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From: Oliver Xymoron <oxymoron@waste.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger@clusterfs.com>
Subject: Re: Problem with random.c and PPC
Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2002 11:56:40 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20020817165640.GB21829@waste.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20020817090950.GN9642@clusterfs.com>

On Sat, Aug 17, 2002 at 03:09:50AM -0600, Andreas Dilger wrote:
> > 
> > Not sure this is an ideal fix. We might instead have an entropy
> > low-water mark (say 1/2 pool size), below which /dev/urandom will not
> > deplete the pool. This way when we have ample entropy, both devices
> > will behave like TRNGs, with /dev/urandom falling back to PRNG when a
> > shortage is threatened.
> 
> Well, I can think of a few mechanisms that would work better than a
> simple on/off method that you are proposing.  The current code will
> basically "fill" the urandom pool each time it is depleted, and then
> when the entropy is gone it will just go on dumping out data.  You
> could make urandom only get more entropy each N times through its pool,
> or make N a function of the "fullness" of the available entropy.  Then
> if a system has lots of entropy sources urandom is TRNG, but if not
> it will gracefully degrade from TRNG to PRNG without wiping out all
> the entropy in the process.
> 
> As an alternative, instead of taking poolsize bytes of entropy each
> N uses, you could take some small amount of entropy to mix into the
> pool slowly.

Actually, that gives us exactly the scenario catastrophic reseeding
intends to avoid. Presume for a moment that the internal state of the
PRNG is somehow known to an attacker - the PRNG has been broken. If we
take eight bits out of the entropy pool, mix them in, then generate a
new random number, an attacker needs to only test 256 possible pool
states before he knows the entire state again. If he keeps up this
state extension attack, /dev/urandom will never return to an unknown
state. If, on the other hand, /dev/urandom waits until there are, say,
64 entropy bits to mix in, it can make a leap to a state that the
attacker will have a very hard time guessing and the PRNG has
recovered.

We merely need to avoid starvation of /dev/random, and I think a
straightforward low watermark approach will do that nicely. Starving
/dev/urandom is no worse than feeding it a trickle. 

-- 
 "Love the dolphins," she advised him. "Write by W.A.S.T.E.." 

  reply	other threads:[~2002-08-17 16:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2002-08-16 10:00 Jon Burgess
2002-08-16 19:52 ` Oliver Xymoron
2002-08-16 17:51   ` henrique
2002-08-16 21:21     ` Ruth Ivimey-Cook
2002-08-17  0:47       ` Oliver Xymoron
2002-08-17  0:45     ` Oliver Xymoron
2002-08-17  6:05       ` Andreas Dilger
2002-08-17  7:23         ` Oliver Xymoron
2002-08-17  9:09           ` Andreas Dilger
2002-08-17 16:56             ` Oliver Xymoron [this message]
2002-08-19  9:29           ` Marco Colombo
2002-08-19 14:02             ` Oliver Xymoron
2002-08-19 15:11               ` Marco Colombo
2002-08-19 15:29                 ` Oliver Xymoron
2002-08-19 16:20                   ` Marco Colombo
2002-08-19 16:33                     ` Oliver Xymoron
2002-08-19 20:23                       ` Marco Colombo
2002-08-22  3:16             ` David Wagner
2002-08-16 20:52   ` Chris Friesen
2002-08-17  0:29     ` Oliver Xymoron
2002-08-22  3:19     ` David Wagner
2002-08-22 15:40       ` Chris Friesen
2002-08-22 17:25       ` Remco Post
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2002-08-15 16:10 henrique
2002-08-15 15:14 henrique
2002-08-15 18:25 ` Andreas Dilger
2002-08-15 19:03   ` Tom Rini
2002-08-15 19:59     ` Andreas Dilger
2002-08-15 21:04       ` Tom Rini
2002-08-16  1:50         ` H. Peter Anvin
2002-08-16 16:33           ` Oliver Xymoron
2002-08-16 16:28         ` Oliver Xymoron
     [not found]           ` <20020816170126.GD26993@opus.bloom.county>
2002-08-16 17:15             ` Oliver Xymoron

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