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From: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alex@amutable.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
	 Christian Brauner	 <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	David Howells	 <dhowells@redhat.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>,  Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, 	linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
		linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 14:24:57 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1f12636403bb7af3759cd933b2612d8a5d7317a2.camel@amutable.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <awBHZO2VwWyJzvBN@kernel.org>

On Fri, 2026-11-20 at 15:13 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 20, 2026 at 01:32:57PM +0100, Alexander Mikhalitsyn
> wrote:
> > On Thu, 2026-11-19 at 15:27 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > On Thu, Nov 19, 2026 at 2:50 PM Andy Lutomirski
> > > <luto@amacapital.net>
> > > wrote:
> > > > 
> > > > On Thu, Nov 19, 2026 at 9:30 AM Josef Bacik
> > > > <josef@toxicpanda.com>
> > > > wrote:
> > > > > 
> > > > > On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 9:46 AM Andy Lutomirski
> > > > > <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> > > > > > cells: The dance where I create an anonymous mountns, mount
> > > > > > stuff into
> > > > > > it, and then attach it to the cell is cute.  But I think
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > userns
> > > > > > interaction is wrong: you are making me assemble all the
> > > > > > mounts
> > > > > > in
> > > > > > *my* userns and then clone the entire tree into a fresh,
> > > > > > non-
> > > > > > anonymous
> > > > > > mountns bound to the current userns.  And that clone
> > > > > > operation
> > > > > > is not
> > > > > > free and serves no actual practical purpose.
> > > > > 
> > > > > The copy buys us nothing, agreed.  That's just what the mount
> > > > > API
> > > > > gives
> > > > > me to work with today, it's not something cells wants.  If I
> > > > > could make
> > > > > an empty mount namespace and fill it by fd I'd use that, the
> > > > > "root" slot
> > > > > takes a mount namespace fd already.  Extending the API for
> > > > > that
> > > > > makes
> > > > > sense to me on its own.
> > > > > 
> > > > > The mount namespace staying with the builder's userns is on
> > > > > purpose
> > > > > though, that's what keeps the cell from mounting anything no
> > > > > matter what
> > > > > capabilities it was given.  The builder sets the tree up and
> > > > > hands it
> > > > > over, so the cell only ever has what it was given, and the
> > > > > mount
> > > > > code
> > > > > isn't something it can attack from the inside.
> > > > 
> > > > I don't get it.
> > > > 
> > > > Using the builder's user namespace means that the contained
> > > > processes
> > > > can't be ns_capable on mntns->userns.  But this solves very few
> > > > problems unless you also deny the contained processes the
> > > > ability
> > > > to
> > > > unshare userns and make a new mountns, and if you can do that,
> > > > surely
> > > > you can also deny the ability to modify the mount namespace.
> > > > 
> > > > As just one example, a mount namespace could have a little flag
> > > > to
> > > > say
> > > > that it's *in* one userns but its owner is a different userns.
> > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > > cells: I find it *incredibly annoying* that one generally
> > > > > > cannot put
> > > > > > new mounts into an existing container using most existing
> > > > > > container
> > > > > > managers.  I hit this on a surprisingly regular basis.  You
> > > > > > seem to be
> > > > > > baking this into the whole cells design.  Why?
> > > > > 
> > > > > By design.  Allowing changes to a running container is what
> > > > > causes the
> > > > > problems.  If you need another mount, tear it down and build
> > > > > it
> > > > > again.
> > > > 
> > > > What problems?
> > 
> > Dear friends,
> > 
> > Dear Andy,
> > 
> > > 
> > > I'll add:
> > > 
> > > On a non-container Linux system, you can hot-add a removable
> > > drive.
> > > On a Linux-hosted VM, you can hot-add all kinds of devices, with
> > > or
> > > without the help of the hypervisor.  (The hypervisor can hot-add
> > > a
> > > device, and the guest can mount network devices or newly added
> > > USB
> > > devices on a port that was already assigned, etc.)
> > > 
> > > For some reason, on Docker and its sort-of-clones, approximately
> > > the
> > > best you can do is rbind in a directory and then mount things
> > > into
> > > that directory from outside.  This is sad.
> > 
> > +1
> > 
> > I guess the root reason here is what you've mentioned - for VMs we
> > have
> > a clear separation of the host-side (hypervisor can hot-plug a
> > device
> > to be visible on a PCI bus, for example) and some agent on the
> > guest
> > side can react on this change and do something depending on how
> > VM's
> > owner has configured it.
> > 
> > For containers, we usually don't have an agent (at least in LXC,
> > OpenVZ
> > and Docker too). So it is a container manager's work to figure out
> > how
> > to hotplug a new filesystem for example and where to place the
> > mount.
> > And this was always a reason for some crazy security issues, when
> > some
> > privileged process on the host was entering a container's
> > namespaces
> > (partially) and then suddenly become trace-able or bring some host
> > FDs
> > (and these FDs could be a way to escape via (struct file*)->f_cred
> > permission delegation model).
> > 
> > Another reason is that in VM you hotplug a device, while in
> > container
> > you can only hotplug a mounted filesystem. And for devices we don't
> > care under which major/minor they land and so on - again, because
> > we
> > have systemd for example and it can figure this out. For filesystem
> > we
> > need to know where to place in in a mount namespace tree from the
> > beginning (we still don't allow mounting a block-device based
> > filesystems inside user namespaces).
> > 
> > I really like your point and that would be great if we can solve
> > this
> > somehow in a new design.

Dear Jarkko,

> 
> This is for v4 (latest).
> 
> MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS takes any nsfs CLONE_NEWNS fd, and populates
> CLONE_EMPTY_MNTNS directly and attaches live submounts without
> setns()
> and FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS mounts FS_USERNS_MOUNT filesystems
> unprivileged
> without entering userns.
> 
> The gaps would be open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE) gating (it's now against
> host), uid_map/gid_map prepopulation and a flag to deny mount table
> changes inside rootns() container while keeping external hot-mounts
> enabled.
> 
> Those are totally addressable issues.

Yeah, detached mounts API solves a security issue here, but it does not
fully enable the use-case Andy describes (if I understood it
correctly). My interpretation here is that to fully cover it we need
some well-isolated communication channel between container and
container manager (vsock for containers? :-D). And some well-defined
agreement of how PID 1 inside the container can get an information
about a hotplugg-ed stuff. [ But it could be that I completely
misunderstood and Andy meant something much more simple here. ]

Kind regards,
Alex

> 
> Br, Jarkko
>  

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-20 13:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-17 23:13 Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/13] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/13] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/13] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/13] rootns: Add rootns_create() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/13] rootns: Add rootns_wait() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/13] rootns: Add rootns_kill() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/13] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/13] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/13] fs: Support installing rootns mount trees via move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/13] arch: Wire up rootns system calls Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/13] docs: Document root namespace uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/13] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 23:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/13] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:47 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Josef Bacik
2026-11-18 15:28   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 15:39     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 15:46       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 16:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-18 17:04   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 17:08     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 17:30       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 17:46       ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-18 18:23         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 17:30         ` Josef Bacik
2026-11-19 17:43           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 17:51             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19 22:50           ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-19 23:27             ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-20 12:32               ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn
2026-11-20 13:13                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-20 13:24                   ` Alexander Mikhalitsyn [this message]
2026-11-20 13:57                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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