From: "tip-bot2 for Kai Huang" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Farrah Chen <farrah.chen@intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/tdx] x86/virt/tdx: Remove the !KEXEC_CORE dependency
Date: Fri, 05 Sep 2025 19:33:07 -0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <175710078713.1920.3219480283836156265.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
The following commit has been merged into the x86/tdx branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 80804847269eba880dc8c1bc64d70082692f72cd
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/80804847269eba880dc8c1bc64d70082692f72cd
Author: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 01 Sep 2025 18:09:28 +02:00
Committer: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
CommitterDate: Fri, 05 Sep 2025 10:40:40 -07:00
x86/virt/tdx: Remove the !KEXEC_CORE dependency
During kexec it is now guaranteed that all dirty cachelines of TDX
private memory are flushed before jumping to the new kernel. The TDX
private memory from the old kernel will remain as TDX private memory in
the new kernel, but it is OK because kernel read/write to TDX private
memory will never cause machine check, except on the platforms with the
TDX partial write erratum, which has already been handled.
It is safe to allow kexec to work together with TDX now. Remove the
!KEXEC_CORE dependency.
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Tested-by: Farrah Chen <farrah.chen@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250901160930.1785244-6-pbonzini%40redhat.com
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 58d890f..e2cbfb0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1896,7 +1896,6 @@ config INTEL_TDX_HOST
depends on X86_X2APIC
select ARCH_KEEP_MEMBLOCK
depends on CONTIG_ALLOC
- depends on !KEXEC_CORE
depends on X86_MCE
help
Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protects guest VMs from malicious
reply other threads:[~2025-09-05 19:33 UTC|newest]
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