From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756134AbYEZVLY (ORCPT ); Mon, 26 May 2008 17:11:24 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1753713AbYEZVLP (ORCPT ); Mon, 26 May 2008 17:11:15 -0400 Received: from smtp7-g19.free.fr ([212.27.42.64]:39413 "EHLO smtp7-g19.free.fr" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753067AbYEZVLO (ORCPT ); Mon, 26 May 2008 17:11:14 -0400 Message-ID: <1ed501c8bf74$95dd02a0$f9b5a8c0@pii350> From: "Gilles Espinasse" To: "Theodore Tso" , Cc: "Chris Peterson" , "Alan Cox" , "Lennart Sorensen" , "Jeff Garzik" , "Kok, Auke" , "Rick Jones" , "Glen Turner" References: <482C7E53.3050300@hp.com> <482C8184.2030906@garzik.org> <482C8550.5000909@intel.com> <482C8D4D.3040702@garzik.org> <20080516132107.GA11304@csclub.uwaterloo.ca> <20080516161029.44ded734@core> <20080516173610.GA27126@csclub.uwaterloo.ca> <20080516191125.46 <20080525232712.GF5970@mit.edu> Subject: Re: [PATCH] drivers/net: remove network drivers' last few uses of IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM Date: Mon, 26 May 2008 23:08:02 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1914 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1914 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org ----- Original Message ----- From: "Theodore Tso" To: "Glen Turner" Cc: "Chris Peterson" ; "Alan Cox" ; "Lennart Sorensen" ; "Jeff Garzik" ; "Kok, Auke" ; "Rick Jones" ; "Brandeburg, Jesse" Sent: Monday, May 26, 2008 1:27 AM Subject: Re: [PATCH] drivers/net: remove network drivers' last few uses of IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM ... > > There is a reason why /dev/random is world-writeable; it's perfectly > safe to write arbitary amounts of data into /dev/random. If the > attacker doesn't know what has been fixed into the entropy pool, his > life just got a lot harder. If it is the attacker mixing known data > into the pool, it's no worse. > man 4 random recommand to save /dev/urandom during stop and seed /dev/urandom at start. For wich reason is it not recommanded to save and seed using /dev/random? Gilles