From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2C1E54B0496; Tue, 8 Sep 2026 22:51:16 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788907879; cv=none; b=CqlHP8fplq6ypkgUa4JR2Rp0iSLWuFatZ1GUpOciVll41rlH6Gsob3RSCCbQdVm5djwbc+G5/2hm/HgJXHnknhmcmLzG4S2GlvHAUBveujNwADwMKRCqLoVWHDlOpKONEbOodk5MOV+282hywaQEsiBnJwes4mQy2jLdwzpozzg= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788907879; c=relaxed/simple; bh=Wbt5cdPNmJX+4p/H3NeyMfK8R40kdM/p8CglW2/sBrs=; h=Subject:From:To:Cc:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: Content-Type:MIME-Version; b=Zc6ssz0RI7drY4cM8E+nshOTX/AORYvZeJ0ALXLroXV4NaYtj87lHIlqpTqnlS3MGXEPwWYe7rolZIxX7zzUEk/Z1gQGWAMiYmGOCBgzBk+R330CKNV9B2ogdB1n9aWdGEpJbbrDI4yZrxihumE6qG0pUzMVrZj+7iv3rHspbJM= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=Zc4g44NA; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Zc4g44NA" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id BD4581F00A3A; Tue, 8 Sep 2026 22:51:15 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1788907876; bh=kvRDMXf4tRtU6mRV46EJyC5lFRk+kTLf2aXiOLtLqJc=; h=Subject:From:To:Cc:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=Zc4g44NADBp1HQzWgAlc9Zob3QTYisqPoJoaUGBcz/6eamwFYxzGPSBm3IFIGh0ON ENYVK3kSCgZK2tu4X1VDDlSInbLCsXQ7ssTxy8tI2tMSXcjL7C1uwKb3TScOF8HN5G 3RgW8rrpwkPeEgA/pW3nwEPKBul6I8GiPN6ocMM+XRhnhkPEGYvKbCOlZvTVEIUCq1 rZNXJIPlCOXl83LwhQuJp5ifuMuUH7Mock3Bk/eayO9/TtoCxDX+MrPU5lLOXu+lER 5tj/uWWt3ehthFHW+MUeDkOxb8JT47FiQ+KlMFAY1M4zy6L0RL0dVmt1vGl/vyDopY n8uZCE8wJ/VbQ== Subject: Re: [PATCH net v3] octeontx2-af: Fix rep link state sync and workqueue races From: netdev-bot+sashiko@kernel.org To: nshettyj@marvell.com Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, gakula@marvell.com, sgoutham@marvell.com, rkannoth@marvell.com, sbhatta@marvell.com, andrew+netdev@lunn.ch, davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com, kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com, bbhushan2@marvell.com, horms@kernel.org, hkalra@marvell.com Date: Tue, 08 Sep 2026 22:51:15 +0000 Message-ID: <178890787528.219967.1188602497819520152@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <20260903074840.2373506-1-nshettyj@marvell.com> References: <20260903074840.2373506-1-nshettyj@marvell.com> X-sashiko-severity: High Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 10 potential issue(s) to consider: Critical: 0 · High: 2 (1) · Medium: 7 (1) · Low: 1 - [High] The new authorization gates added by this patch (`req->hdr.pcifunc != rvu->rep_pcifunc -> -EPERM` in… - [High] rvu_mbox_handler_get_rep_cnt() now truncates rvu->rep_cnt / rep2pfvf_map to RVU_MAX_REP (64) entries, but every consumer in the AF… - [Medium] rvu_rep_open() and rvu_rep_stop() in nic/rep.c now return early for every VF representor (`if (rep->pcifunc &… - [Medium] The new teardown barrier in rvu_remove() only flushes rvu->afpf_wq_info.mbox_wq before destroy_workqueue(rep_wq), and its… - [Medium] The representor PF's own TL2->LBK link enable performed by rvu_rep_pf_init() (rvu_rep.c:445-451, rvu_switch_enable_lbk_link(rvu,… - [Medium] rvu_remove() decides whether to destroy rvu->rep_evt_wq, and clears the pointer, without holding rvu->rsrc_lock, whereas… - [Medium] The patch introduces a lockless publish/consume protocol for rvu->rep_evt_wq (rvu_remove() uses WRITE_ONCE(),… - [Medium] rvu_rep_install_mcam_rules() tests