From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
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alex.popov@linux.com
Subject: [PATCH RFC v9 5/7] lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK
Date: Sat, 3 Mar 2018 23:00:30 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1520107232-14111-6-git-send-email-alex.popov@linux.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1520107232-14111-1-git-send-email-alex.popov@linux.com>
Introduce two lkdtm tests for the STACKLEAK feature: STACKLEAK_ALLOCA
and STACKLEAK_DEEP_RECURSION. Both of them check that the current task
stack is properly erased (filled with STACKLEAK_POISON).
STACKLEAK_ALLOCA tests that:
- check_alloca() allows alloca calls which don't exhaust the kernel stack;
- alloca calls which exhaust/overflow the kernel stack hit BUG() in
check_alloca().
STACKLEAK_DEEP_RECURSION tests that exhausting the current task stack
with a deep recursion is detected by CONFIG_VMAP_STACK (which is implied
by CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK).
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
---
drivers/misc/Makefile | 3 +
drivers/misc/lkdtm.h | 4 ++
drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c | 2 +
drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c | 136 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 145 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c
diff --git a/drivers/misc/Makefile b/drivers/misc/Makefile
index c3c8624..2b11823 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/misc/Makefile
@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_perms.o
lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_refcount.o
lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_rodata_objcopy.o
lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_usercopy.o
+lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm_stackleak.o
+
+KASAN_SANITIZE_lkdtm_stackleak.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_lkdtm_rodata.o := n
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
index 9e513dc..4b2b8e3 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
@@ -83,4 +83,8 @@ void lkdtm_USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_FROM(void);
void lkdtm_USERCOPY_STACK_BEYOND(void);
void lkdtm_USERCOPY_KERNEL(void);
+/* lkdtm_stackleak.c */
+void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ALLOCA(void);
+void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_DEEP_RECURSION(void);
+
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
index 2154d1b..c37fd85 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
@@ -183,6 +183,8 @@ static const struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_STACK_FRAME_FROM),
CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_STACK_BEYOND),
CRASHTYPE(USERCOPY_KERNEL),
+ CRASHTYPE(STACKLEAK_ALLOCA),
+ CRASHTYPE(STACKLEAK_DEEP_RECURSION),
};
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1d2a9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_stackleak.c
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+/*
+ * This code tests several aspects of the STACKLEAK feature:
+ * - the current task stack is properly erased (filled with STACKLEAK_POISON);
+ * - check_alloca() allows alloca calls which don't exhaust the kernel stack;
+ * - alloca calls which exhaust/overflow the kernel stack hit BUG() in
+ * check_alloca();
+ * - exhausting the current task stack with a deep recursion is detected by
+ * CONFIG_VMAP_STACK (which is implied by CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK).
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
+ * Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
+ */
+
+#include "lkdtm.h"
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+# define STACKLEAK_POISON -0xBEEF
+# define CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE 100
+#endif
+
+static noinline bool stack_is_erased(void)
+{
+ unsigned long *sp, left, found, i;
+
+ /*
+ * For the details about the alignment of the poison values, see
+ * the comment in track_stack().
+ */
+ sp = PTR_ALIGN(&i, sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+ left = ((unsigned long)sp & (THREAD_SIZE - 1)) / sizeof(unsigned long);
+ sp--;
+
+ /*
+ * Two unsigned long ints at the bottom of the thread stack are
+ * reserved and not poisoned.
