From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5934FC433FE for ; Mon, 17 Oct 2022 14:54:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230339AbiJQOyI (ORCPT ); Mon, 17 Oct 2022 10:54:08 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58748 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230352AbiJQOxt (ORCPT ); Mon, 17 Oct 2022 10:53:49 -0400 Received: from galois.linutronix.de (Galois.linutronix.de [193.142.43.55]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7401968898; Mon, 17 Oct 2022 07:53:32 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2022 14:53:28 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020; t=1666018410; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=ZruSc3Kfq+CYiRFjzBS2291CgL3iuGM3Epn6RFXv1ZU=; b=EtevFTpWdhgRrpZTJUIzSBs/J7IuT0U+1Ef5M2FhvOWc1G8KaW8MUnt0h/AVUqrY2l0x9w 6JTlYe06sxuaB6sktk3eDXPEtiLnUV5YU4ppzb+uMgHnQoiLwnIjU+N+FU9ta9RA3ZeF+3 ThVolQD0JRbj023LKFbjQG/4odrbqAe070Av2DQOeg/juTNCMunrmG4GJudijneegaq2Ra Jr/lsPWiWWqd4nkO1JDOjDne1/sOQO1ALcfKNxJXbmJuVnyrGegUdE9DjSGstb/Ofsgx5U ZTXBI0aciu3YZH/KkdSG9Wu0E7G/3MIr8/zjZm5xxl7SXLKvlqpH4a889d66rw== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020e; t=1666018410; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=ZruSc3Kfq+CYiRFjzBS2291CgL3iuGM3Epn6RFXv1ZU=; b=JHaLEc+4nSZCGo3V/6mL1qHoKPEVj7D+oJBeLDzXSZRtTr/z4WIB6ot8ECclRJtVkILQhP nzpr7cRjybzjm+BA== From: "tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner" Sender: tip-bot2@linutronix.de Reply-to: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Subject: [tip: x86/core] x86/retbleed: Add call depth tracking mitigation Cc: Thomas Gleixner , "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" , x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: <20220915111149.029587352@infradead.org> References: <20220915111149.029587352@infradead.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID: <166601840880.401.15353726051870422822.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> Robot-ID: Robot-Unsubscribe: Contact to get blacklisted from these emails Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org The following commit has been merged into the x86/core branch of tip: Commit-ID: d82a0345cf218f5050f5ad913e1ae6c579105731 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/d82a0345cf218f5050f5ad913e1ae6c579105731 Author: Thomas Gleixner AuthorDate: Thu, 15 Sep 2022 13:11:38 +02:00 Committer: Peter Zijlstra CommitterDate: Mon, 17 Oct 2022 16:41:20 +02:00 x86/retbleed: Add call depth tracking mitigation The fully secure mitigation for RSB underflow on Intel SKL CPUs is IBRS, which inflicts up to 30% penalty for pathological syscall heavy work loads. Software based call depth tracking and RSB refill is not perfect, but reduces the attack surface massively. The penalty for the pathological case is about 8% which is still annoying but definitely more palatable than IBRS. Add a retbleed=stuff command line option to enable the call depth tracking and software refill of the RSB. This gives admins a choice. IBeeRS are safe and cause headaches, call depth tracking is considered to be s(t)ufficiently safe. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220915111149.029587352@infradead.org --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index da7c361..e6c23ea 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -787,6 +787,7 @@ enum retbleed_mitigation { RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB, RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS, RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS, + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF, }; enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd { @@ -794,6 +795,7 @@ enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd { RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO, RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET, RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB, + RETBLEED_CMD_STUFF, }; static const char * const retbleed_strings[] = { @@ -802,6 +804,7 @@ static const char * const retbleed_strings[] = { [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB", [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS", [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF] = "Mitigation: Stuffing", }; static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init = @@ -831,6 +834,8 @@ static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str) retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET; } else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb")) { retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB; + } else if (!strcmp(str, "stuff")) { + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_STUFF; } else if (!strcmp(str, "nosmt")) { retbleed_nosmt = true; } else { @@ -879,6 +884,21 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) } break; + case RETBLEED_CMD_STUFF: + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) && + spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE) { + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF; + + } else { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING)) + pr_err("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n"); + else + pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING.\n"); + + goto do_cmd_auto; + } + break; + do_cmd_auto: case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO: default: @@ -916,6 +936,12 @@ do_cmd_auto: mitigate_smt = true; break; + case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF: + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH); + x86_set_skl_return_thunk(); + break; + default: break; } @@ -926,7 +952,7 @@ do_cmd_auto: /* * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the - * retbleed= cmdline option. + * retbleed= cmdline option except for call depth based stuffing */ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { switch (spectre_v2_enabled) { @@ -939,7 +965,8 @@ do_cmd_auto: retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS; break; default: - pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG); + if (retbleed_mitigation != RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF) + pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG); } } @@ -1413,6 +1440,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY) && boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) && retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_OFF && + retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_STUFF && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) { mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;