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From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
To: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	matthew.garrett@nebula.com, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	acpi4asus-user <acpi4asus-user@lists.sourceforge.net>,
	Platform Driver <platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2017 15:34:35 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1492526075.2409.140.camel@decadent.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHp75Vd+-_CmW2MPpK3b6bER8bFmECusnx0BZMwYAizWZys4YA@mail.gmail.com>

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On Tue, 2017-04-18 at 09:06 +0300, Andy Shevchenko wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 4:16 PM, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > > Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> wrote:
> > 
> > > > > It looks a bit fragile when responsility of whatever reasons kernel
> > > > > can't serve become a driver burden.
> > > > > Can we fix this in debugfs framework instead?
> > > > 
> > > > Fix it with debugfs how?  We can't offload the decision to userspace.
> > > 
> > > I mean to do at least similar like you have done for module
> > > parameters. So, instead of putting above code to each attribute in
> > > question make a special (marked) attribute instead and debugfs
> > > framework will know how to deal with that.
> > 
> > Hmmm...  It's tricky in that debugfs doesn't have any of its own structures,
> > but is entirely built on standard VFS ones, so finding somewhere to store the
> > information is going to be awkward.
> 
> I see.
> 
> >  One obvious solution is to entirely lock
> > down debugfs in secure boot more, but that might be a bit drastic.
> 
> But this sounds sane! debugFS for debugging, not for production. If
> someone is using secure kernel it means pure production use (otherwise
> one may do temporary hacks in kernel).
[...]

Production systems need instrumentation to understand performance
issues and any bugs that for whatever reason didn't show up in earlier
testing.  A number of interfaces for that have been added under
debugfs:

- tracing (now tracefs, but it's expected to appear under debugfs)
- dynamic_debug
- various ad-hoc statistics

So it's generally not going to be OK to turn off debugfs.  There will
probably need to be a distinction between believed-safe and unsafe
directories/files.

Ben.

-- 
Ben Hutchings
The world is coming to an end.	Please log off.


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  reply	other threads:[~2017-04-18 14:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 83+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-04-05 20:14 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2017-04-06  8:26   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-06  8:48   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-14 18:05   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-14 18:15     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-14 23:16     ` David Howells
2017-04-16 20:46     ` Matt Fleming
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-07  3:07   ` Dave Young
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells
2017-04-07  3:05   ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  3:49     ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  6:19       ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:45         ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  8:01           ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:07       ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:41         ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  8:28           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  8:42             ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:09     ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:46       ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  9:17       ` David Howells
2017-04-07 12:36         ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-10 13:19         ` David Howells
2017-05-02 19:01           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 10/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: " David Howells
2017-04-05 23:38   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06  6:39     ` Oliver Neukum
2017-04-06  8:41     ` David Howells
2017-04-06 20:09       ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 20:12         ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 20:25           ` Jiri Kosina
2017-04-08  3:28             ` poma
2017-04-12 13:44               ` joeyli
2017-04-06  6:55   ` David Howells
2017-04-06 20:07     ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2017-04-18 17:50   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2017-04-14 18:28   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR " David Howells
2017-04-14 18:30   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2017-04-07 10:25   ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-07 12:50   ` David Howells
2017-04-09 11:10     ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-10 13:16     ` David Howells
2017-04-18  6:06       ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-18 14:34         ` Ben Hutchings [this message]
2017-04-18 14:55         ` David Howells
2017-04-18 15:19           ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-18 15:34           ` David Howells
2017-04-18 15:30         ` David Howells
2017-04-18 17:39           ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 16/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2017-04-06 19:43   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-07  6:31     ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:05     ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:39       ` Dave Young
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 18/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 19/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when " David Howells
2017-04-06 12:29   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-04-06 12:40     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-12 14:57   ` joeyli
2017-04-13  8:46   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 21/24] scsi: Lock down the eata driver David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 22/24] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 23/24] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells
2017-04-05 20:18 ` [PATCH 24/24] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells
2017-04-07 15:59 ` [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown Austin S. Hemmelgarn
2017-04-07 16:29   ` Justin Forbes
2017-04-10 23:15 ` Why kernel lockdown? David Howells
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2017-04-05 17:09 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down David Howells

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