From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S264363AbUBRKyp (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Feb 2004 05:54:45 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S264364AbUBRKyp (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Feb 2004 05:54:45 -0500 Received: from fw.osdl.org ([65.172.181.6]:11203 "EHLO mail.osdl.org") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S264363AbUBRKyn (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Feb 2004 05:54:43 -0500 Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2004 02:55:49 -0800 From: Andrew Morton To: Andi Kleen Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: 2.6.3-mm1 Message-Id: <20040218025549.4e7c56a1.akpm@osdl.org> In-Reply-To: References: <20040217232130.61667965.akpm@osdl.org.suse.lists.linux.kernel> X-Mailer: Sylpheed version 0.9.4 (GTK+ 1.2.10; i686-pc-linux-gnu) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Andi Kleen wrote: > > Andrew Morton writes: > > > ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/akpm/patches/2.6/2.6.3/2.6.3-mm1/ > > > > - Added the dm-crypt driver: a crypto layer for device-mapper. > > > > People need to test and use this please. There is documentation at > > http://www.saout.de/misc/dm-crypt/. > > > > We should get this tested and merged up. We can then remove the nasty > > bio remapping code from the loop driver. This will remove the current > > ordering guarantees which the loop driver provides for journalled > > filesystems. ie: ext3 on cryptoloop will no longer be crash-proof. > > > > After that we should remove cryptoloop altogether. > > > > It's a bit late but cyptoloop hasn't been there for long anyway and it > > doesn't even work right with highmem systems (that part is fixed in -mm). > > Is it guaranteed that this thing will be disk format compatible to cryptoloop? > (mainly in IVs and crypto algorithms) Allegedly. Of course, doing this will simply retain crypto-loop's security weaknesses. > While 2.3 and 2.4 have broken the on disk format of crypto loop several > times (each time to a new "improved and ultimately perfect format") > I don't think that's acceptable for a mature OS anymore. Well I guess people are free to do that sort of thing with out-of-kernel patches. One question which needs to be adressed is whether dm-crypt adequately addresses crypto-loop's security weaknesses, and if so, how one should set it up to do so.