test_bit(NIXLF_INITIALIZED, &pfvf->flags) outside any lock and then calls… - [Medium] Draining the representor event workqueue after unregistering interrupts causes mailbox communication timeouts. - [Low] In the first-time GET_REP_CNT path, `rvu->rep_pcifunc = req->hdr.pcifunc;` (rvu_rep.c:504) executes before both -ENOMEM exits… Pre-existing issues: - [High] When rvu_rep_install_mcam_rules() fails (the new err_disable_lbk path still returns err), rvu_switch_enable()'s uninstall_rules label… - [Medium] rvu_rep_install_tx_rule() first calls rvu_rep_tx_vlan_cfg(), which allocates a NIX TX VTAG definition entry and programs… -- octeontx2-af: Fix rep link state sync and workqueue races This moves the representor event workqueue creation from rvu_rep_install_mcam_rules() into rvu_mbox_handler_get_rep_cnt(), adds sender and bounds validation to the REP mailbox handlers, and makes LBK link configuration take rsrc_lock. A few questions below about the new validation and teardown paths. > diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu.c > index 937b085582b5..dc4e1fa900b7 100644 > --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu.c > +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu.c > @@ -3721,6 +3721,20 @@ static void rvu_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev) > rvu_unregister_dl(rvu); > rvu_unregister_interrupts(rvu); > rvu_flr_wq_destroy(rvu); > + if (rvu->rep_evt_wq) { > + struct workqueue_struct *rep_wq = rvu->rep_evt_wq; > + > + /* NULL the pointer before flushing mbox_wq. Any mbox handler > + * still in flight will snapshot NULL via READ_ONCE() and return > + * -EINVAL without calling queue_work(), so no new items can be > + * added to rep_wq after flush_workqueue(mbox_wq) returns. > + */ > + WRITE_ONCE(rvu->rep_evt_wq, NULL); > + flush_workqueue(rvu->afpf_wq_info.mbox_wq); > + destroy_workqueue(rep_wq); > + } else { > + flush_workqueue(rvu->afpf_wq_info.mbox_wq); > + } [Severity: Medium] This teardown sits after rvu_unregister_interrupts(), which has already disabled the AF-PF mailbox interrupt (RVU_AF_PFAF_MBOX_INT_ENA_W1C, or cn20k_rvu_unregister_interrupts()). destroy_workqueue() calls drain_workqueue(), so any rep_evt_work still queued now runs to completion here, and rvu_rep_wq_handler() -> rvu_rep_up_notify() does otx2_mbox_msg_send_up() followed by otx2_mbox_wait_for_zero() and otx2_mbox_wait_for_rsp() on rvu->afpf_wq_info.mbox_up. With the mailbox interrupt already gone, the PF's reply is never processed by the AF, so each of those waits has to time out rather than complete. With a non-empty rep_evtq_head that is paid per queued event, all while holding rvu->mbox_lock, which stretches rvu_remove() out by seconds at a time on a path userspace is blocked on. Would it be better to move this block ahead of rvu_unregister_interrupts() so the pending up-notifies can still be acknowledged, or alternatively to stop rvu_rep_wq_handler() from sending anything once removal has started (a teardown flag checked before otx2_mbox_msg_send_up(), or draining rep_evtq_head and freeing the qentries without notifying)? Note the same question applies to the qentry list itself: nothing appears to free the entries that are still on rvu->rep_evtq_head if the handler is not allowed to consume them. [Severity: Medium] Is flushing only rvu->afpf_wq_info.mbox_wq enough to close the queue_work() window