From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-11.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_INVALID,DKIM_SIGNED, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DF8CBC433DF for ; Tue, 30 Jun 2020 12:12:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BDFEE2073E for ; Tue, 30 Jun 2020 12:12:10 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (2048-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b="VesSUYvp"; dkim=permerror (0-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b="Uj5+au7X" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2387470AbgF3MMJ (ORCPT ); Tue, 30 Jun 2020 08:12:09 -0400 Received: from Galois.linutronix.de ([193.142.43.55]:55114 "EHLO galois.linutronix.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2387461AbgF3MMF (ORCPT ); Tue, 30 Jun 2020 08:12:05 -0400 X-Greylist: delayed 7211 seconds by postgrey-1.27 at vger.kernel.org; Tue, 30 Jun 2020 08:12:03 EDT Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2020 12:12:00 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020; t=1593519121; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=QQofTU652nzi7btAijaCF/NR0FRitK1IWHgv5m5mego=; b=VesSUYvpG+xeiFU+CjPj2iqz+cvPvN7MLRhZriIa9gXmuuqbkufLcFaApkIKns4IwO1MDF Ry+u/qDyQR21WCid7ilj4paRTHUkp8REeNlpKYwy6g/bPwtL6LHKU38qnZxOhQhp1EipCl zSlGh0TUtmn4EAXe1f11aaLNTmy/d9bhL9flO8DRK4MMsjp3lMlrGxgyLKRkNfaZ2u+R6D JhiesgXgF6xLrPVoMMTcskLPpJ+OoH7E+tToVqlfShi7Q5W/eWauw9v7kAg2Uxwj7zd7Ui /c56DvagosBVNb+AVmPeWDgG7BeILPrvavLXC1tlMM9tQiZbDT3vpAL1HdHSKw== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020e; t=1593519121; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=QQofTU652nzi7btAijaCF/NR0FRitK1IWHgv5m5mego=; b=Uj5+au7XvfZKfsjTst8iYX5redM5PeOmIL4CsqeNPXW0UNQCN4BlPHT8bGO8azFpcKx4ni LZ91jf4vEZplUHCg== From: "tip-bot2 for Sean Christopherson" Reply-to: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Subject: [tip: x86/urgent] x86/split_lock: Don't write MSR_TEST_CTRL on CPUs that aren't whitelisted Cc: Sean Christopherson , Thomas Gleixner , stable@vger.kernel.org, x86 , LKML In-Reply-To: <20200605192605.7439-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> References: <20200605192605.7439-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID: <159351912091.4006.8957636138691015363.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> Robot-ID: Robot-Unsubscribe: Contact to get blacklisted from these emails Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip: Commit-ID: 009bce1df0bb5eb970b9eb98d963861f7fe353c7 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/009bce1df0bb5eb970b9eb98d963861f7fe353c7 Author: Sean Christopherson AuthorDate: Fri, 05 Jun 2020 12:26:05 -07:00 Committer: Thomas Gleixner CommitterDate: Tue, 30 Jun 2020 14:09:31 +02:00 x86/split_lock: Don't write MSR_TEST_CTRL on CPUs that aren't whitelisted Choo! Choo! All aboard the Split Lock Express, with direct service to Wreckage! Skip split_lock_verify_msr() if the CPU isn't whitelisted as a possible SLD-enabled CPU model to avoid writing MSR_TEST_CTRL. MSR_TEST_CTRL exists, and is writable, on many generations of CPUs. Writing the MSR, even with '0', can result in bizarre, undocumented behavior. This fixes a crash on Haswell when resuming from suspend with a live KVM guest. Because APs use the standard SMP boot flow for resume, they will go through split_lock_init() and the subsequent RDMSR/WRMSR sequence, which runs even when sld_state==sld_off to ensure SLD is disabled. On Haswell (at least, my Haswell), writing MSR_TEST_CTRL with '0' will succeed and _may_ take the SMT _sibling_ out of VMX root mode. When KVM has an active guest, KVM performs VMXON as part of CPU onlining (see kvm_starting_cpu()). Because SMP boot is serialized, the resulting flow is effectively: on_each_ap_cpu() { WRMSR(MSR_TEST_CTRL, 0) VMXON } As a result, the WRMSR can disable VMX on a different CPU that has already done VMXON. This ultimately results in a #UD on VMPTRLD when KVM regains control and attempt run its vCPUs. The above voodoo was confirmed by reworking KVM's VMXON flow to write MSR_TEST_CTRL prior to VMXON, and to serialize the sequence as above. Further verification of the insanity was done by redoing VMXON on all APs after the initial WRMSR->VMXON sequence. The additional VMXON, which should VM-Fail, occasionally succeeded, and also eliminated the unexpected #UD on VMPTRLD. The damage done by writing MSR_TEST_CTRL doesn't appear to be limited to VMX, e.g. after suspend with an active KVM guest, subsequent reboots almost always hang (even when fudging VMXON), a #UD on a random Jcc was observed, suspend/resume stability is qualitatively poor, and so on and so forth. kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:386! CPU: 1 PID: 2592 Comm: CPU 6/KVM Tainted: G D Hardware name: ASUS Q87M-E/Q87M-E, BIOS 1102 03/03/2014 RIP: 0010:kvm_spurious_fault+0xf/0x20 Call Trace: vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs+0x1fb/0x2b0 vmx_vcpu_load+0x3e/0x160 kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x48/0x260 finish_task_switch+0x140/0x260 __schedule+0x460/0x720 _cond_resched+0x2d/0x40 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x82e/0x1ca0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x363/0x5c0 ksys_ioctl+0x88/0xa0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fixes: dbaba47085b0c ("x86/split_lock: Rework the initialization flow of split lock detection") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200605192605.7439-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c index c25a67a..0ab48f1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -50,6 +50,13 @@ static enum split_lock_detect_state sld_state __ro_after_init = sld_off; static u64 msr_test_ctrl_cache __ro_after_init; /* + * With a name like MSR_TEST_CTL it should go without saying, but don't touch + * MSR_TEST_CTL unless the CPU is one of the whitelisted models. Writing it + * on CPUs that do not support SLD can cause fireworks, even when writing '0'. + */ +static bool cpu_model_supports_sld __ro_after_init; + +/* * Processors which have self-snooping capability can handle conflicting * memory type across CPUs by snooping its own cache. However, there exists * CPU models in which having conflicting memory types still leads to @@ -1071,7 +1078,8 @@ static void sld_update_msr(bool on) static void split_lock_init(void) { - split_lock_verify_msr(sld_state != sld_off); + if (cpu_model_supports_sld) + split_lock_verify_msr(sld_state != sld_off); } static void split_lock_warn(unsigned long ip) @@ -1177,5 +1185,6 @@ void __init cpu_set_core_cap_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) return; } + cpu_model_supports_sld = true; split_lock_setup(); }