From: Security Coordinator <security@aptusventures.com>
To: rjh@world.std.com, jijo@free.net.ph
Cc: bugtraq@securityfocus.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Very large font size crashing X Font Server and Grounding Server to a Halt (was: remote DoS in Mozilla 1.0)
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2002 09:50:57 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20020614145331.E95A1137BB@smtp.h3technology.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <200206131626.MAA20634@TheWorld.com>
On Thursday 13 June 2002 12:26, rjh@world.std.com wrote:
Exactly, any user without limits can arbitrarily "fork bomb" a system too. A
shell script and newbie level programming talent is all you need... That
whole class of DoS are hard to stop. You can do 100 things, like starve a
system of file handles, open 50,000 listen ports, whatever. You can set
limits, but there are not even standard APIs for limiting every conceivable
exhaustible resource systems allocate.
> On 13 Jun, Federico Sevilla III wrote:
> > Suggestions on how to work around this on multiple levels would
> > definitely be appreciated. I'll be starting by removing the X font server
> > from our file and authentication server onto some high-powered
> > workstation, but I'm sure this won't be enough, and knowing that a user
> > process like xfs-daemon can drag the Linux kernel down to knees is not
> > very comforting. :(
>
> The protection that you need is provided by "ulimit" on most Unixes.
> There are facilities to limit maximum real memory used, maximum virtual
> memory, maximum number of processes, etc. This specific bug in XFree is
> one of a general case of inescapable user process bugs. It resulted in
> an almost infinite size malloc() request. You can acheive the same
> effect in any userspace program by just putting malloc() inside an
> infinite loop.
>
> If you allow users to run with unlimited memory permission, you are
> vulnerable. The XFree bug will hit more people than usual because it is
> common to put the ulimit on regular user logins and forget to place a
> limit on the automatically started processes. The default configuration
> from RedHat, SuSE, and others is to start XFree outside the login
> system. You can also place limits on these processes but you need to
> examine the startup scripts to install the limits in the right places.
>
> This would then result in a different DoS. Whenever XFree hits the
> memory limit, the malloc's will fail, and XFree will decide what to do
> about it. Depending on the circumstances, XFree may shut down, thus
> killing all the X window dependent processes.
>
> R Horn
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2002-06-14 13:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20020610102006.A6947@lemuria.org>
2002-06-13 1:44 ` Federico Sevilla III
2002-06-13 5:39 ` Very large font size crashing X Font Server and Grounding Server to Alan Cox
2002-06-13 5:57 ` rlimits and non overcommit (was: Very large font size ...) Federico Sevilla III
2002-06-13 6:11 ` Keith Owens
2002-06-13 9:25 ` rlimits and non overcommit Federico Sevilla III
2002-06-13 7:18 ` Very large font size crashing X Font Server and Grounding Server to a Halt (was: remote DoS in Mozilla 1.0) Matti Aarnio
2002-06-13 16:26 ` rjh
2002-06-14 13:50 ` Security Coordinator [this message]
2002-06-13 21:10 ` Matthew Wakeling
2002-06-13 22:33 ` Very large font size crashing X Font Server and Grounding Server to a Halt Bernd Eckenfels
2002-06-13 16:53 Very large font size crashing X Font Server and Grounding Server to a Halt (was: remote DoS in Mozilla 1.0) Melchior FRANZ
2002-06-13 17:17 Melchior FRANZ
2002-06-13 17:34 ` Billy O'Connor
2002-06-13 18:44 ` Melchior FRANZ
2002-06-13 21:47 Jesse Pollard
2002-06-13 22:09 ` Matthew Wakeling
2002-06-14 13:46 Juliusz Chroboczek
2002-06-22 1:36 ` Alan Cox
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