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From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 5/8] exec: take care of disabling PTI upon execve()
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 20:28:17 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515612500-14505-6-git-send-email-w@1wt.eu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515612500-14505-1-git-send-email-w@1wt.eu>

Here's what we do here :
  - TIF_DISABLE_PTI_NOW is always cleared as we don't want an unprotected
    process to pass its lack of protection to any possible other program
    it could exec.

  - TIF_DISABLE_PTI_NEXT is copied into TIF_DISABLE_PTI_NOW and cleared,
    this is used by wrappers to disable PTI for a single exec call.

Thanks to this, PTI-aware programs can adjust TIF_DISABLE_PTI_NOW for
themselves, and a simple wrapper can be implemented by setting
TIF_DISABLE_PTI_NEXT to manage those unable to set TIF_DISABLE_PTI_NOW
themselves.

Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
 fs/exec.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 7eb8d21..cf42ddc 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1814,6 +1814,16 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename,
 	putname(filename);
 	if (displaced)
 		put_files_struct(displaced);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PER_PROCESS_PTI
+	/*
+	 * TIF_DISABLE_PTI_NOW doesn't pass execve(). TIF_DISABLE_PTI_NEXT
+	 * turns into TIF_DISABLE_PTI_NOW and disappears.
+	 */
+	clear_thread_flag(TIF_DISABLE_PTI_NOW);
+	if (test_and_clear_thread_flag(TIF_DISABLE_PTI_NEXT))
+		set_thread_flag(TIF_DISABLE_PTI_NOW);
+#endif
 	return retval;
 
 out:
-- 
1.7.12.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-10 19:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-10 19:28 [RFC PATCH v3 0/8] Per process PTI activation Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10 19:28 ` [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] x86/thread_info: add TIF_DISABLE_PTI_{NOW,NEXT} to disable PTI per task Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10 19:28 ` [RFC PATCH v3 2/8] x86/pti: add new config option PER_PROCESS_PTI Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10 19:28 ` [RFC PATCH v3 3/8] x86/pti: create the pti_adjust sysctl Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10 19:28 ` [RFC PATCH v3 4/8] x86/arch_prctl: add ARCH_DISABLE_PTI_{NOW,NEXT} to enable/disable PTI Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10 19:28 ` Willy Tarreau [this message]
2018-01-10 19:28 ` [RFC PATCH v3 6/8] x86/pti: don't mark the user PGD with _PAGE_NX Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10 19:54   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-10 19:59     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-10 20:28       ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-11  6:23         ` Willy Tarreau
2018-02-23 17:58         ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-02-23 19:30           ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-10 20:20   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-11  6:27     ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10 19:28 ` [RFC PATCH v3 7/8] x86/entry/pti: avoid setting CR3 when it's already correct Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10 19:28 ` [RFC PATCH v3 8/8] x86/entry/pti: don't switch PGD when TIF_DISABLE_PTI_NOW is set Willy Tarreau
2018-01-10 19:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 0/8] Per process PTI activation Linus Torvalds

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