From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-11.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5A347C2BA1A for ; Wed, 8 Apr 2020 12:21:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 366A820BED for ; Wed, 8 Apr 2020 12:21:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728691AbgDHMVF (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Apr 2020 08:21:05 -0400 Received: from Galois.linutronix.de ([193.142.43.55]:49687 "EHLO Galois.linutronix.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726760AbgDHMVC (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Apr 2020 08:21:02 -0400 Received: from [5.158.153.53] (helo=tip-bot2.lab.linutronix.de) by Galois.linutronix.de with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:256) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1jM9hR-0006Be-Ha; Wed, 08 Apr 2020 14:20:57 +0200 Received: from [127.0.1.1] (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by tip-bot2.lab.linutronix.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 206F71C047B; Wed, 8 Apr 2020 14:20:57 +0200 (CEST) Date: Wed, 08 Apr 2020 12:20:56 -0000 From: "tip-bot2 for Jann Horn" Reply-to: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Subject: [tip: locking/urgent] locking/refcount: Document interaction with PID_MAX_LIMIT Cc: Kees Cook , Will Deacon , Jann Horn , "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" , Ingo Molnar , x86 , LKML In-Reply-To: <20200303105427.260620-1-jannh@google.com> References: <20200303105427.260620-1-jannh@google.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID: <158634845677.28353.8519164850978803726.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> X-Mailer: tip-git-log-daemon Robot-ID: Robot-Unsubscribe: Contact to get blacklisted from these emails Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Linutronix-Spam-Score: -1.0 X-Linutronix-Spam-Level: - X-Linutronix-Spam-Status: No , -1.0 points, 5.0 required, ALL_TRUSTED=-1,SHORTCIRCUIT=-0.0001 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org The following commit has been merged into the locking/urgent branch of tip: Commit-ID: a13f58a0cafa7b0416a2898bc3b0defbb305d108 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/a13f58a0cafa7b0416a2898bc3b0defbb305d108 Author: Jann Horn AuthorDate: Tue, 03 Mar 2020 11:54:27 +01:00 Committer: Ingo Molnar CommitterDate: Wed, 08 Apr 2020 12:05:07 +02:00 locking/refcount: Document interaction with PID_MAX_LIMIT Document the circumstances under which refcount_t's saturation mechanism works deterministically. Acked-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200303105427.260620-1-jannh@google.com --- include/linux/refcount.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/refcount.h b/include/linux/refcount.h index 0ac50cf..0e3ee25 100644 --- a/include/linux/refcount.h +++ b/include/linux/refcount.h @@ -38,11 +38,24 @@ * atomic operations, then the count will continue to edge closer to 0. If it * reaches a value of 1 before /any/ of the threads reset it to the saturated * value, then a concurrent refcount_dec_and_test() may erroneously free the - * underlying object. Given the precise timing details involved with the - * round-robin scheduling of each thread manipulating the refcount and the need - * to hit the race multiple times in succession, there doesn't appear to be a - * practical avenue of attack even if using refcount_add() operations with - * larger increments. + * underlying object. + * Linux limits the maximum number of tasks to PID_MAX_LIMIT, which is currently + * 0x400000 (and can't easily be raised in the future beyond FUTEX_TID_MASK). + * With the current PID limit, if no batched refcounting operations are used and + * the attacker can't repeatedly trigger kernel oopses in the middle of refcount + * operations, this makes it impossible for a saturated refcount to leave the + * saturation range, even if it is possible for multiple uses of the same + * refcount to nest in the context of a single task: + * + * (UINT_MAX+1-REFCOUNT_SATURATED) / PID_MAX_LIMIT = + * 0x40000000 / 0x400000 = 0x100 = 256 + * + * If hundreds of references are added/removed with a single refcounting + * operation, it may potentially be possible to leave the saturation range; but + * given the precise timing details involved with the round-robin scheduling of + * each thread manipulating the refcount and the need to hit the race multiple + * times in succession, there doesn't appear to be a practical avenue of attack + * even if using refcount_add() operations with larger increments. * * Memory ordering * ===============