the comment describes? The same rvu_mbox_handler_* dispatch also runs on rvu->afvf_wq_info.mbox_wq via rvu_afvf_mbox_handler(), and that workqueue is destroyed much later, inside rvu_disable_sriov() -> rvu_mbox_destroy(). For AF-VF messages the dispatcher clears only the func bits and keeps the sender-supplied PF field, so rvu_mbox_handler_nix_lf_start_rx()/nix_lf_stop_rx()/rvu_nix_lf_teardown() can reach rvu_rep_notify_pfvf_state(), which sets req.hdr.pcifunc = rvu->rep_pcifunc and therefore passes the new -EPERM gate: CPU0 (afvf mbox work) CPU1 (rvu_remove) wq = READ_ONCE(rvu->rep_evt_wq); /* non-NULL */ WRITE_ONCE(rvu->rep_evt_wq, NULL); flush_workqueue(afpf mbox_wq); destroy_workqueue(rep_wq); queue_work(wq, &rvu->rep_evt_work); /* freed wq */ Should the afvf mailbox workqueue be flushed here too (or the VF mailbox torn down before this point)? The qentry that handler already kmalloc'd and put on rep_evtq_head is leaked in that case as well. [Severity: Medium] Can rvu->rep_evt_wq become non-NULL after this if () test? The producer, rvu_mbox_handler_get_rep_cnt(), now publishes the pointer under rvu->rsrc_lock, while this teardown reads and clears it with no lock and never re-checks: CPU0 (get_rep_cnt work on mbox_wq) CPU1 (rvu_remove) if (rvu->rep_evt_wq) /* NULL */ else flush_workqueue(mbox_wq); mutex_lock(&rvu->rsrc_lock); rvu->rep_evt_wq = alloc_workqueue(...); The freshly created workqueue and its worker pool are then never destroyed, and a REP_EVENT_NOTIFY message processed later in the same drained batch can queue_work(&rvu->rep_evt_work) on a workqueue nothing waits for, so rvu_rep_wq_handler() may touch rvu after devm_kfree(&pdev->dev, rvu). Would taking rsrc_lock here (or a "removing" flag checked by the handler) close that? > diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_rep.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_rep.c > index a2781e0f504e..69b260fdd52d 100644 > --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_rep.c > +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_rep.c [ ... ] > @@ -95,8 +101,17 @@ static void rvu_rep_wq_handler(struct work_struct *work) > int rvu_mbox_handler_rep_event_notify(struct rvu *rvu, struct rep_event *req, > struct msg_rsp *rsp) > { > + struct workqueue_struct *wq; > struct rep_evtq_ent *qentry; > > + wq = READ_ONCE(rvu->rep_evt_wq); > + if (!wq) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* Only the registered representor PF may send REP_EVENT_NOTIFY. */ > + if (req->hdr.pcifunc != rvu->rep_pcifunc) > + return -EPERM; [Severity: High] How much does this gate actually restrict, given that rvu->rep_pcifunc is whatever function sent MBOX_MSG_GET_REP_CNT first? rvu_mbox_handler_get_rep_cnt() still does an unconditional rvu->rep_pcifunc = req->hdr.pcifunc with no check that the sender is the representor function (PCI_DEVID_RVU_REP), no capability check and no rep_mode gating. The PF driver forwards VF mailbox messages to the AF verbatim - otx2_pfvf_mbox_handler() only rewrites the func bits and does no message-ID filtering: msg->pcifunc &= ~RVU_PFVF_FUNC_MASK; msg->pcifunc |= (vf_idx + 1) & RVU_PFVF_FUNC_MASK; So can a guest VF send GET_REP_CNT before the representor driver probes, become rvu->rep_pcifunc, and then satisfy both new -EPERM checks? From there REP_EVENT_NOTIFY with req->pcifunc pointing at any other