+ */
+ if (left <= 2)
+ return false;
+
+ left -= 2;
+ pr_info("checking unused part of the thread stack (%lu bytes)...\n",
+ left * sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+ /* Search for 17 poison values in a row (like erase_kstack() does) */
+ for (i = 0, found = 0; i < left && found < 17; i++) {
+ if (*(sp - i) == STACKLEAK_POISON)
+ found++;
+ else
+ found = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (found < 17) {
+ pr_err("FAIL: thread stack is not erased (checked %lu bytes)\n",
+ i * sizeof(unsigned long));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("first %lu bytes are unpoisoned\n",
+ (i - found) * sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+ /* The rest of thread stack should be erased */
+ for (; i < left; i++) {
+ if (*(sp - i) != STACKLEAK_POISON) {
+ pr_err("FAIL: thread stack is NOT properly erased\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pr_info("the rest of the thread stack is properly erased\n");
+ return true;
+}
+
+static noinline void do_alloca(unsigned long size)
+{
+ char buf[size];
+
+ /* So this doesn't get inlined or optimized out */
+ snprintf(buf, size, "testing alloca...\n");
+}
+
+void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ALLOCA(void)
+{
+ unsigned long left = (unsigned long)&left & (THREAD_SIZE - 1);
+
+ if (!stack_is_erased())
+ return;
+
+ /* Try a small alloca to see if it works */
+ pr_info("try a small alloca of 16 bytes...\n");
+ do_alloca(16);
+ pr_info("small alloca is successful\n");
+
+ /* Try to hit the BUG() in check_alloca() */
+ pr_info("try a large alloca of %lu bytes (stack overflow)...\n", left);
+ do_alloca(left);
+ pr_err("FAIL: large alloca overstepped the thread stack boundary\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * The stack frame size of recursion() is bigger than the
+ * CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE, hence that function is instrumented
+ * by the STACKLEAK gcc plugin and it calls track_stack() at the beginning.
+ */
+static noinline unsigned long recursion(unsigned long prev_sp)
+{
+ char buf[CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE + 42];
+ unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp;
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "testing deep recursion...\n");
+
+ if (prev_sp < sp + THREAD_SIZE)
+ sp = recursion(prev_sp);
+
+ return sp;
+}
+
+void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_DEEP_RECURSION(void)
+{
+ unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)&sp;
+
+ if (!stack_is_erased())
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Exhaust the thread stack with a deep recursion. It should hit the
+ * guard page provided by CONFIG_VMAP_STACK (which is implied by
+ * CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK).
+ */
+ pr_info("try to exhaust the thread stack with a deep recursion...\n");
+ pr_err("FAIL: thread stack exhaustion (%lu bytes) is not detected\n",
+ sp - recursion(sp));
+}
--
2.7.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-03 20:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-03-03 20:00 [PATCH RFC v9 0/7] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it Alexander Popov
2018-03-03 20:00 ` [PATCH RFC v9 1/7] gcc-plugins: Clean up the cgraph_create_edge* macros Alexander Popov
2018-03-03 20:00 ` [PATCH RFC v9 2/7] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls Alexander Popov
2018-03-05 16:41 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-05 19:43 ` Laura Abbott
2018-03-05 19:50 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-05 20:25 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-03-05 21:21 ` Alexander Popov
2018-03-05 21:36 ` Kees Cook
2018-03-21 11:04 ` Alexander Popov
2018-03-21 15:33 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-22 20:56 ` Alexander Popov
2018-03-26 17:32 ` Kees Cook
2018-03-26 17:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-03 20:00 ` [PATCH RFC v9 3/7] gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack Alexander Popov
2018-03-03 20:00 ` [PATCH RFC v9 4/7] x86/entry: Erase kernel stack in syscall_trace_enter() Alexander Popov
2018-03-05 19:40 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-05 20:06 ` Kees Cook
2018-03-05 20:15 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-05 21:02 ` Alexander Popov
2018-03-05 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-03-05 21:40 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-05 22:07 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06 0:56 ` Kees Cook
2018-03-06 4:30 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06 17:58 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-06 7:56 ` [OLD PATCH] net: recvmsg: Unconditionally zero struct sockaddr_storage " Ingo Molnar
2018-03-06 8:08 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-03-06 15:16 ` Daniel Micay
2018-03-06 15:28 ` Daniel Micay
2018-03-06 18:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06 19:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-03-06 19:07 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-03-06 19:16 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06 20:42 ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-03-06 21:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06 21:21 ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-03-06 21:29 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06 22:09 ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-03-06 22:24 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06 21:36 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-03-06 21:41 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06 21:47 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06 22:29 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-03-06 22:41 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-06 22:52 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-03-06 23:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-12 8:22 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-03-12 9:00 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-03-12 9:21 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-03-06 21:47 ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-03-06 22:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-03-05 20:26 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-03-03 20:00 ` Alexander Popov [this message]
2018-03-03 20:00 ` [PATCH RFC v9 6/7] fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system Alexander Popov
2018-03-03 20:00 ` [PATCH RFC v9 7/7] doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature Alexander Popov
2018-03-05 19:34 ` [PATCH RFC v9 0/7] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it Kees Cook
2018-03-05 19:42 ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-05 20:02 ` Kees Cook
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