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Dadhania" , bp@alien8.de Cc: tglx@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, xin@zytor.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, x86@kernel.org, jon.grimm@amd.com, stable@vger.kernel.org, Tom Lendacky , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, sohil.mehta@intel.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com References: <20260205051030.1225975-1-nikunj@amd.com> <9c8c2d69-5434-4416-ba37-897ce00e2b11@intel.com> <02df7890-83c2-4047-8c88-46fbc6e0a892@intel.com> <103bc1df-4caf-430a-9c8b-fcee78b3dd1d@amd.com> <5cf9358a-a5c3-4d4b-b82f-16d69fa30f3e@amd.com> <317f7def-9ac7-41e1-8754-808cd08f88cb@amd.com> From: Dave Hansen Content-Language: en-US Autocrypt: addr=dave.hansen@intel.com; keydata= xsFNBE6HMP0BEADIMA3XYkQfF3dwHlj58Yjsc4E5y5G67cfbt8dvaUq2fx1lR0K9h1bOI6fC oAiUXvGAOxPDsB/P6UEOISPpLl5IuYsSwAeZGkdQ5g6m1xq7AlDJQZddhr/1DC/nMVa/2BoY 2UnKuZuSBu7lgOE193+7Uks3416N2hTkyKUSNkduyoZ9F5twiBhxPJwPtn/wnch6n5RsoXsb ygOEDxLEsSk/7eyFycjE+btUtAWZtx+HseyaGfqkZK0Z9bT1lsaHecmB203xShwCPT49Blxz VOab8668QpaEOdLGhtvrVYVK7x4skyT3nGWcgDCl5/Vp3TWA4K+IofwvXzX2ON/Mj7aQwf5W iC+3nWC7q0uxKwwsddJ0Nu+dpA/UORQWa1NiAftEoSpk5+nUUi0WE+5DRm0H+TXKBWMGNCFn c6+EKg5zQaa8KqymHcOrSXNPmzJuXvDQ8uj2J8XuzCZfK4uy1+YdIr0yyEMI7mdh4KX50LO1 pmowEqDh7dLShTOif/7UtQYrzYq9cPnjU2ZW4qd5Qz2joSGTG9eCXLz5PRe5SqHxv6ljk8mb ApNuY7bOXO/A7T2j5RwXIlcmssqIjBcxsRRoIbpCwWWGjkYjzYCjgsNFL6rt4OL11OUF37wL QcTl7fbCGv53KfKPdYD5hcbguLKi/aCccJK18ZwNjFhqr4MliQARAQABzUVEYXZpZCBDaHJp c3RvcGhlciBIYW5zZW4gKEludGVsIFdvcmsgQWRkcmVzcykgPGRhdmUuaGFuc2VuQGludGVs LmNvbT7CwXgEEwECACIFAlQ+9J0CGwMGCwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEGg1 lTBwyZKwLZUP/0dnbhDc229u2u6WtK1s1cSd9WsflGXGagkR6liJ4um3XCfYWDHvIdkHYC1t MNcVHFBwmQkawxsYvgO8kXT3SaFZe4ISfB4K4CL2qp4JO+nJdlFUbZI7cz/Td9z8nHjMcWYF IQuTsWOLs/LBMTs+ANumibtw6UkiGVD3dfHJAOPNApjVr+M0P/lVmTeP8w0uVcd2syiaU5jB aht9CYATn+ytFGWZnBEEQFnqcibIaOrmoBLu2b3fKJEd8Jp7NHDSIdrvrMjYynmc6sZKUqH2 I1qOevaa8jUg7wlLJAWGfIqnu85kkqrVOkbNbk4TPub7VOqA6qG5GCNEIv6ZY7HLYd/vAkVY E8Plzq/NwLAuOWxvGrOl7OPuwVeR4hBDfcrNb990MFPpjGgACzAZyjdmYoMu8j3/MAEW4P0z F5+EYJAOZ+z212y1pchNNauehORXgjrNKsZwxwKpPY9qb84E3O9KYpwfATsqOoQ6tTgr+1BR CCwP712H+E9U5HJ0iibN/CDZFVPL1bRerHziuwuQuvE0qWg0+0SChFe9oq0KAwEkVs6ZDMB2 P16MieEEQ6StQRlvy2YBv80L1TMl3T90Bo1UUn6ARXEpcbFE0/aORH/jEXcRteb+vuik5UGY 5TsyLYdPur3TXm7XDBdmmyQVJjnJKYK9AQxj95KlXLVO38lczsFNBFRjzmoBEACyAxbvUEhd GDGNg0JhDdezyTdN8C9BFsdxyTLnSH31NRiyp1QtuxvcqGZjb2trDVuCbIzRrgMZLVgo3upr MIOx1CXEgmn23Zhh0EpdVHM8IKx9Z7V0r+rrpRWFE8/wQZngKYVi49PGoZj50ZEifEJ5qn/H Nsp2+Y+bTUjDdgWMATg9DiFMyv8fvoqgNsNyrrZTnSgoLzdxr89FGHZCoSoAK8gfgFHuO54B lI8QOfPDG9WDPJ66HCodjTlBEr/Cwq6GruxS5i2Y33YVqxvFvDa1tUtl+iJ2SWKS9kCai2DR 3BwVONJEYSDQaven/EHMlY1q8Vln3lGPsS11vSUK3QcNJjmrgYxH5KsVsf6PNRj9mp8Z1kIG qjRx08+nnyStWC0gZH6NrYyS9rpqH3j+hA2WcI7De51L4Rv9pFwzp161mvtc6eC/GxaiUGuH BNAVP0PY0fqvIC68p3rLIAW3f97uv4ce2RSQ7LbsPsimOeCo/5vgS6YQsj83E+AipPr09Caj 0hloj+hFoqiticNpmsxdWKoOsV0PftcQvBCCYuhKbZV9s5hjt9qn8CE86A5g5KqDf83Fxqm/ vXKgHNFHE5zgXGZnrmaf6resQzbvJHO0Fb0CcIohzrpPaL3YepcLDoCCgElGMGQjdCcSQ+Ci FCRl0Bvyj1YZUql+ZkptgGjikQARAQABwsFfBBgBAgAJBQJUY85qAhsMAAoJEGg1lTBwyZKw l4IQAIKHs/9po4spZDFyfDjunimEhVHqlUt7ggR1Hsl/tkvTSze8pI1P6dGp2XW6AnH1iayn yRcoyT0ZJ+Zmm4xAH1zqKjWplzqdb/dO28qk0bPso8+1oPO8oDhLm1+tY+cOvufXkBTm+whm +AyNTjaCRt6aSMnA/QHVGSJ8grrTJCoACVNhnXg/R0g90g8iV8Q+IBZyDkG0tBThaDdw1B2l asInUTeb9EiVfL/Zjdg5VWiF9LL7iS+9hTeVdR09vThQ/DhVbCNxVk+DtyBHsjOKifrVsYep WpRGBIAu3bK8eXtyvrw1igWTNs2wazJ71+0z2jMzbclKAyRHKU9JdN6Hkkgr2nPb561yjcB8 sIq1pFXKyO+nKy6SZYxOvHxCcjk2fkw6UmPU6/j/nQlj2lfOAgNVKuDLothIxzi8pndB8Jju KktE5HJqUUMXePkAYIxEQ0mMc8Po7tuXdejgPMwgP7x65xtfEqI0RuzbUioFltsp1jUaRwQZ MTsCeQDdjpgHsj+P2ZDeEKCbma4m6Ez/YWs4+zDm1X8uZDkZcfQlD9NldbKDJEXLIjYWo1PH hYepSffIWPyvBMBTW2W5FRjJ4vLRrJSUoEfJuPQ3vW9Y73foyo/qFoURHO48AinGPZ7PC7TF vUaNOTjKedrqHkaOcqB185ahG2had0xnFsDPlx5y In-Reply-To: <317f7def-9ac7-41e1-8754-808cd08f88cb@amd.