mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
To: <mhocko@suse.com>, <avagin@openvz.org>, <peterz@infradead.org>,
	<oleg@redhat.com>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	<luto@kernel.org>, <gorcunov@openvz.org>,
	<akpm@linux-foundation.org>, <mingo@kernel.org>,
	<ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>, <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2] pid_ns: Fix race between setns'ed fork() and zap_pid_ns_processes()
Date: Fri, 12 May 2017 19:11:31 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <149460544264.18650.5677597682925453388.stgit@localhost.localdomain> (raw)

Imagine we have a pid namespace and a task from its parent's pid_ns,
which made setns() to the pid namespace. The task is doing fork(),
while the pid namespace's child reaper is dying. We have the race
between them:

Task from parent pid_ns             Child reaper
copy_process()                      ..
  alloc_pid()                       ..
  ..                                zap_pid_ns_processes()
  ..                                  disable_pid_allocation()
  ..                                  read_lock(&tasklist_lock)
  ..                                  iterate over pids in pid_ns
  ..                                    kill tasks linked to pids
  ..                                  read_unlock(&tasklist_lock)
  write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);   ..
  attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID);       ..
  ..                                ..

So, just created task p won't receive SIGKILL signal,
and the pid namespace will be in contradictory state.
Only manual kill will help there, but does the userspace
care about this? I suppose, the most users just inject
a task into a pid namespace and wait a SIGCHLD from it.

The patch fixes the problem. It simply checks for
(pid_ns->nr_hashed & PIDNS_HASH_ADDING) in copy_process().
We do it under the tasklist_lock, and can't skip
PIDNS_HASH_ADDING as noted by Oleg:

"zap_pid_ns_processes() does disable_pid_allocation()
and then takes tasklist_lock to kill the whole namespace.
Given that copy_process() checks PIDNS_HASH_ADDING
under write_lock(tasklist) they can't race;
if copy_process() takes this lock first, the new child will
be killed, otherwise copy_process() can't miss
the change in ->nr_hashed."

If allocation is disabled, we just return -ENOMEM
like it's made for such cases in alloc_pid().

v2: Do not move disable_pid_allocation(), do not
introduce a new variable in copy_process() and simplify
the patch as suggested by Oleg Nesterov.
Account the problem with double irq enabling
found by Eric W. Biederman.

Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CC: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
CC: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CC: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
CC: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CC: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
---
 kernel/fork.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index bfd91b180778..d2cade9b6ad8 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1845,11 +1845,13 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
 	*/
 	recalc_sigpending();
 	if (signal_pending(current)) {
-		spin_unlock(&current->sighand->siglock);
-		write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
 		retval = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
 		goto bad_fork_cancel_cgroup;
 	}
+	if (unlikely(!(ns_of_pid(pid)->nr_hashed & PIDNS_HASH_ADDING))) {
+		retval = -ENOMEM;
+		goto bad_fork_cancel_cgroup;
+	}
 
 	if (likely(p->pid)) {
 		ptrace_init_task(p, (clone_flags & CLONE_PTRACE) || trace);
@@ -1907,6 +1909,8 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
 	return p;
 
 bad_fork_cancel_cgroup:
+	spin_unlock(&current->sighand->siglock);
+	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
 	cgroup_cancel_fork(p);
 bad_fork_free_pid:
 	cgroup_threadgroup_change_end(current);

             reply	other threads:[~2017-05-12 16:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-05-12 16:11 Kirill Tkhai [this message]
2017-05-12 16:17 ` Oleg Nesterov
2017-05-12 16:34   ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-05-12 17:05     ` Oleg Nesterov

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=149460544264.18650.5677597682925453388.stgit@localhost.localdomain \
    --to=ktkhai@virtuozzo.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=avagin@openvz.org \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=gorcunov@openvz.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mhocko@suse.com \
    --cc=mingo@kernel.org \
    --cc=oleg@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®