
> diff ...
>
> with the all description indented by 4 spaces, then assume that it's the
> output of git show and not give the warnings about signed-off-by and other
> things being indented?
No. Use --format=email as appropriate instead.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-22 16:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-16 21:47 [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2016-11-16 22:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 22:40 ` David Howells
2016-12-25 21:20 ` Pavel Machek
2016-12-25 21:44 ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-17 12:37 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 0:31 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services David Howells
2016-11-22 10:20 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:17 ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:58 ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 15:52 ` David Howells
2016-11-22 16:25 ` Joe Perches [this message]
2016-11-22 16:40 ` David Howells
2016-11-22 16:51 ` Joe Perches
2016-11-22 0:31 ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-11-22 0:31 ` [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions David Howells
2016-11-22 0:32 ` [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-22 10:44 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 10:49 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-22 14:47 ` David Howells
2016-11-22 20:30 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 0:02 ` David Howells
2016-11-22 14:52 ` David Howells
2016-11-22 20:36 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 14:57 ` David Howells
2016-11-22 0:32 ` [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-22 13:03 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-22 0:32 ` [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-22 13:04 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 11:42 ` [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status David Howells
2016-11-21 11:52 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 12:41 ` David Howells
2016-11-21 13:14 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 15:17 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-21 15:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-21 11:46 ` David Howells
2016-11-21 19:58 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 03/16] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 04/16] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:47 ` [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2016-11-17 21:58 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 11:58 ` Josh Boyer
2016-11-18 12:10 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-18 17:28 ` David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 06/16] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 07/16] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 08/16] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 09/16] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 10/16] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 11/16] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 12/16] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 13/16] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:48 ` [PATCH 14/16] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 15/16] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2016-11-16 21:49 ` [PATCH 16/16] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is " David Howells
2016-11-16 22:27 ` [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-21 19:53 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-30 14:27 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-16 22:28 ` Justin Forbes
2016-11-21 23:10 ` [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed David Howells
2016-11-22 6:12 ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-23 12:58 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 19:21 ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-24 17:34 ` David Howells
2016-11-24 20:19 ` Dominik Brodowski
2016-11-25 14:49 ` David Howells
2016-11-28 22:32 ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29 0:11 ` David Howells
2016-11-29 0:23 ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-29 14:03 ` David Howells
2016-11-29 14:35 ` Corey Minyard
2016-11-30 14:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-11-30 16:25 ` David Howells
2016-11-29 10:40 ` David Howells
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