CGX-mapped function passes is_pf_func_valid()/is_pf_cgxmapped() (those only confirm the victim exists), and rvu_rep_up_notify() then does: if (event->event & RVU_EVENT_MAC_ADDR_CHANGE) ether_addr_copy(pfvf->mac_addr, event->evt_data.mac); overwriting the victim's AF-side MAC and sending a forged up-notify to the victim's PF. is_rep_dev() is just a pcifunc comparison against rvu->rep_pcifunc, so the same caller also gets representor treatment in rvu_nix.c / rvu_npc_fs.c, and the real representor driver is locked out afterwards because its GET_REP_CNT now returns -EPERM. Should the registration itself authenticate the representor rather than trusting the first mailbox caller? [ ... ] > int rvu_rep_notify_pfvf_state(struct rvu *rvu, u16 pcifunc, bool enable) > { > - struct rep_event *req; > - int pf; > + struct rep_event req = { 0 }; > + struct msg_rsp rsp; > > if (!is_pf_cgxmapped(rvu, rvu_get_pf(rvu->pdev, pcifunc))) > return 0; > > - pf = rvu_get_pf(rvu->pdev, rvu->rep_pcifunc); > - > - mutex_lock(&rvu->mbox_lock); > - req = otx2_mbox_alloc_msg_rep_event_up_notify(rvu, pf); [ ... ] > + req.hdr.pcifunc = rvu->rep_pcifunc; > + req.event = RVU_EVENT_PFVF_STATE; > + req.pcifunc = pcifunc; > + req.evt_data.vf_state = enable; > + return rvu_mbox_handler_rep_event_notify(rvu, &req, &rsp); > } [ ... ] > @@ -334,19 +344,22 @@ int rvu_rep_install_mcam_rules(struct rvu *rvu) > continue; > > pcifunc = rvu_make_pcifunc(rvu->pdev, pf, 0); > + pfvf = rvu_get_pfvf(rvu, pcifunc); > rvu_get_nix_blkaddr(rvu, pcifunc); > + if (test_bit(NIXLF_INITIALIZED, &pfvf->flags)) > + rvu_switch_enable_lbk_link(rvu, pcifunc, true); [Severity: Medium] Does moving rsrc_lock inside rvu_switch_enable_lbk_link() serialize anything useful here? The NIXLF_INITIALIZED test is outside the lock, and the flag is set in rvu_mbox_handler_nix_lf_start_rx() and cleared in rvu_mbox_handler_nix_lf_stop_rx()/rvu_nix_lf_teardown() with no lock at all. rvu_rep_install_mcam_rules() runs from rvu_devlink_eswitch_mode_set() -> rvu_switch_enable(), which holds no RVU lock: CPU0 (devlink switchdev) CPU1 (mbox NIX_LF_STOP_RX) test_bit(NIXLF_INITIALIZED) /* 1 */ clear_bit(NIXLF_INITIALIZED); rvu_switch_update_rules(false) rvu_rep_update_rules() lbk_link(..., false); /* lock */ rvu_switch_enable_lbk_link(true); /* lock, writes enable */ Doesn't that leave the TL2 LBK link on channel 63 enabled for a function whose NIXLF was stopped or freed? The new err_disable_lbk rollback and the new rep_mode loop in rvu_switch_disable() can lose the same race against a concurrent LF start. [ ... ] > @@ -366,30 +382,37 @@ int rvu_rep_install_mcam_rules(struct rvu *rvu) > } > } > + return 0; > > - /* Initialize the wq for handling REP events */ > - spin_lock_init(&rvu->rep_evtq_lock); > - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rvu->rep_evtq_head); > - INIT_WORK(&rvu->rep_evt_work, rvu_rep_wq_handler); > - rvu->rep_evt_wq = alloc_workqueue("rep_evt_wq", WQ_PERCPU, 0); > - if (!rvu->rep_evt_wq) { > - dev_err(rvu->dev, "REP workqueue allocation failed\n"); > - return -ENOMEM; > +err_disable_lbk: > + /* Undo any LBK links enabled above before the MCAM rule failure. > + * Disabling a link that was never enabled is a safe no-op. > + */ > + for (pf = 1; pf < hw->total_pfs; pf++) { > + if (!is_pf_cgxmapped(rvu, pf)) > + continue; > + pcifunc = rvu_make_pcifunc(rvu->pdev, pf, 