From: "tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/boot] x86/efistub: Perform SNP feature test while running in the firmware
Date: Tue, 08 Aug 2023 08:43:58 -0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <169148423806.27769.4186073114311056791.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230807162720.545787-23-ardb@kernel.org>
The following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 31c77a50992e8dd136feed7b67073bb5f1f978cc
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/31c77a50992e8dd136feed7b67073bb5f1f978cc
Author: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
AuthorDate: Mon, 07 Aug 2023 18:27:19 +02:00
Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
CommitterDate: Mon, 07 Aug 2023 21:03:53 +02:00
x86/efistub: Perform SNP feature test while running in the firmware
Before refactoring the EFI stub boot flow to avoid the legacy bare metal
decompressor, duplicate the SNP feature check in the EFI stub before
handing over to the kernel proper.
The SNP feature check can be performed while running under the EFI boot
services, which means it can force the boot to fail gracefully and
return an error to the bootloader if the loaded kernel does not
implement support for all the features that the hypervisor enabled.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230807162720.545787-23-ardb@kernel.org
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 112 +++++++++++++----------
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 4 +-
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 17 +++-
3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
index c3e343b..199155b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
@@ -367,20 +367,25 @@ static void enforce_vmpl0(void)
*/
#define SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT (0)
+u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status)
+{
+ if (!(status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
+ return 0;
+
+ return status & SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ & ~SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT;
+}
+
void snp_check_features(void)
{
u64 unsupported;
- if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
- return;
-
/*
* Terminate the boot if hypervisor has enabled any feature lacking
* guest side implementation. Pass on the unsupported features mask through
* EXIT_INFO_2 of the GHCB protocol so that those features can be reported
* as part of the guest boot failure.
*/
- unsupported = sev_status & SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ & ~SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT;
+ unsupported = snp_get_unsupported_features(sev_status);
if (unsupported) {
if (ghcb_version < 2 || (!boot_ghcb && !early_setup_ghcb()))
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
@@ -390,35 +395,22 @@ void snp_check_features(void)
}
}
-void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
+/*
+ * sev_check_cpu_support - Check for SEV support in the CPU capabilities
+ *
+ * Returns < 0 if SEV is not supported, otherwise the position of the
+ * encryption bit in the page table descriptors.
+ */
+static int sev_check_cpu_support(void)
{
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
- struct msr m;
- bool snp;
-
- /*
- * bp->cc_blob_address should only be set by boot/compressed kernel.
- * Initialize it to 0 to ensure that uninitialized values from
- * buggy bootloaders aren't propagated.
- */
- if (bp)
- bp->cc_blob_address = 0;
-
- /*
- * Do an initial SEV capability check before snp_init() which
- * loads the CPUID page and the same checks afterwards are done
- * without the hypervisor and are trustworthy.
- *
- * If the HV fakes SEV support, the guest will crash'n'burn
- * which is good enough.
- */
/* Check for the SME/SEV support leaf */
eax = 0x80000000;
ecx = 0;
native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
if (eax < 0x8000001f)
- return;
+ return -ENODEV;
/*
* Check for the SME/SEV feature:
@@ -433,6 +425,35 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
/* Check whether SEV is supported */
if (!(eax & BIT(1)))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ return ebx & 0x3f;
+}
+
+void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
+{
+ struct msr m;
+ int bitpos;
+ bool snp;
+
+ /*
+ * bp->cc_blob_address should only be set by boot/compressed kernel.
+ * Initialize it to 0 to ensure that uninitialized values from
+ * buggy bootloaders aren't propagated.
+ */
+ if (bp)
+ bp->cc_blob_address = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Do an initial SEV capability check before snp_init() which
+ * loads the CPUID page and the same checks afterwards are done
+ * without the hypervisor and are trustworthy.
+ *
+ * If the HV fakes SEV support, the guest will crash'n'burn
+ * which is good enough.
+ */
+
+ if (sev_check_cpu_support() < 0)
return;
/*
@@ -443,26 +464,8 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
/* Now repeat the checks with the SNP CPUID table. */
- /* Recheck the SME/SEV support leaf */
- eax = 0x80000000;
- ecx = 0;
- native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
- if (eax < 0x8000001f)
- return;
-
- /*
- * Recheck for the SME/SEV feature:
- * CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX]
- * - Bit 0 - Secure Memory Encryption support
- * - Bit 1 - Secure Encrypted Virtualization support
- * CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX]
- * - Bits 5:0 - Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
- */
- eax = 0x8000001f;
- ecx = 0;
- native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
- /* Check whether SEV is supported */
- if (!(eax & BIT(1))) {
+ bitpos = sev_check_cpu_support();
+ if (bitpos < 0) {
if (snp)
error("SEV-SNP support indicated by CC blob, but not CPUID.");
return;
@@ -494,7 +497,24 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
if (snp && !(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
error("SEV-SNP supported indicated by CC blob, but not SEV status MSR.");
- sme_me_mask = BIT_ULL(ebx & 0x3f);
+ sme_me_mask = BIT_ULL(bitpos);
+}
+
+/*
+ * sev_get_status - Retrieve the SEV status mask
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the CPU is not SEV capable, otherwise the value of the
+ * AMD64_SEV MSR.
