From: Chris Wright <chris@wirex.com>
To: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org>
Cc: Kernel List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Linux 2.5 and Zsh bug
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2002 15:03:15 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20021018150315.F26442@figure1.int.wirex.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1034974867.5475.26.camel@dell_ss3.pdx.osdl.net>; from shemminger@osdl.org on Fri, Oct 18, 2002 at 02:01:07PM -0700
* Stephen Hemminger (shemminger@osdl.org) wrote:
> When running zsh on a Linux 2.5 kernel, the prompt always has a hash
> sign '#' rather than the normal user '$'. This probably happens because
> the shell function privasserted() is returning true for all users. I
> know nothing about Posix capabilities but the zsh code for this looks
> suspicious.
See if this patch fixes your problem. There is a bug in capget(2) which
is called by cap_get_proc(3). I was holding off on submitting this patch
to Linus until the LSM stuff is resolved.
thanks,
-chris
--- 2.5.43/kernel/capability.c Sun Sep 15 12:19:29 2002
+++ 2.5.43-capget/kernel/capability.c Wed Oct 16 00:51:33 2002
@@ -54,15 +54,15 @@
spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
- target = find_task_by_pid(pid);
- if (!target) {
- ret = -ESRCH;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (pid && pid != current->pid) {
+ target = find_task_by_pid(pid);
+ if (!target) {
+ ret = -ESRCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else
+ target = current;
- data.permitted = cap_t(target->cap_permitted);
- data.inheritable = cap_t(target->cap_inheritable);
- data.effective = cap_t(target->cap_effective);
ret = security_ops->capget(target, &data.effective, &data.inheritable, &data.permitted);
out:
--- 2.5.43/security/dummy.c Fri Oct 11 14:22:54 2002
+++ 2.5.43-capget/security/dummy.c Tue Oct 15 00:47:24 2002
@@ -27,6 +27,17 @@
static int dummy_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t * effective,
kernel_cap_t * inheritable, kernel_cap_t * permitted)
{
+ *effective = *inheritable = *permitted = 0;
+ if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
+ if (target->euid == 0) {
+ *permitted |= (~0 & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
+ *effective |= (~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP) & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
+ }
+ if (target->fsuid == 0) {
+ *permitted |= CAP_FS_MASK;
+ *effective |= CAP_FS_MASK;
+ }
+ }
return 0;
}
--
Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net
prev parent reply other threads:[~2002-10-18 22:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2002-10-18 21:01 Stephen Hemminger
2002-10-18 22:03 ` Chris Wright [this message]
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