0); > + rvu_switch_enable_lbk_link(rvu, pcifunc, false); > + rvu_get_pf_numvfs(rvu, pf, &numvfs, NULL); > + for (vf = 0; vf < numvfs; vf++) { > + pcifunc = rvu_make_pcifunc(rvu->pdev, pf, vf + 1); > + rvu_switch_enable_lbk_link(rvu, pcifunc, false); > + } > } > - return 0; > + return err; > } [Severity: Medium] Does this rollback miss the representor function itself? rvu_rep_pf_init() enables the LBK link for rvu->rep_pcifunc: set_bit(NIXLF_INITIALIZED, &pfvf->flags); rvu_switch_enable_lbk_link(rvu, pcifunc, true); but this loop, and the new rep_mode loop in rvu_switch_disable(), both skip anything that is not CGX-mapped, and the representor is a separate non-CGX-mapped function (PCI_DEVID_RVU_REP). rvu_nix_tx_tl2_cfg() explicitly allows the write for it: if (!is_pf_cgxmapped(rvu, pf) && !is_rep_dev(rvu, pcifunc)) return; So after a failed install, or after "devlink dev eswitch set mode legacy", does the representor PF keep its TL2 nodes pointed at LBK channel 63 with all matching NPC entries deleted? Nothing re-evaluates it either, since rvu_rep_pf_init() leaves NIXLF_INITIALIZED set on the rep pfvf. [Severity: High] This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but every rule-installation failure now routes through this return err, so it may be worth fixing alongside. rvu_switch_enable()'s uninstall_rules label does kfree(rswitch->entry2pcifunc) without clearing the pointer or resetting rswitch->used_entries, and rvu_devlink_eswitch_mode_set() has already committed rswitch->mode. A following "devlink dev eswitch set mode legacy" reaches rvu_switch_disable(), whose only guard is: if (!rswitch->used_entries) return; ... free_ents: ... kfree(rswitch->entry2pcifunc); which frees the same pointer a second time. rvu_rep_update_rules() and rvu_switch_update_rules(), reachable from NIX_LF_START_RX/STOP_RX mailbox messages, are gated only on used_entries as well and then read rswitch->entry2pcifunc[entry]. Should the failure path also clear rswitch->entry2pcifunc and rswitch->used_entries? [Severity: Medium] This is a pre-existing issue, but does the new cleanup also need to release TX VTAG definitions? rvu_rep_install_tx_rule() calls rvu_rep_tx_vlan_cfg() first, which allocates a NIX TX VTAG definition entry and programs NIX_AF_TX_VTAG_DEFX_DATA/CTL, and only then calls rvu_mbox_handler_npc_install_flow(). When the MCAM install fails the returned vtag0_idx is dropped: err_disable_lbk only touches LBK links, and rvu_switch_enable()'s uninstall_rules/free_entries labels only delete NPC flows and free MCAM entries, while VTAG entries live in nix_hw->txvlan and need nix_tx_vtag_free(). Do repeated failed switchdev enables then consume the hardware VTAG definition table? [ ... ] > @@ -443,35 +466,92 @@ int rvu_mbox_handler_esw_cfg(struct rvu *rvu, struct esw_cfg_req *req, [ ... ] > int rvu_mbox_handler_get_rep_cnt(struct rvu *rvu, struct msg_req *req, > struct get_rep_cnt_rsp *rsp) > { > - int pf, vf, numvfs, hwvf, rep = 0; > + int pf, vf, numvfs, hwvf, rep = 0, cnt; > + int ret = 0; > u16 pcifunc; > + u16 *map; > + > + /* Serialize first-time initialization. mbox_wq is WQ_PERCPU so > + * handlers for different PFs can run concurrently; without this > + * lock two callers could both observe rep2pfvf_map == NULL and > + * double-allocate the workqueue, leaking one permanently. > + */ > + mutex_lock(&rvu->rsrc_lock); > + > + if (rvu->rep2pfvf_map) { > + ret = rvu_rep_get_rep_map(rvu, req, rsp); > + goto unlock; > + } > > rvu->rep_pcifunc = req->hdr.pcifunc; [Severity: Low] Is it intentional that rvu->rep_pcifunc is published before both -ENOMEM exits below? On either failure rvu->rep2pfvf_map stays NULL, so the fast-path guard above does not fire for the next caller, which re-enters this branch and overwrites rvu->rep_pcifunc. Meanwhile the failed caller already has is_rep_dev() true, and its pcifunc is consumed by rvu_rep_install_rx_rule()/rvu_rep_install_tx_rule() (req.vf = rvu->rep_pcifunc) and by rvu_rep_pf_init(), which sets NIXLF_INITIALIZED and enables the LBK link for it. Would assigning rep_pcifunc only on the success path avoid that stale state? > - rsp->rep_cnt = rvu->cgx_mapped_pfs + rvu->cgx_mapped_vfs; > - rvu->rep_cnt = rsp->rep_cnt; > + cnt = min_t(int, rvu->cgx_mapped_pfs + rvu->cgx_mapped_vfs, > + RVU_MAX_REP); [Severity: High] What happens on a part where rvu->cgx_mapped_pfs + rvu->cgx_mapped_vfs exceeds RVU_MAX_REP? The map is capped here, but the consumers are not: rvu_switch_enable() still sizes the MCAM allocation from the uncapped sum (times 4 in rep mode), and rvu_rep_install_mcam_rules() still loops pf = 1..hw->total_pfs and vf = 0..numvfs with no bound tied to rvu->rep_cnt. Both rule installers take their VLAN/index from rvu_rep_get_vlan_id(), which falls off its loop and returns the identifier of representor 0 when the pcifunc is not in the map: for (id = 0; id < rvu->rep_cnt; id++) if (rvu->rep2pfvf_map[id] == pcifunc) return id; return 0; So for every function past the cap, does rvu_rep_install_rx_rule() program a rule identical to representor 0's - vlan_tci = rep_id | BIT_ULL(8); req.vf = rvu->rep_pcifunc; req.index = rep_id; - and steer that traffic to the wrong representor? Their state events are dropped on the peer side as well, since rvu_rep_get_repid() returns -EINVAL and only the new warning fires. Since numvfs is an 8-bit per-PF field summed over all CGX PFs, 8 PFs with 8 VFs each already passes 64. Would rejecting such a configuration with a diagnostic here, or applying the same cap in the rule installer and event producers, be preferable to silent truncation? [ ... ] > + /* Initialize the wq for handling REP events */ > + spin_lock_init(&rvu->rep_evtq_lock); > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rvu->rep_evtq_head); > + INIT_WORK(&rvu->rep_evt_work, rvu_rep_wq_handler); > + rvu->rep_evt_wq = alloc_workqueue("rep_evt_wq", WQ_UNBOUND, 0); [Severity: Medium] The consumer side uses READ_ONCE(rvu->rep_evt_wq) as the gate for touching rep_evtq_lock, rep_evtq_head and rep_evt_work, but the publication here is a plain store with no smp_store_release() and the reader has no acquire. On a weakly ordered machine, can a consumer that is not serialized with this function by rvu->mbox_lock - for example rvu_mbox_handler_rep_event_notify() reached from an AF-VF mailbox work item, since rvu_afvf_mbox_handler() does not take mbox_lock - see rep_evt_wq non-NULL before the spin_lock_init()/INIT_LIST_HEAD()/ INIT_WORK() stores are visible, and then run spin_lock() and list_add_tail() on uninitialized state? The same ordering question applies to rvu->rep_pcifunc, which now gates the -EPERM check. > diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_switch.