From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Cyrus-Session-Id: sloti22d1t05-2473614-1527616982-2-6390358731940272760 X-Sieve: CMU Sieve 3.0 X-Spam-known-sender: no ("Email failed DMARC policy for domain") X-Spam-charsets: X-IgnoreVacation: yes ("Email failed DMARC policy for domain") X-Resolved-to: linux@kroah.com X-Delivered-to: linux@kroah.com X-Mail-from: linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; d=messagingengine.com; s=fm2; t= 1527616982; b=bJ/JPT/EAqWWQYAF1wuUOB3+lGKAzKLmgadLF6ETl90zBn0/pi DiLkKk1qTEnm60bFEfvdDeZwP38H+6lNG1jEFWUWLlVQ3UOMov0qp7egiQMrNzDU qL8C+IjJ4FSjeqvLGz9EJUkWCHFNGNwknp6yzClFFf5fs/6j+Cz6ZlS7cZVVu5yT BmGQWgJ2+HKAb9dp02UYn68wpscu1DwhBank0UjqQiYVr8tp/nV71bCYudTzHfeH qG1vO2GMm9dHT27x1sgweBVyEp8nBQWGPDPKSLINqMl41V/A4DVg09YDvig85oMf oyHgPBmY7OeWmXi+tzniHMXiuo752GI5s5GA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d= messagingengine.com; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:in-reply-to :references:message-id:sender:list-id; s=fm2; t=1527616982; bh=f EfwzyU6nPh8x7I2Nnn4h0UGuIAH3vG4vdXv96s9ujw=; b=QcmvShOf7QqU3rcbV bTKpfkEH00GlMEPCseSZcgOfzGkakn8Kbwu3Tz6dlwKYhMwb/nbr6K1KOHLXY+pc fGXcDxgl9eu7IdmuzTIYnIorV0yuXY9Ss322ZNUoO2GgKTMwC95dpvMD/opnuLYs FufReMA8CJZc1K4bBnGEyy2bvN7vr6a9SGJCTzBi/PDkQ4WOLJg2kUL+5zsCzGnh R+seTHMD2W9oKE7MyhPXk9f7/UcH/ux1pXFdEeWmPNYuWUGZtYf0dPneepfwkfeG oBScP0ZFpgnzpBSjxw6yCICnumAaiEvpH84GumgaZedUkrQ63q5lLReVWVOhJtg5 Vsgjw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx4.messagingengine.com; arc=none (no signatures found); dkim=none (no signatures found); dmarc=fail (p=none,has-list-id=yes,d=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com; iprev=pass policy.iprev=209.132.180.67 (vger.kernel.org); spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org smtp.helo=vger.kernel.org; x-aligned-from=fail; x-cm=none score=0; x-ptr=pass smtp.helo=vger.kernel.org policy.ptr=vger.kernel.org; x-return-mx=pass smtp.domain=vger.kernel.org smtp.result=pass smtp_org.domain=kernel.org smtp_org.result=pass smtp_is_org_domain=no header.domain=linux.vnet.ibm.com header.result=pass header_org.domain=ibm.com header_org.result=pass header_is_org_domain=no; x-vs=clean score=-100 state=0 Authentication-Results: mx4.messagingengine.com; arc=none (no signatures found); dkim=none (no signatures found); dmarc=fail (p=none,has-list-id=yes,d=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com; iprev=pass policy.iprev=209.132.180.67 (vger.kernel.org); spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org smtp.helo=vger.kernel.org; x-aligned-from=fail; x-cm=none score=0; x-ptr=pass smtp.helo=vger.kernel.org policy.ptr=vger.kernel.org; x-return-mx=pass smtp.domain=vger.kernel.org smtp.result=pass smtp_org.domain=kernel.org smtp_org.result=pass smtp_is_org_domain=no header.domain=linux.vnet.ibm.com header.result=pass header_org.domain=ibm.com header_org.result=pass header_is_org_domain=no; x-vs=clean score=-100 state=0 X-ME-VSCategory: clean X-CM-Envelope: MS4wfD9Y/5wDGzaztvf0WGAPJxdmQjiANsMMmXuftX0kNetdvFo2JgRSk78OFr7sMOHAFJONB+vp3h/pFZVEHNQejMgXYPAEsqTQVWueBGLlq2FsxVz39/gr Mc59UjmLYXfJmwxDI7jMyy5NnfiXmUTcRhIyAGpl7kJE9PdTcSW0szUd1UPLJ9aGkdo2loYbObowJWKtE4daUSdYlGoY9UjmyEjmZmtJm+10rk/DMBgfBMNw 9vAIHHkAiM4v05Wx0eqPFg== X-CM-Analysis: v=2.3 cv=JLoVTfCb c=1 sm=1 tr=0 a=UK1r566ZdBxH71SXbqIOeA==:117 a=UK1r566ZdBxH71SXbqIOeA==:17 a=VUJBJC2UJ8kA:10 a=VnNF1IyMAAAA:8 a=1XWaLZrsAAAA:8 a=xVhDTqbCAAAA:8 a=vpqfxihKAAAA:8 a=VwQbUJbxAAAA:8 a=wXcipsOM8ntSdkT-vb8A:9 a=x8gzFH9gYPwA:10 a=GrmWmAYt4dzCMttCBZOh:22 a=AULIiLoY-XQsE5F6gcqX:22 a=AjGcO6oz07-iQ99wixmX:22 X-ME-CMScore: 0 X-ME-CMCategory: none Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S965540AbeE2SC6 (ORCPT ); Tue, 29 May 2018 14:02:58 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:34934 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S965857AbeE2SCh (ORCPT ); Tue, 29 May 2018 14:02:37 -0400 From: Mimi Zohar To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells , "Luis R . Rodriguez" , Eric Biederman , kexec@lists.infradead.org, Andres Rodriguez , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeff Vander Stoep , Paul Moore , Casey Schaufler Subject: [PATCH v4 8/8] module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module Date: Tue, 29 May 2018 14:02:00 -0400 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.5 