From: "tip-bot2 for Kees Cook" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/core] x86/Kconfig: Enable kernel IBT by default
Date: Sat, 05 Nov 2022 10:36:24 -0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <166764458451.4906.10224019690835731804.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221101172503.gonna.094-kees@kernel.org>
The following commit has been merged into the x86/core branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 4fd5f70ce14da230c6a29648c3d51a48ee0b4bfd
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/4fd5f70ce14da230c6a29648c3d51a48ee0b4bfd
Author: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
AuthorDate: Tue, 01 Nov 2022 10:25:07 -07:00
Committer: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
CommitterDate: Sat, 05 Nov 2022 11:28:03 +01:00
x86/Kconfig: Enable kernel IBT by default
The kernel IBT defense strongly mitigates the common "first step" of ROP
attacks, by eliminating arbitrary stack pivots (that appear either at
the end of a function or in immediate values), which cannot be reached
if indirect calls must be to marked function entry addresses. IBT is
also required to be enabled to gain the FineIBT feature when built with
Kernel Control Flow Integrity.
Additionally, given that this feature is runtime enabled via CPU ID,
it clearly should be built in by default; it will only be enabled if the
CPU supports it. The build takes 2 seconds longer, which seems a small
price to pay for gaining this coverage by default.
Suggested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221101172503.gonna.094-kees@kernel.org
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 479ee63..aaf1f0f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1856,7 +1856,7 @@ config CC_HAS_IBT
config X86_KERNEL_IBT
prompt "Indirect Branch Tracking"
- bool
+ def_bool y
depends on X86_64 && CC_HAS_IBT && HAVE_OBJTOOL
# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/9d7001eba9c4cb311e03cd8cdc231f9e579f2d0f
depends on !LD_IS_LLD || LLD_VERSION >= 140000
prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-05 10:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-01 17:25 [PATCH v2] " Kees Cook
2022-11-05 10:36 ` tip-bot2 for Kees Cook [this message]
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