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From: "tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>,
	"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for Spectre v1
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2024 14:15:13 -0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <172234891314.2215.1983688628596540699.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240729164105.554296-7-leitao@debian.org>

The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     ca01c0d8d03089f81c713aec0c63d359bc0f6796
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/ca01c0d8d03089f81c713aec0c63d359bc0f6796
Author:        Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
AuthorDate:    Mon, 29 Jul 2024 09:40:54 -07:00
Committer:     Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
CommitterDate: Tue, 30 Jul 2024 14:49:28 +02:00

x86/bugs: Add a separate config for Spectre v1

Currently, the CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is halfway populated,
where some mitigations have entries in Kconfig, and they could be
modified, while others mitigations do not have Kconfig entries, and
could not be controlled at build time.

Create an entry for the Spectre v1 CPU mitigation under
CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS. This allow users to enable or disable
it at compilation time.

Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240729164105.554296-7-leitao@debian.org
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig           | 10 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |  3 ++-
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index c9a9f92..e3c63e5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2705,6 +2705,16 @@ config MITIGATION_RETBLEED
 	  unprivileged attacker can use these flaws to bypass conventional
 	  memory security restrictions to gain read access to privileged memory
 	  that would otherwise be inaccessible.
+
+config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V1
+	bool "Mitigate SPECTRE V1 hardware bug"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for Spectre V1 (Bounds Check Bypass). Spectre V1 is a
+	  class of side channel attacks that takes advantage of speculative
+	  execution that bypasses conditional branch instructions used for
+	  memory access bounds check.
+	  See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst>
 endif
 
 config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 08edca8..ebb6a2f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -874,7 +874,8 @@ enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
 };
 
 static enum spectre_v1_mitigation spectre_v1_mitigation __ro_after_init =
-	SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO;
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V1) ?
+		SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO : SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
 
 static const char * const spectre_v1_strings[] = {
 	[SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers",

  reply	other threads:[~2024-07-30 14:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-07-29 16:40 [PATCH v4 00/11] x86/bugs: Separate config for mitigations Breno Leitao
2024-07-29 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 01/11] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for MDS Breno Leitao
2024-07-30 14:15   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao
2024-07-29 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 02/11] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for TAA Breno Leitao
2024-07-30 14:15   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao
2024-07-29 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 03/11] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for MMIO Stable Data Breno Leitao
2024-07-30 14:15   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao
2024-07-29 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 04/11] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for L1TF Breno Leitao
2024-07-30 14:15   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao
2024-07-29 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 05/11] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for RETBLEED Breno Leitao
2024-07-30 14:15   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao
2024-07-29 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 06/11] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for Spectre v1 Breno Leitao
2024-07-30 14:15   ` tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao [this message]
2024-07-29 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 07/11] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for SRBDS Breno Leitao
2024-07-30 14:15   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao
2024-07-29 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 08/11] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for Spectre V2 Breno Leitao
2024-07-30 14:15   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao
2024-07-29 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 09/11] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for SSB Breno Leitao
2024-07-30 14:15   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao
2024-07-29 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 10/11] x86/bugs: Remove GDS Force Kconfig option Breno Leitao
2024-07-29 17:09   ` Daniel Sneddon
2024-07-30 14:15   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao
2024-07-29 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 11/11] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for GDS Breno Leitao
2024-07-30 14:15   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Breno Leitao

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