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From: Ryan Afranji <afranji@google.com>
To: afranji@google.com, ackerleytng@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	 seanjc@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, x86@kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,  tabba@google.com
Cc: mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	hpa@zytor.com,  shuah@kernel.org, andrew.jones@linux.dev,
	ricarkol@google.com,  chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com,
	jarkko@kernel.org, yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com,
	 vannapurve@google.com, erdemaktas@google.com,
	mail@maciej.szmigiero.name,  vbabka@suse.cz, david@redhat.com,
	qperret@google.com, michael.roth@amd.com,  wei.w.wang@intel.com,
	liam.merwick@oracle.com, isaku.yamahata@gmail.com,
	 kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, sagis@google.com,
	jthoughton@google.com
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 01/13] fs: Refactor to provide function that allocates a secure anonymous inode
Date: Fri, 16 May 2025 19:19:21 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1f42c32fc18d973b8ec97c8be8b7cd921912d42a.1747368092.git.afranji@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1747368092.git.afranji@google.com>

From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>

alloc_anon_secure_inode() returns an inode after running checks in
security_inode_init_security_anon().

Also refactor secretmem's file creation process to use the new
function.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Afranji <afranji@google.com>
---
 fs/anon_inodes.c   | 23 ++++++++++++++++-------
 include/linux/fs.h | 13 +++++++------
 mm/secretmem.c     |  9 +--------
 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/anon_inodes.c b/fs/anon_inodes.c
index 583ac81669c2..0ce28959c43a 100644
--- a/fs/anon_inodes.c
+++ b/fs/anon_inodes.c
@@ -55,17 +55,20 @@ static struct file_system_type anon_inode_fs_type = {
 	.kill_sb	= kill_anon_super,
 };
 
-static struct inode *anon_inode_make_secure_inode(
-	const char *name,
-	const struct inode *context_inode)
+static struct inode *anon_inode_make_secure_inode(struct super_block *s,
+		const char *name, const struct inode *context_inode,
+		bool fs_internal)
 {
 	struct inode *inode;
 	int error;
 
-	inode = alloc_anon_inode(anon_inode_mnt->mnt_sb);
+	inode = alloc_anon_inode(s);
 	if (IS_ERR(inode))
 		return inode;
-	inode->i_flags &= ~S_PRIVATE;
+
+	if (!fs_internal)
+		inode->i_flags &= ~S_PRIVATE;
+
 	error =	security_inode_init_security_anon(inode, &QSTR(name),
 						  context_inode);
 	if (error) {
@@ -75,6 +78,12 @@ static struct inode *anon_inode_make_secure_inode(
 	return inode;
 }
 
+struct inode *alloc_anon_secure_inode(struct super_block *s, const char *name)
+{
+	return anon_inode_make_secure_inode(s, name, NULL, true);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(alloc_anon_secure_inode);
+
 static struct file *__anon_inode_getfile(const char *name,
 					 const struct file_operations *fops,
 					 void *priv, int flags,
@@ -88,7 +97,8 @@ static struct file *__anon_inode_getfile(const char *name,
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
 
 	if (make_inode) {
-		inode =	anon_inode_make_secure_inode(name, context_inode);
+		inode = anon_inode_make_secure_inode(anon_inode_mnt->mnt_sb,
+						     name, context_inode, false);
 		if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
 			file = ERR_CAST(inode);
 			goto err;
@@ -318,4 +328,3 @@ static int __init anon_inode_init(void)
 }
 
 fs_initcall(anon_inode_init);
-
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 016b0fe1536e..8eeef9a7fe07 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ struct iattr {
  */
 #define FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH 2
 
-/** 
+/**
  * enum positive_aop_returns - aop return codes with specific semantics
  *
  * @AOP_WRITEPAGE_ACTIVATE: Informs the caller that page writeback has
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ struct iattr {
  * 			    be a candidate for writeback again in the near
  * 			    future.  Other callers must be careful to unlock
  * 			    the page if they get this return.  Returned by
- * 			    writepage(); 
+ * 			    writepage();
  *
  * @AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE: The AOP method that was handed a locked page has
  *  			unlocked it and the page might have been truncated.
@@ -1141,8 +1141,8 @@ struct file *get_file_active(struct file **f);
 
 #define	MAX_NON_LFS	((1UL<<31) - 1)
 
-/* Page cache limit. The filesystems should put that into their s_maxbytes 
-   limits, otherwise bad things can happen in VM. */ 
+/* Page cache limit. The filesystems should put that into their s_maxbytes
+   limits, otherwise bad things can happen in VM. */
 #if BITS_PER_LONG==32
 #define MAX_LFS_FILESIZE	((loff_t)ULONG_MAX << PAGE_SHIFT)
 #elif BITS_PER_LONG==64
@@ -2607,7 +2607,7 @@ int sync_inode_metadata(struct inode *inode, int wait);
 struct file_system_type {
 	const char *name;
 	int fs_flags;
-#define FS_REQUIRES_DEV		1 
+#define FS_REQUIRES_DEV		1
 #define FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA	2
 #define FS_HAS_SUBTYPE		4
 #define FS_USERNS_MOUNT		8	/* Can be mounted by userns root */
@@ -3195,7 +3195,7 @@ ssize_t __kernel_read(struct file *file, void *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos);
 extern ssize_t kernel_write(struct file *, const void *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern ssize_t __kernel_write(struct file *, const void *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern struct file * open_exec(const char *);
- 
+
 /* fs/dcache.c -- generic fs support functions */
 extern bool is_subdir(struct dentry *, struct dentry *);
 extern bool path_is_under(const struct path *, const struct path *);
@@ -3550,6 +3550,7 @@ extern int simple_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
 extern const struct address_space_operations ram_aops;
 extern int always_delete_dentry(const struct dentry *);
 extern struct inode *alloc_anon_inode(struct super_block *);
+extern struct inode *alloc_anon_secure_inode(struct super_block *, const char *);
 extern int simple_nosetlease(struct file *, int, struct file_lease **, void **);
 extern const struct dentry_operations simple_dentry_operations;
 
diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
index 1b0a214ee558..c0e459e58cb6 100644
--- a/mm/secretmem.c
+++ b/mm/secretmem.c
@@ -195,18 +195,11 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
 	struct file *file;
 	struct inode *inode;
 	const char *anon_name = "[secretmem]";
-	int err;
 
-	inode = alloc_anon_inode(secretmem_mnt->mnt_sb);
+	inode = alloc_anon_secure_inode(secretmem_mnt->mnt_sb, anon_name);
 	if (IS_ERR(inode))
 		return ERR_CAST(inode);
 
-	err = security_inode_init_security_anon(inode, &QSTR(anon_name), NULL);
-	if (err) {
-		file = ERR_PTR(err);
-		goto err_free_inode;
-	}
-
 	file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, secretmem_mnt, "secretmem",
 				 O_RDWR, &secretmem_fops);
 	if (IS_ERR(file))
-- 
2.49.0.1101.gccaa498523-goog


  reply	other threads:[~2025-05-16 19:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-05-16 19:19 [RFC PATCH v2 00/13] New KVM ioctl to link a gmem inode to a new gmem file Ryan Afranji
2025-05-16 19:19 ` Ryan Afranji [this message]
2025-05-16 19:19 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/13] KVM: guest_memfd: Make guest mem use guest mem inodes instead of anonymous inodes Ryan Afranji
2025-05-16 19:19 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/13] KVM: guest_mem: Refactor out kvm_gmem_alloc_view() Ryan Afranji
2025-05-16 19:19 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/13] KVM: guest_mem: Add ioctl KVM_LINK_GUEST_MEMFD Ryan Afranji
2025-05-16 19:19 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for KVM_LINK_GUEST_MEMFD ioctl Ryan Afranji
2025-05-16 19:19 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/13] KVM: selftests: Test transferring private memory to another VM Ryan Afranji
2025-05-16 19:19 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/13] KVM: x86: Refactor sev's flag migration_in_progress to kvm struct Ryan Afranji
2025-05-16 19:19 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/13] KVM: x86: Refactor common code out of sev.c Ryan Afranji
2025-05-16 19:19 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/13] KVM: x86: Refactor common migration preparation code out of sev_vm_move_enc_context_from Ryan Afranji
2025-05-16 19:19 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/13] KVM: x86: Let moving encryption context be configurable Ryan Afranji
2025-05-16 19:19 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/13] KVM: x86: Handle moving of memory context for intra-host migration Ryan Afranji
2025-05-16 19:19 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/13] KVM: selftests: Generalize migration functions from sev_migrate_tests.c Ryan Afranji
2025-05-16 19:19 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for migration of private mem Ryan Afranji

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