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_switch.c > index 49ce38685a7e..8c2c98403507 100644 > --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_switch.c > +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_switch.c > @@ -12,11 +12,18 @@ void rvu_switch_enable_lbk_link(struct rvu *rvu, u16 pcifunc, bool enable) > { > struct rvu_pfvf *pfvf = rvu_get_pfvf(rvu, pcifunc); > struct nix_hw *nix_hw; > + int blkaddr; > > - nix_hw = get_nix_hw(rvu->hw, pfvf->nix_blkaddr); > + mutex_lock(&rvu->rsrc_lock); > + blkaddr = pfvf->nix_blkaddr; > + nix_hw = get_nix_hw(rvu->hw, blkaddr); > /* Enable LBK links with channel 63 for TX MCAM rule */ > - rvu_nix_tx_tl2_cfg(rvu, pfvf->nix_blkaddr, pcifunc, > + if (!nix_hw) > + goto unlock; > + rvu_nix_tx_tl2_cfg(rvu, blkaddr, pcifunc, > &nix_hw->txsch[NIX_TXSCH_LVL_TL2], enable); > +unlock: > + mutex_unlock(&rvu->rsrc_lock); > } [ ... ] > @@ -229,8 +236,20 @@ void rvu_switch_disable(struct rvu *rvu) > if (!rswitch->used_entries) > return; > > - if (rvu->rep_mode) > + if (rvu->rep_mode) { > + for (pf = 1; pf < hw->total_pfs; pf++) { > + if (!is_pf_cgxmapped(rvu, pf)) > + continue; > + pcifunc = rvu_make_pcifunc(rvu->pdev, pf, 0); > + rvu_switch_enable_lbk_link(rvu, pcifunc, false); > + rvu_get_pf_numvfs(rvu, pf, &numvfs, NULL); > + for (vf = 0; vf < numvfs; vf++) { > + pcifunc = rvu_make_pcifunc(rvu->pdev, pf, vf + 1); > + rvu_switch_enable_lbk_link(rvu, pcifunc, false); > + } > + } > goto free_ents; > + } > diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/nic/rep.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/nic/rep.c > index 0f5d5642d3f7..ef47e7e21901 100644 > --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/nic/rep.c > +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/nic/rep.c [ ... ] > @@ -459,6 +465,9 @@ static int rvu_rep_open(struct net_device *dev) > netif_carrier_on(dev); > netif_tx_start_all_queues(dev); > > + if (rep->pcifunc & RVU_PFVF_FUNC_MASK) > + return 0; > + > evt.event = RVU_EVENT_PORT_STATE; > evt.evt_data.port_state = 1; > evt.pcifunc = rep->pcifunc; [Severity: Medium] These two early returns in rvu_rep_open() and rvu_rep_stop() skip the RVU_EVENT_PORT_STATE notification for every VF representor, which is the representor-to-representee link state propagation added by the commit in the Fixes: tag (b8fea84a0468). After this, does "ip link set up/down" still affect the representee? The reason the notification does not work today looks like the missing handler on the VF side - otx2vf_process_mbox_msg_up() only handles MBOX_MSG_CGX_LINK_EVENT and answers everything else with: default: otx2_reply_invalid_msg(&vf->mbox.mbox_up, 0, 0, req->id); return -ENODEV; while the PF side does implement otx2_mbox_up_handler_rep_event_up_notify(). Would adding MBOX_MSG_REP_EVENT_UP_NOTIFY to otx2vf_process_mbox_msg_up() be the fix instead? Neither the commit message nor the changelog mentions these two hunks. > @@ -478,6 +487,9 @@ static int rvu_rep_stop(struct net_device *dev) > netif_carrier_off(dev); > netif_tx_disable(dev); > > + if (rep->pcifunc & RVU_PFVF_FUNC_MASK) > + return 0; > + > evt.event = RVU_EVENT_PORT_STATE; > evt.pcifunc = rep->pcifunc; > rvu_rep_notify_pfvf(priv, RVU_EVENT_PORT_STATE, &evt); Thanks for looking at these. -- Sashiko AI review · https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20260903074840.2373506-1-nshettyj%40marvell.com