From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>,
Fabricio Voznika <fvoznika@google.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 1/4] seccomp: Provide matching filter for introspection
Date: Wed, 9 Aug 2017 12:01:54 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1502305317-85052-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1502305317-85052-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
Both the upcoming logging improvements and changes to RET_KILL will need
to know which filter a given seccomp return value originated from. In
order to delay logic processing of result until after the seccomp loop,
this adds a single pointer assignment on matches. This will allow both
log and RET_KILL logic to work off the filter rather than doing more
expensive tests inside the time-critical run_filters loop.
Running tight cycles of getpid() with filters attached shows no measurable
difference in speed.
Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
---
kernel/seccomp.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 98b59b5db90b..1f3347fc2605 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -171,10 +171,14 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
/**
* seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @sd
* @sd: optional seccomp data to be passed to filters
+ * @match: stores struct seccomp_filter that resulted in the return value,
+ * unless filter returned SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, in which case it will
+ * be unchanged.
*
* Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
*/
-static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
+static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd,
+ struct seccomp_filter **match)
{
struct seccomp_data sd_local;
u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
@@ -198,8 +202,10 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
for (; f; f = f->prev) {
u32 cur_ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(f->prog, sd);
- if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION))
+ if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION)) {
ret = cur_ret;
+ *match = f;
+ }
}
return ret;
}
@@ -566,6 +572,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
const bool recheck_after_trace)
{
u32 filter_ret, action;
+ struct seccomp_filter *match = NULL;
int data;
/*
@@ -574,7 +581,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
*/
rmb();
- filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd);
+ filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd, &match);
data = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
action = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION;
@@ -638,6 +645,11 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
return 0;
case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
+ /*
+ * Note that the "match" filter will always be NULL for
+ * this action since SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW is the starting
+ * state in seccomp_run_filters().
+ */
return 0;
case SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
--
2.7.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-08-09 19:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-08-09 19:01 [PATCH v3 0/4] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_KILL_PROCESS Kees Cook
2017-08-09 19:01 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-08-09 19:01 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] " Kees Cook
2017-08-11 16:58 ` Tyler Hicks
2017-08-11 18:32 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-09 19:01 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] selftests/seccomp: Refactor RET_ERRNO tests Kees Cook
2017-08-09 19:01 ` [PATCH v3 4/4] selftests/seccomp: Test thread vs process killing Kees Cook
2017-08-09 20:22 ` [PATCH v3 0/4] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_KILL_PROCESS Tycho Andersen
2017-08-09 20:33 ` Tyler Hicks
2017-08-09 20:40 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-09 20:41 ` Tycho Andersen
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