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From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
To: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on fixed Intel processors
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2018 18:59:21 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1516820361.13558.173.camel@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180124183958.267e405b@alans-desktop>

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On Wed, 2018-01-24 at 18:40 +0000, Alan Cox wrote:
> Nobody has published official statements on Cyrix or AMD 32bit processors
> so we don't know if they are vulnerable to meltdown. One problem I
> suspect is that as with things like Alpha 21264 - the people who knew are
> probably long retired. We do know the Intel ones I listed are OK and the
> Centaur.
> 
> If someone can figure out the Cyrix and AMD cases that would be great.

Well Tom already submitted a patch to turn it off for *all* AMD, 32-bit 
and 64-bit.

> > 
> > By the time the dust settles we might end up with a bunch of different
> > match tables, *one* of which is "does not speculate at all". And the
> > conditions for the different bugs will each use different sets of match
> > tables. For example
> > 
> >  if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation_at_all) &&
> >      !x86_match_cpu(speculation_but_no_meltdown) &&
> >      !cpu_sets_rdcl_no())
> > 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
> > 
> >  if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation_at_all) &&
> >      !x86_match_cpu(no_branch_target_buffer))
> > 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
> There are afaik no x86 processors that speculate and don't have a BTB.
> It's a bit like building a racing car with no gearbox.

Right, "has a BTB and doesn't tag/flush it according to privilege level
and context". Which is the thing that, as lamented, Intel hasn't even
proposed a way to *tell* us that's the case, if/when they finally
manage to fix it up in the next generation *after* the IBRS_ALL hack.

So yeah, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 probably *does* end up being "speculates".

I'll change !Meltdown from ANY,5 to INTEL,5 + CENTAUR,5 as you suggest,
and we can work on Spectre separately.

Thanks.

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  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-24 18:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-23 16:52 [PATCH v2 0/5] Basic Speculation Control feature support David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:43   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-24  1:23     ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-24  1:28       ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-24  8:13         ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " David Woodhouse
2018-01-24  8:39   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-01-24  8:40     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:27   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-23 18:31     ` Greg KH
2018-01-23 18:48       ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on fixed Intel processors David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:12   ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-24  1:21     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:40   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-24  1:27     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:41   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-23 18:44     ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 18:45   ` Alan Cox
2018-01-23 19:02     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-23 20:45       ` Alan Cox
2018-01-23 20:38     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-23 20:50     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 16:25     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 17:07       ` Alan Cox
2018-01-24 17:42         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 18:40           ` Alan Cox
2018-01-24 18:59             ` David Woodhouse [this message]
2018-01-24 19:37             ` David Woodhouse

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