In-Reply-To: <1527616920-5415-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1527616920-5415-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18052918-0008-0000-0000-000004FC48D4 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18052918-0009-0000-0000-00001E906786 Message-Id: <1527616920-5415-9-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-05-29_07:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=5 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1805290195 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Both the init_module and finit_module syscalls call either directly or indirectly the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook. This patch replaces the direct call in init_module with a call to the new security_kernel_load_data hook and makes the corresponding changes in SELinux and IMA. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep Cc: Paul Moore Cc: Casey Schaufler --- kernel/module.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 24 ++++++++++-------------- security/selinux/hooks.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index ce8066b88178..b97c642b5b4d 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -2879,7 +2879,7 @@ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len, if (info->len < sizeof(*(info->hdr))) return -ENOEXEC; - err = security_kernel_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE); + err = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_MODULE); if (err) return err; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 3dae605a1604..0ff1d8152f6e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -441,17 +441,6 @@ static int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { */ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { - bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); - - if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) { - if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && - (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { - pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); - return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ - } - return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */ - } - if (read_id == READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER) { if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { @@ -490,9 +479,6 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, return 0; } - if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */ - return 0; - /* permit signed certs */ if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE) return 0; @@ -521,6 +507,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, */ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) { + bool sig_enforce; + if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) != IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) return 0; @@ -536,6 +524,14 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n"); return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ } + break; + case LOADING_MODULE: + sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); + + if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES)) { + pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); + return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ + } default: break; } diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 02ebd1585eaf..e02186470fc5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4018,12 +4018,6 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; - /* init_module */ - if (file == NULL) - return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, - SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL); - /* finit_module */ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; @@ -4043,6 +4037,25 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad); } +static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) +{ + u32 sid; + int rc = 0; + + switch (id) { + case LOADING_MODULE: + sid = current_sid(); + + /* init_module */ + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, + SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL); + default: + break; + } + + return rc; +} + static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) { @@ -6950,6 +6963,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid), -- 2.7.5