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit > CR pinning can prematurely enable features during secondary CPU bringup > before their supporting infrastructure is initialized. Specifically, when > FRED is enabled, cr4_init() sets CR4.FRED via the pinned mask early in > start_secondary(), long before cpu_init_fred_exceptions() configures the > required FRED MSRs. This creates a window where exceptions cannot be > properly handled. This is a collision of FRED, CR-pinning and SEV. Future me would appreciate having all that background in one place: == CR Pinning Background == Modern CPU hardening features like SMAP/SMEP are enabled by flipping control register (CR) bits. Attackers find these features inconvenient and often try to disable them. CR-pinning is a kernel hardening feature that detects when security-sensitive control bits are flipped off, complains about it, then turns them back on. The CR-pinning checks are performed in the CR manipulation helpers. X86_CR4_FRED controls FRED enabling and is pinned. There is a single, system-wide static key that controls CR-pinning behavior. The static key is enabled by the boot CPU after it has established its CR configuration. The end result is that CR-pinning is not active while initializing the boot CPU but it is active while bringing up secondary CPUs. == FRED Background == FRED is a new hardware entry/exit feature for the kernel. It is not on by default and started out as Intel-only. AMD is just adding support now. FRED has MSRs for configuration and is enabled by the pinned X86_CR4_FRED bit. It should not be enabled until after MSRs are properly initialized. == SEV Background == Some flavors of AMD SEV have special virtualization exceptions: #VC. These exceptions happen in "weird" places like when accessing MMIO, running CPUID or even accessing apparently normal kernel memory. Writes to the console can generate #VC. == Problem == CR-pinning implicitly enables FRED on secondary CPUs at a different point than the boot CPU. This point is *before* the CPU has done an explicit cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FRED) and before the MSRs are initialized. This means that there is a window where no exceptions can be handled. For SEV-ES/SNP and TDX guests, any console output during this window triggers #VC or #VE exceptions that result in triple faults because the exception handlers rely on FRED MSRs that aren't yet configured. == Fix == Defer CR-pinning enforcement during secondary CPU bringup. This avoids any implicit CR changes during CPU bringup, ensuring that FRED is not enabled before it is configured and able to handle a #VC. This also aligns boot and secondary CPU bringup. Note: FRED is not on by default anywhere so this is not likely to be causing many problems. The only reason this was noticed was that AMD started to enable FRED and was turning it on. With that, you can add: Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen