From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.8 required=3.0 tests=BITCOIN_SPAM_02,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,PDS_BTC_ID,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D4428C43603 for ; Thu, 5 Dec 2019 16:49:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 898C122525 for ; Thu, 5 Dec 2019 16:49:22 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=yahoo.com header.i=@yahoo.com header.b="ScR7YtW/" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729944AbfLEQtV (ORCPT ); Thu, 5 Dec 2019 11:49:21 -0500 Received: from sonic313-14.consmr.mail.ne1.yahoo.com ([66.163.185.37]:45097 "EHLO sonic313-14.consmr.mail.ne1.yahoo.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729047AbfLEQtU (ORCPT ); Thu, 5 Dec 2019 11:49:20 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=yahoo.com; s=s2048; t=1575564558; bh=cATTb/3yPpybnLKN0leex6/bZJhyfDu+y2cJCZuZ2/o=; h=Subject:To:Cc:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From:Subject; b=ScR7YtW/wG/izRm9NhCr9VLELpHyNPYpIZf+06UIJXpXB62QbVhoh4bSNc8lZabNyPCvcmWEpKfN+4p4YcS6YmEIVHVHvXkoOv2jKZU4cft1JE+t2kz5U+V8/F95OXdqOCgSPqJ3FXZgSCszuknUwI7zINz4js0q7XDsNoMkPKIig49+QHTjG3z1Wyg7GzTHjT9L13fIy7KqM2YYmWaeJ3Ooh6tkdN5FmHprATnQ85bgcxv/xJKraIe33JlNRNKiY0kQOrdAjurBaNQ7XckBEc2x1D8Fq61iqp+K8hpEaAy3UAf4v6EiPVEZIknpTRVIlOMGgaI1LUgYNizVKRr1iQ== X-YMail-OSG: Xs1eQIcVM1l9M47q0lJ4TGdrIk2iS1XQJtwh4FUwg3R7OeWTdyQpno3Zi9F6l89 MAOGMlq_xQV70ajJF4ZhoEFRq6NWACrp6ZjvOtG88pbuINaki8.f28EBPF6tCjTwAhvxNAZMsbiS yvylRrFhcbLu7WFg9WnnZw9L3R14h4Inwm7_I71RMriUzHvSpKD0LvIPaqXtl9.QSF5EHHi8zBkO v0jM0NAC2XAmPXg047pR5s_2rkwaIKt129zkvCFZ_Q6RKEylnNue1vWXnVdSibqod9H83B9DvpcK DWaD8KvzELq8E_gkmXRGCo9StxABrrTQ.hfCHPndYxbSmVP25C0lVgclXmPI.HA5lF_j4HD7N6mJ Vx4DGcRT.fJYhFBePUj1oyodouYRwXabcCzwOv2W0ROS1zstPd9RAe.YzyNUHjh1pfqWEVUw_vdO 3wWQLH5PCsKA4dUiz.5yD.bDeEZnh0.pwFKuyYuzAN0WEefeZ3Nds_pqz8ELzbZrL1SAXhw7.Z8M NUMl3HnggybCJmhDAi.BNZ8yerONHR8tCPgXAYlqBol98NhDV69I7xBHDYDLeBavaRUVdWQu3Pdm JoEohNslyvgU1oB9OEMG.N0Sw.j_MR6jDvSDA1uGoR9eYAaVfxPwLSUa5dgOS_q1ERZtIUYPIVpE hLewi5OHH__aBcrkSgiBFxvgv5kli5iEAJtGuJ2jlHkO.pPjCV_8bKCD9xFbSw8y36N92UKucg_O 3TvyZiyvcs7jrYUjUX253FmfH5YFX6vgA4bEafacR9JI2rc_kTnoqaMiZLkt..UWDF26.dmqyWLv piM_MyDqR1azgENGvkvbA0U6zb6QOplf0TSO.07OvQL5rJkKawxIG5B5Fp3GEW83rSR76JXmgLTT 0YrRix7mRX8RmPfZiY1xSL7bd4vK7tABJw7OP1ydFYQtwW_2O07dGXlugcl3G2g3uwTvv8EU3AtS rReAeTnA2sipSjt4H.mELKQla_bd9A5C9qqH.BQd54uQqgD4IElCvyWOtcOs9NpS.uylsleGUAQE FwJbjFqbYN5nvPv5CzYekiSANg.LHNN9iBxA88RKzmIx3hEbQmenypXvblN2zgCRqJXcL8kfIgYX bm33AE86.qvDP2yBim8BD5vp22FcMCo36oa5DHHcGOHWTZ2o9FYJD1JbfmISHhdPupSaSMsPYP4T 5A9UtXL3sgxV2yEkStryydtK_0tNBnGAZPDxLjt96TUJcViGPFOtjfiu7m7x.4wUBj7MfUThlUjR FzTfLsUJ5GddPIUB6McuIGwi2GXN2SucQ7TQw1adHChjiDWCByyLuxI_sOye.MSHqEUx7HYH.jcm iEDR0i4ZIlyVrF0FYXk1GxFwHLUcpe4oaVAKaLomG54SSIxhOmHBqi4WuuezgWzzx8qgHhgSYdYZ .5ze.ia1R3Zab5btvlwcwoiv3J8XOzI9b5Yn15vXV0qe0fqcVYqeaFPFGNQoQOFJTP7XN Received: from sonic.gate.mail.ne1.yahoo.com by sonic313.consmr.mail.ne1.yahoo.com with HTTP; Thu, 5 Dec 2019 16:49:18 +0000 Received: by smtp432.mail.gq1.yahoo.com (Oath Hermes SMTP Server) with ESMTPA ID b8cde399072ed3df1dba498fa2f274e4; Thu, 05 Dec 2019 16:49:15 +0000 (UTC) Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/3] Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability for secure Perf users groups To: Alexey Budankov , Peter Zijlstra , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Ingo Molnar Cc: Jiri Olsa , Andi Kleen , elena.reshetova@intel.com, Alexander Shishkin , Jann Horn , Kees Cook , Stephane Eranian , Namhyung Kim , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel , Casey Schaufler References: <283f09a5-33bd-eac3-bdfd-83d775045bf9@linux.intel.com> From: Casey Schaufler Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=casey@schaufler-ca.com; keydata= mQINBFzV9HABEAC/mmv3jeJyF7lR7QhILYg1+PeBLIMZv7KCzBSc/4ZZipoWdmr77Lel/RxQ 1PrNx0UaM5r6Hj9lJmJ9eg4s/TUBSP67mTx+tsZ1RhG78/WFf9aBe8MSXxY5cu7IUwo0J/CG vdSqACKyYPV5eoTJmnMxalu8/oVUHyPnKF3eMGgE0mKOFBUMsb2pLS/enE4QyxhcZ26jeeS6 3BaqDl1aTXGowM5BHyn7s9LEU38x/y2ffdqBjd3au2YOlvZ+XUkzoclSVfSR29bomZVVyhMB h1jTmX4Ac9QjpwsxihT8KNGvOM5CeCjQyWcW/g8LfWTzOVF9lzbx6IfEZDDoDem4+ZiPsAXC SWKBKil3npdbgb8MARPes2DpuhVm8yfkJEQQmuLYv8GPiJbwHQVLZGQAPBZSAc7IidD2zbf9 XAw1/SJGe1poxOMfuSBsfKxv9ba2i8hUR+PH7gWwkMQaQ97B1yXYxVEkpG8Y4MfE5Vd3bjJU kvQ/tOBUCw5zwyIRC9+7zr1zYi/3hk+OG8OryZ5kpILBNCo+aePeAJ44znrySarUqS69tuXd a3lMPHUJJpUpIwSKQ5UuYYkWlWwENEWSefpakFAIwY4YIBkzoJ/t+XJHE1HTaJnRk6SWpeDf CreF3+LouP4njyeLEjVIMzaEpwROsw++BX5i5vTXJB+4UApTAQARAQABtChDYXNleSBTY2hh dWZsZXIgPGNhc2V5QHNjaGF1Zmxlci1jYS5jb20+iQJUBBMBCAA+FiEEC+9tH1YyUwIQzUIe OKUVfIxDyBEFAlzV9HACGwMFCRLMAwAFCwkIBwIGFQoJCAsCBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQOKUV fIxDyBG6ag/6AiRl8yof47YOEVHlrmewbpnlBTaYNfJ5cZflNRKRX6t4bp1B2YV1whlDTpiL vNOwFkh+ZE0eI5M4x8Gw2Oiok+4Q5liA9PHTozQYF+Ia+qdL5EehfbLGoEBqklpGvG3h8JsO 7SvONJuFDgvab/U/UriDYycJwzwKZuhVtK9EMpnTtUDyP3DY+Q8h7MWsniNBLVXnh4yBIEJg SSgDn3COpZoFTPGKE+rIzioo/GJe8CTa2g+ZggJiY/myWTS3quG0FMvwvNYvZ4I2g6uxSl7n bZVqAZgqwoTAv1HSXIAn9muwZUJL03qo25PFi2gQmX15BgJKQcV5RL0GHFHRThDS3IyadOgK P2j78P8SddTN73EmsG5OoyzwZAxXfck9A512BfVESqapHurRu2qvMoUkQaW/2yCeRQwGTsFj /rr0lnOBkyC6wCmPSKXe3dT2mnD5KnCkjn7KxLqexKt4itGjJz4/ynD/qh+gL7IPbifrQtVH JI7cr0fI6Tl8V6efurk5RjtELsAlSR6fKV7hClfeDEgLpigHXGyVOsynXLr59uE+g/+InVic jKueTq7LzFd0BiduXGO5HbGyRKw4MG5DNQvC//85EWmFUnDlD3WHz7Hicg95D+2IjD2ZVXJy x3LTfKWdC8bU8am1fi+d6tVEFAe/KbUfe+stXkgmfB7pxqW5Ag0EXNX0cAEQAPIEYtPebJzT wHpKLu1/j4jQcke06Kmu5RNuj1pEje7kX5IKzQSs+CPH0NbSNGvrA4dNGcuDUTNHgb5Be9hF zVqRCEvF2j7BFbrGe9jqMBWHuWheQM8RRoa2UMwQ704mRvKr4sNPh01nKT52ASbWpBPYG3/t WbYaqfgtRmCxBnqdOx5mBJIBh9Q38i63DjQgdNcsTx2qS7HFuFyNef5LCf3jogcbmZGxG/b7 yF4OwmGsVc8ufvlKo5A9Wm+tnRjLr/9Mn9vl5Xa/tQDoPxz26+aWz7j1in7UFzAarcvqzsdM Em6S7uT+qy5jcqyuipuenDKYF/yNOVSNnsiFyQTFqCPCpFihOnuaWqfmdeUOQHCSo8fD4aRF emsuxqcsq0Jp2ODq73DOTsdFxX2ESXYoFt3Oy7QmIxeEgiHBzdKU2bruIB5OVaZ4zWF+jusM Uh+jh+44w9DZkDNjxRAA5CxPlmBIn1OOYt1tsphrHg1cH1fDLK/pDjsJZkiH8EIjhckOtGSb aoUUMMJ85nVhN1EbU/A3DkWCVFEA//Vu1+BckbSbJKE7Hl6WdW19BXOZ7v3jo1q6lWwcFYth esJfk3ZPPJXuBokrFH8kqnEQ9W2QgrjDX3et2WwZFLOoOCItWxT0/1QO4ikcef/E7HXQf/ij Dxf9HG2o5hOlMIAkJq/uLNMvABEBAAGJAjwEGAEIACYWIQQL720fVjJTAhDNQh44pRV8jEPI EQUCXNX0cAIbDAUJEswDAAAKCRA4pRV8jEPIEWkzEACKFUnpp+wIVHpckMfBqN8BE5dUbWJc GyQ7wXWajLtlPdw1nNw0Wrv+ob2RCT7qQlUo6GRLcvj9Fn5tR4hBvR6D3m8aR0AGHbcC62cq I7LjaSDP5j/em4oVL2SMgNTrXgE2w33JMGjAx9oBzkxmKUqprhJomPwmfDHMJ0t7y39Da724 oLPTkQDpJL1kuraM9TC5NyLe1+MyIxqM/8NujoJbWeQUgGjn9uxQAil7o/xSCjrWCP3kZDID vd5ZaHpdl8e1mTExQoKr4EWgaMjmD/a3hZ/j3KfTVNpM2cLfD/QwTMaC2fkK8ExMsz+rUl1H icmcmpptCwOSgwSpPY1Zfio6HvEJp7gmDwMgozMfwQuT9oxyFTxn1X3rn1IoYQF3P8gsziY5 qtTxy2RrgqQFm/hr8gM78RhP54UPltIE96VywviFzDZehMvuwzW//fxysIoK97Y/KBZZOQs+ /T+Bw80Pwk/dqQ8UmIt2ffHEgwCTbkSm711BejapWCfklxkMZDp16mkxSt2qZovboVjXnfuq wQ1QL4o4t1hviM7LyoflsCLnQFJh6RSBhBpKQinMJl/z0A6NYDkQi6vEGMDBWX/M2vk9Jvwa v0cEBfY3Z5oFgkh7BUORsu1V+Hn0fR/Lqq/Pyq+nTR26WzGDkolLsDr3IH0TiAVH5ZuPxyz6 abzjfg== Message-ID: <1e836f34-eda3-542d-f7ce-9a3e87ac5e2e@schaufler-ca.com> Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 08:49:14 -0800 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.9.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <283f09a5-33bd-eac3-bdfd-83d775045bf9@linux.intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Language: en-US X-Mailer: WebService/1.1.14728 hermes Apache-HttpAsyncClient/4.1.4 (Java/1.8.0_181) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 12/5/2019 8:15 AM, Alexey Budankov wrote: > Currently access to perf_events functionality [1] beyond the scope perm= itted > by perf_event_paranoid [1] kernel setting is allowed to a privileged pr= ocess > [2] with CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability enabled in the process effective set = [3]. > > This patch set introduces CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure = performance > monitoring activity so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN = in its > governing role for perf_events based performance monitoring of a system= =2E > > CAP_SYS_PERFMON aims to harden system security and integrity when monit= oring > performance using perf_events subsystem by processes and Perf privilege= d users > [2], thus decreasing attack surface that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN > privileged processes [3]. Are there use cases where you would need CAP_SYS_PERFMON where you would not also need CAP_SYS_ADMIN? If you separate a new capability from CAP_SYS_ADMIN but always have to use CAP_SYS_ADMIN in conjunction with the new capability it is all rather pointless. The scope you've defined for this CAP_SYS_PERFMON is very small. Is there a larger set of privilege checks that might be applicable for it? =C2=A0 > > CAP_SYS_PERFMON aims to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to > performance monitoring functionality of perf_events and balance amount = of > CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials in accordance with the recommendations provid= ed in > the man page for CAP_SYS_ADMIN [3]: "Note: this capability is overloade= d; > see Notes to kernel developers, below." > > For backward compatibility reasons performance monitoring functionality= of=20 > perf_events subsystem remains available under CAP_SYS_ADMIN but its usa= ge for > secure performance monitoring use cases is discouraged with respect to = the > introduced CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability. > > In the suggested implementation CAP_SYS_PERFMON enables Perf privileged= users > [2] to conduct secure performance monitoring using perf_events in the s= cope > of available online CPUs when executing code in kernel and user modes. > > Possible alternative solution to this capabilities balancing, system se= curity > hardening task could be to use the existing CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability t= o govern > perf_events' performance monitoring functionality, since process debugg= ing is > similar to performance monitoring with respect to providing insights in= to > process memory and execution details. However CAP_SYS_PTRACE still prov= ides > users with more credentials than are required for secure performance mo= nitoring > using perf_events subsystem and this excess is avoided by using the ded= icated > CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability. > > libcap library utilities [4], [5] and Perf tool can be used to apply > CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability for secure performance monitoring beyond the= scope > permitted by system wide perf_event_paranoid kernel setting and below a= re the > steps to evaluate the advancement suggested by the patch set: > > - patch, build and boot the kernel > - patch, build Perf tool e.g. to /home/user/perf > ... > # git clone git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git libca= p > # pushd libcap > # patch libcap/include/uapi/linux/capabilities.h with [PATCH 1/3] > # make > # pushd progs > # ./setcap "cap_sys_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=3Dep" /home/use= r/perf > # ./setcap -v "cap_sys_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=3Dep" /home/= user/perf > /home/user/perf: OK > # ./getcap /home/user/perf > /home/user/perf =3D cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_sys_perfmon+ep > # echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid > # cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid=20 > 2 > ... > $ /home/user/perf top > ... works as expected ... > $ cat /proc/`pidof perf`/status > Name: perf > Umask: 0002 > State: S (sleeping) > Tgid: 2958 > Ngid: 0 > Pid: 2958 > PPid: 9847 > TracerPid: 0 > Uid: 500 500 500 500 > Gid: 500 500 500 500 > FDSize: 256 > ... > CapInh: 0000000000000000 > CapPrm: 0000004400080000 > CapEff: 0000004400080000 =3D> 01000100 00000000 00001000 00000000 000= 00000 > cap_sys_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap= _syslog > CapBnd: 0000007fffffffff > CapAmb: 0000000000000000 > NoNewPrivs: 0 > Seccomp: 0 > Speculation_Store_Bypass: thread vulnerable > Cpus_allowed: ff > Cpus_allowed_list: 0-7 > ... > > Usage of cap_sys_perfmon effectively avoids unused credentials excess: > - with cap_sys_admin: > CapEff: 0000007fffffffff =3D> 01111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 111= 11111 > - with cap_sys_perfmon: > CapEff: 0000004400080000 =3D> 01000100 00000000 00001000 00000000 000= 00000 > 38 34 19 > sys_perfmon syslog sys_ptrace > > The patch set is for tip perf/core repository: > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip perf/core > tip sha1: ceb9e77324fa661b1001a0ae66f061b5fcb4e4e6 > > [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/perf_event_open.2.html > [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.ht= ml > [3] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html > [4] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/setcap.8.html > [5] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git > [6] https://sites.google.com/site/fullycapable/, posix_1003.1e-990310.p= df > > --- > Alexey Budankov (3): > capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space > perf/core: apply CAP_SYS_PERFMON to CPUs and kernel monitoring > perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_SYS_PERFMON support > > include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 ++++-- > include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 10 +++++++++- > security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++-- > tools/perf/design.txt | 3 ++- > tools/perf/util/cap.h | 4 ++++ > tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 +++++----- > tools/perf/util/util.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- > 7 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) >