From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Zhan Xusheng <zhanxusheng1024@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
Ricardo Robaina <rrobaina@redhat.com>,
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>,
audit@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Zhan Xusheng <zhanxusheng@xiaomi.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] audit: fix potential integer overflow in audit_log_n_string()
Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2026 17:44:01 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1b04c65e7aca9259a405b926346214e3@paul-moore.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260715024635.25376-1-zhanxusheng@xiaomi.com>
On Jul 14, 2026 Zhan Xusheng <zhanxusheng1024@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> audit_log_n_string() computes new_len as "slen + 3" (enclosing quotes
> plus the NUL terminator) and stores it into an int, while slen is a
> size_t. For a sufficiently large slen the addition can overflow and/or
> the result be truncated when assigned to the int new_len, so the
> "new_len > avail" check can be bypassed and the subsequent
> memcpy(ptr, string, slen) can write past the skb tail.
>
> This is the same class of bug that was fixed for the hex sibling in
> commit 65dfde57d1e2 ("audit: fix potential integer overflow in
> audit_log_n_hex()"); both helpers are reached through
> audit_log_n_untrustedstring() with the same length source.
>
> Make new_len a size_t and use check_add_overflow() to catch the
> overflow, mirroring the audit_log_n_hex() fix. No functional change for
> the in-tree callers, which all pass bounded lengths.
>
> Fixes: 168b7173959f ("AUDIT: Clean up logging of untrusted strings")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Zhan Xusheng <zhanxusheng@xiaomi.com>
> ---
> kernel/audit.c | 11 +++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 562476937fa7..547ae0cebec9 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -2120,7 +2120,8 @@ void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf,
> void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string,
> size_t slen)
> {
> - int avail, new_len;
> + int avail;
> + size_t new_len;
> unsigned char *ptr;
> struct sk_buff *skb;
>
> @@ -2130,7 +2131,13 @@ void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string,
> BUG_ON(!ab->skb);
> skb = ab->skb;
> avail = skb_tailroom(skb);
> - new_len = slen + 3; /* enclosing quotes + null terminator */
> +
> + /* enclosing quotes + null terminator */
> + if (check_add_overflow(slen, (size_t)3, &new_len)) {
You shouldn't need the size_t cast for the '3' constant.
> + audit_log_format(ab, "\"?\"");
There is no need for the additional quotes, see the related
audit_log_n_hex() fix you mentioned in the commit description:
audit_log_format(ab, "?");
> + return;
> + }
> +
> if (new_len > avail) {
> avail = audit_expand(ab, new_len);
> if (!avail)
> --
> 2.43.0
--
paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-17 21:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-15 2:46 Zhan Xusheng
2026-07-17 21:44 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2026-07-18 5:09 ` [PATCH v2] " Zhan Xusheng
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