From: "tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/urgent] x86/sev: Improve handling of writes to intercepted TSC MSRs
Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2025 10:58:33 -0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <175499631833.1420.8242908162869935320.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250722074853.22253-1-nikunj@amd.com>
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 5eb1bcdb6a8c088514019c3a9bda5d565beed1af
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/5eb1bcdb6a8c088514019c3a9bda5d565beed1af
Author: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
AuthorDate: Tue, 22 Jul 2025 13:18:53 +05:30
Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
CommitterDate: Tue, 12 Aug 2025 12:33:58 +02:00
x86/sev: Improve handling of writes to intercepted TSC MSRs
Currently, when a Secure TSC enabled SNP guest attempts to write to the
intercepted GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR (a read-only MSR), the guest kernel response
incorrectly implies a VMM configuration error, when in fact it is the usual
VMM configuration to intercept writes to read-only MSRs, unless explicitly
documented.
Modify the intercepted TSC MSR #VC handling:
* Write to GUEST_TSC_FREQ will generate a #GP instead of terminating the
guest
* Write to MSR_IA32_TSC will generate a #GP instead of silently ignoring it
However, continue to terminate the guest when reading from intercepted
GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR with Secure TSC enabled, as intercepted reads indicate an
improper VMM configuration for Secure TSC enabled SNP guests.
[ bp: simplify comment. ]
Fixes: 38cc6495cdec ("x86/sev: Prevent GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR interception for Secure TSC enabled guests")
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250722074853.22253-1-nikunj@amd.com
---
arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
index faf1fce..c3b4acb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
@@ -371,29 +371,30 @@ static enum es_result __vc_handle_msr_caa(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write)
* executing with Secure TSC enabled, so special handling is required for
* accesses of MSR_IA32_TSC and MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ.
*/
-static enum es_result __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write)
+static enum es_result __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, bool write)
{
+ struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
u64 tsc;
/*
- * GUEST_TSC_FREQ should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is enabled.
- * Terminate the SNP guest when the interception is enabled.
+ * Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads of the TSC to
+ * return undefined values, and GUEST_TSC_FREQ is read-only. Generate
+ * a #GP on all writes.
*/
- if (regs->cx == MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ)
- return ES_VMM_ERROR;
+ if (write) {
+ ctxt->fi.vector = X86_TRAP_GP;
+ ctxt->fi.error_code = 0;
+ return ES_EXCEPTION;
+ }
/*
- * Writes: Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads of the TSC
- * to return undefined values, so ignore all writes.
- *
- * Reads: Reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the current TSC value, use
- * the value returned by rdtsc_ordered().
+ * GUEST_TSC_FREQ read should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is
+ * enabled. Terminate the guest if a read is attempted.
*/
- if (write) {
- WARN_ONCE(1, "TSC MSR writes are verboten!\n");
- return ES_OK;
- }
+ if (regs->cx == MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ)
+ return ES_VMM_ERROR;
+ /* Reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the current TSC value. */
tsc = rdtsc_ordered();
regs->ax = lower_32_bits(tsc);
regs->dx = upper_32_bits(tsc);
@@ -416,7 +417,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
case MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ:
if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC)
- return __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs(regs, write);
+ return __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs(ctxt, write);
break;
default:
break;
prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-12 10:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-22 7:48 [PATCH v3] " Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-07-22 18:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-08-12 10:58 ` tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
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