+ */
+u64 sev_get_status(void)
+{
+ struct msr m;
+
+ if (sev_check_cpu_support() < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ boot_rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV, &m);
+ return m.q;
}
/* Search for Confidential Computing blob in the EFI config table. */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 66c8067..b97d239 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -210,6 +210,8 @@ bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp);
void __init __noreturn snp_abort(void);
int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio);
void snp_accept_memory(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end);
+u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status);
+u64 sev_get_status(void);
#else
static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
@@ -235,6 +237,8 @@ static inline int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *in
}
static inline void snp_accept_memory(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end) { }
+static inline u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status) { return 0; }
+static inline u64 sev_get_status(void) { return 0; }
#endif
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
index acb1c65..b4685da 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
#include <asm/boot.h>
+#include <asm/sev.h>
#include "efistub.h"
#include "x86-stub.h"
@@ -790,6 +791,19 @@ static efi_status_t exit_boot(struct boot_params *boot_params, void *handle)
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
+static bool have_unsupported_snp_features(void)
+{
+ u64 unsupported;
+
+ unsupported = snp_get_unsupported_features(sev_get_status());
+ if (unsupported) {
+ efi_err("Unsupported SEV-SNP features detected: 0x%llx\n",
+ unsupported);
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
static void __noreturn enter_kernel(unsigned long kernel_addr,
struct boot_params *boot_params)
{
@@ -820,6 +834,9 @@ void __noreturn efi_stub_entry(efi_handle_t handle,
if (efi_system_table->hdr.signature != EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE_SIGNATURE)
efi_exit(handle, EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ if (have_unsupported_snp_features())
+ efi_exit(handle, EFI_UNSUPPORTED);
+
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_DXE_MEM_ATTRIBUTES)) {
efi_dxe_table = get_efi_config_table(EFI_DXE_SERVICES_TABLE_GUID);
if (efi_dxe_table &&
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-08-08 16:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-08-07 16:26 [PATCH v9 00/23] efi/x86: Avoid bare metal decompressor during EFI boot Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:26 ` [PATCH v9 01/23] x86/decompressor: Don't rely on upper 32 bits of GPRs being preserved Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:44 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:26 ` [PATCH v9 02/23] x86/head_64: Store boot_params pointer in callee save register Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:44 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 03/23] x86/efistub: Branch straight to kernel entry point from C code Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:44 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 04/23] x86/efistub: Simplify and clean up handover entry code Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:44 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 05/23] x86/decompressor: Avoid magic offsets for EFI handover entrypoint Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:44 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 06/23] x86/efistub: Clear BSS in EFI handover protocol entrypoint Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:44 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 07/23] x86/decompressor: Store boot_params pointer in callee save register Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:44 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 08/23] x86/decompressor: Assign paging related global variables earlier Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:44 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 09/23] x86/decompressor: Call trampoline as a normal function Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:44 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 10/23] x86/decompressor: Use standard calling convention for trampoline Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:44 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 11/23] x86/decompressor: Avoid the need for a stack in the 32-bit trampoline Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:44 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 12/23] x86/decompressor: Call trampoline directly from C code Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:44 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 13/23] x86/decompressor: Only call the trampoline when changing paging levels Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:44 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 14/23] x86/decompressor: Pass pgtable address to trampoline directly Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:44 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 15/23] x86/decompressor: Merge trampoline cleanup with switching code Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:44 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 16/23] x86/efistub: Perform 4/5 level paging switch from the stub Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:44 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 17/23] x86/efistub: Prefer EFI memory attributes protocol over DXE services Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:44 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 18/23] decompress: Use 8 byte alignment Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:44 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 19/23] x86/decompressor: Move global symbol references to C code Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:43 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 20/23] x86/decompressor: Factor out kernel decompression and relocation Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:43 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 21/23] efi/libstub: Add limit argument to efi_random_alloc() Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:43 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 22/23] x86/efistub: Perform SNP feature test while running in the firmware Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:43 ` tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2023-08-07 16:27 ` [PATCH v9 23/23] x86/efistub: Avoid legacy decompressor when doing EFI boot Ard Biesheuvel
2023-08-08 8:43 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=169148423806.27769.4186073114311056791.tip-bot2@tip-bot2 \
--to=tip-bot2@linutronix.de \
--cc=ardb@kernel.org \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®