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From: netdev-bot+sashiko@kernel.org
To: bsdhenrymartin@gmail.com
Cc: edumazet@kernel.org, kuniyu@google.com, pabeni@redhat.com,
	willemb@google.com, davem@davemloft.net, kuba@kernel.org,
	horms@kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: initialize sk_peer_lock in cloned sockets
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 23:50:12 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <179513221226.3136.10545319024086149359@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261118084927.1756747-1-bsdhenrymartin@gmail.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential
issue(s) to consider.

Critical: 0 · High: 1 · Medium: 0 · Low: 1

If you believe none of the issues are legitimate, please reply to each
issue of Medium severity or higher and explain why the AI is wrong.
If any of them are legitimate and you plan to respin, please let patchwork
know by including "pw-bot: cr" as a separate line at the end of your reply
(one such reply per series is enough).

- [High] The fix is incomplete: on 32-bit kernels, sk_clone() still
  inherits sk->sk_stamp_seq in a held state.
- [Low] The commit message says sock_copy() clones a struct sock 'with
  two memcpys that both include sk_peer_lock'.

--

Here is the LKML reply:

net: initialize sk_peer_lock in cloned sockets

This commit adds a spin_lock_init() of sk_peer_lock in sk_clone(). Without
it, a clone made while the parent's sk_peer_lock is held starts with the
lock already locked, and the first getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED) on the child
hangs.

> sock_copy() clones a struct sock with two memcpys that both include
> sk_peer_lock.  sk_clone() re-initializes sk_lock, but nothing resets

[Severity: Low]
Is the "two memcpys that both include sk_peer_lock" part accurate? The
first copy in sock_copy() stops at sk_dontcopy_begin, which sits inside
__sk_common:

net/core/sock.c:sock_copy() {
    ...
	memcpy(nsk, osk, offsetof(struct sock, sk_dontcopy_begin));

	unsafe_memcpy(&nsk->sk_dontcopy_end, &osk->sk_dontcopy_end,
		      prot->obj_size - offsetof(struct sock, sk_dontcopy_end),
		      /* alloc is larger than struct, see sk_prot_alloc() */);
    ...
}

sk_peer_lock is a field in the struct sock body, well after __sk_common.
So only the second unsafe_memcpy() copies it.

The conclusion that the lock is copied verbatim still holds. Could the
commit message describe the mechanism more precisely?

> diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
> index ad414878dc5ba..b5e2a2a7741cd 100644
> --- a/net/core/sock.c
> +++ b/net/core/sock.c
> @@ -2545,6 +2545,10 @@ struct sock *sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, const gfp_t priority,
>  
>  	sk_node_init(&newsk->sk_node);
>  	sock_lock_init(newsk);
> +	/* sock_copy() copies the parent's sk_peer_lock verbatim, including a
> +	 * held state, so the clone must start with a fresh lock.
> +	 */
> +	spin_lock_init(&newsk->sk_peer_lock);

[Severity: High]
Does the same problem remain for sk_stamp_seq on 32-bit kernels?

sk_stamp_seq is a seqlock_t (a spinlock plus a seqcount) declared under
BITS_PER_LONG==32 in struct sock:

include/net/sock.h:
#if BITS_PER_LONG==32
	seqlock_t		sk_stamp_seq;
#endif

It lies outside the sk_dontcopy range, so sock_copy() copies it along with
sk_peer_lock. It is only initialized by seqlock_init() in
sock_init_data_uid(), which the clone path never runs. Neither sk_clone()
nor sk_init_common() resets it.

The writer takes the spinlock and leaves the sequence count odd:

include/net/sock.h:sock_write_timestamp() {
	write_seqlock(&sk->sk_stamp_seq);
	sk->sk_stamp = kt;
	write_sequnlock(&sk->sk_stamp_seq);
}

sock_gettstamp() (ioctl SIOCGSTAMP) calls that writer without lock_sock
whenever sk_stamp is 0:

net/core/sock.c:sock_gettstamp() {
    ...
	if (ts.tv_sec == 0) {
		ktime_t kt = ktime_get_real();
		sock_write_timestamp(sk, kt);
    ...
}

On an SCTP one-to-many socket, sk_stamp becomes 0 after the first
sctp_recvmsg()->sock_recv_cmsgs(). With that state, can the following
happen?

CPU0
ioctl(SIOCGSTAMP)
  sock_gettstamp()
    sock_write_timestamp()
      write_seqlock(&parent->sk_stamp_seq)

CPU1
getsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF)
  sctp_getsockopt()            /* lock_sock() held */
    sctp_do_peeloff()
      sctp_clone_sock()
        sk_clone()
          sock_copy()

The lock_sock() taken on CPU1 does not exclude CPU0's lockless write. The
child would then get a locked spinlock and an odd seqcount.

After that, sock_read_timestamp() on the child would spin forever in
read_seqbegin(). That covers SIOCGSTAMP, and recvmsg via
sock_recv_cmsgs(). On PREEMPT_RT it would block on the copied held lock
instead.

Any sock_write_timestamp() on the child would spin forever in spin_lock()
with preemption disabled. That is the same RCU-stall hang the commit
message describes for sk_peer_lock.

Two threads of an unprivileged user could trigger this. Would it make
sense to also add a seqlock_init(&newsk->sk_stamp_seq) under
BITS_PER_LONG==32 next to the new spin_lock_init()? Another option is to
move all lock re-initialization for clones into one helper.

>  
>  	if (lock)
>  		bh_lock_sock(newsk);

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20261118084927.1756747-1-bsdhenrymartin%40gmail.com

      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-19 23:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-18  8:49 Henry Martin
2026-11-18  8:52 ` netdev-bot+sinfo
2026-11-18  9:00 ` Eric Dumazet
2026-11-19 23:50 ` netdev-bot+sashiko [this message]

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