From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6B7ADC072B5 for ; Fri, 24 May 2019 14:46:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 40A86204EC for ; Fri, 24 May 2019 14:46:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2404158AbfEXOqq (ORCPT ); Fri, 24 May 2019 10:46:46 -0400 Received: from inva021.nxp.com ([92.121.34.21]:48568 "EHLO inva021.nxp.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2403997AbfEXOqq (ORCPT ); Fri, 24 May 2019 10:46:46 -0400 Received: from inva021.nxp.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by inva021.eu-rdc02.nxp.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0424D200464; Fri, 24 May 2019 16:46:44 +0200 (CEST) Received: from inva024.eu-rdc02.nxp.com (inva024.eu-rdc02.nxp.com [134.27.226.22]) by inva021.eu-rdc02.nxp.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EA5D220009E; Fri, 24 May 2019 16:46:43 +0200 (CEST) Received: from lorenz.ea.freescale.net (lorenz.ea.freescale.net [10.171.71.5]) by inva024.eu-rdc02.nxp.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9F5C0205EF; Fri, 24 May 2019 16:46:43 +0200 (CEST) From: Iuliana Prodan To: Herbert Xu , Horia Geanta , Aymen Sghaier Cc: "David S. Miller" , linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-imx Subject: [PATCH v3 1/2] crypto: caam - fix pkcs1pad(rsa-caam, sha256) failure because of invalid input Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 17:46:28 +0300 Message-Id: <1558709189-7237-1-git-send-email-iuliana.prodan@nxp.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.1.0 X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org The problem is with the input data size sent to CAAM for encrypt/decrypt. Pkcs1pad is failing due to pkcs1 padding done in SW starting with0x01 instead of 0x00 0x01. CAAM expects an input of modulus size. For this we strip the leading zeros in case the size is more than modulus or pad the input with zeros until the modulus size is reached. Signed-off-by: Iuliana Prodan --- Changes since V2: - resolved conflicts; - free zero_buffer in case crypto_register_akcipher fails. --- drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h | 2 + 2 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c index 34e37f9..3878fcb 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c @@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ sizeof(struct rsa_priv_f2_pdb)) #define DESC_RSA_PRIV_F3_LEN (2 * CAAM_CMD_SZ + \ sizeof(struct rsa_priv_f3_pdb)) +#define CAAM_RSA_MAX_INPUT_SIZE 512 /* for a 4096-bit modulus */ + +/* buffer filled with zeros, used for padding */ +static u8 *zero_buffer; static void rsa_io_unmap(struct device *dev, struct rsa_edesc *edesc, struct akcipher_request *req) @@ -168,6 +172,13 @@ static void rsa_priv_f3_done(struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 err, akcipher_request_complete(req, err); } +/** + * Count leading zeros, need it to strip, from a given scatterlist + * + * @sgl : scatterlist to count zeros from + * @nbytes: number of zeros, in bytes, to strip + * @flags : operation flags + */ static int caam_rsa_count_leading_zeros(struct scatterlist *sgl, unsigned int nbytes, unsigned int flags) @@ -187,7 +198,8 @@ static int caam_rsa_count_leading_zeros(struct scatterlist *sgl, lzeros = 0; len = 0; while (nbytes > 0) { - while (len && !*buff) { + /* do not strip more than given bytes */ + while (len && !*buff && lzeros < nbytes) { lzeros++; len--; buff++; @@ -218,6 +230,7 @@ static struct rsa_edesc *rsa_edesc_alloc(struct akcipher_request *req, struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm); struct device *dev = ctx->dev; struct caam_rsa_req_ctx *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req); + struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key; struct rsa_edesc *edesc; gfp_t flags = (req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) ? GFP_KERNEL : GFP_ATOMIC; @@ -225,21 +238,37 @@ static struct rsa_edesc *rsa_edesc_alloc(struct akcipher_request *req, int sgc; int sec4_sg_index, sec4_sg_len = 0, sec4_sg_bytes; int src_nents, dst_nents; + unsigned int diff_size = 0; int lzeros; - lzeros = caam_rsa_count_leading_zeros(req->src, req->src_len, sg_flags); - if (lzeros < 0) - return ERR_PTR(lzeros); - - req->src_len -= lzeros; - req->src = scatterwalk_ffwd(req_ctx->src, req->src, lzeros); + if (req->src_len > key->n_sz) { + /* + * strip leading zeros and + * return the number of zeros to skip + */ + lzeros = caam_rsa_count_leading_zeros(req->src, req->src_len - + key->n_sz, sg_flags); + if (lzeros < 0) + return ERR_PTR(lzeros); + + req->src_len -= lzeros; + req->src = scatterwalk_ffwd(req_ctx->src, req->src, lzeros); + } else { + /* + * input src is less then n key modulus, + * so there will be zero padding + */ + diff_size = key->n_sz - req->src_len; + } src_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->src, req->src_len); dst_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, req->dst_len); - if (src_nents > 1) - sec4_sg_len = src_nents; - + if (!diff_size && src_nents == 1) + sec4_sg_len = 0; /* no need for an input hw s/g table */ + else + sec4_sg_len = src_nents + !!diff_size; + sec4_sg_index = sec4_sg_len; if (dst_nents > 1) sec4_sg_len += pad_sg_nents(dst_nents); else @@ -266,12 +295,14 @@ static struct rsa_edesc *rsa_edesc_alloc(struct akcipher_request *req, } edesc->sec4_sg = (void *)edesc + sizeof(*edesc) + desclen; + if (diff_size) + dma_to_sec4_sg_one(edesc->sec4_sg, ctx->padding_dma, diff_size, + 0); + + if (sec4_sg_index) + sg_to_sec4_sg_last(req->src, src_nents, edesc->sec4_sg + + !!diff_size, 0); - sec4_sg_index = 0; - if (src_nents > 1) { - sg_to_sec4_sg_last(req->src, src_nents, edesc->sec4_sg, 0); - sec4_sg_index += src_nents; - } if (dst_nents > 1) sg_to_sec4_sg_last(req->dst, dst_nents, edesc->sec4_sg + sec4_sg_index, 0); @@ -292,6 +323,10 @@ static struct rsa_edesc *rsa_edesc_alloc(struct akcipher_request *req, edesc->sec4_sg_bytes = sec4_sg_bytes; + print_hex_dump_debug("caampkc sec4_sg@" __stringify(__LINE__) ": ", + DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, edesc->sec4_sg, + edesc->sec4_sg_bytes, 1); + return edesc; sec4_sg_fail: @@ -981,6 +1016,15 @@ static int caam_rsa_init_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm) return PTR_ERR(ctx->dev); } + ctx->padding_dma = dma_map_single(ctx->dev, zero_buffer, + CAAM_RSA_MAX_INPUT_SIZE - 1, + DMA_TO_DEVICE); + if (dma_mapping_error(ctx->dev, ctx->padding_dma)) { + dev_err(ctx->dev, "unable to map padding\n"); + caam_jr_free(ctx->dev); + return -ENOMEM; + } + return 0; } @@ -990,6 +1034,8 @@ static void caam_rsa_exit_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm) struct caam_rsa_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm); struct caam_rsa_key *key = &ctx->key; + dma_unmap_single(ctx->dev, ctx->padding_dma, CAAM_RSA_MAX_INPUT_SIZE - + 1, DMA_TO_DEVICE); caam_rsa_free_key(key); caam_jr_free(ctx->dev); } @@ -1030,17 +1076,26 @@ int caam_pkc_init(struct device *ctrldev) if (!pk_inst) return 0; + /* allocate zero buffer, used for padding input */ + zero_buffer = kzalloc(CAAM_RSA_MAX_INPUT_SIZE - 1, GFP_DMA | + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!zero_buffer) + err = -ENOMEM; + err = crypto_register_akcipher(&caam_rsa); - if (err) + if (err) { + kfree(zero_buffer); dev_warn(ctrldev, "%s alg registration failed\n", caam_rsa.base.cra_driver_name); - else + } else { dev_info(ctrldev, "caam pkc algorithms registered in /proc/crypto\n"); + } return err; } void caam_pkc_exit(void) { + kfree(zero_buffer); crypto_unregister_akcipher(&caam_rsa); } diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h index 82645bc..5ac7201 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h @@ -89,10 +89,12 @@ struct caam_rsa_key { * caam_rsa_ctx - per session context. * @key : RSA key in DMA zone * @dev : device structure + * @padding_dma : dma address of padding, for adding it to the input */ struct caam_rsa_ctx { struct caam_rsa_key key; struct device *dev; + dma_addr_t padding_dma; }; /** -- 2.1.0