From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S264269AbUENBB2 (ORCPT ); Thu, 13 May 2004 21:01:28 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S264272AbUENBB2 (ORCPT ); Thu, 13 May 2004 21:01:28 -0400 Received: from fw.osdl.org ([65.172.181.6]:17863 "EHLO mail.osdl.org") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S264269AbUENBB1 (ORCPT ); Thu, 13 May 2004 21:01:27 -0400 Date: Thu, 13 May 2004 18:01:24 -0700 From: Chris Wright To: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Chris Wright , Andrew Morton , Christoph Hellwig , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: 2.6.6-mm2 Message-ID: <20040513180124.C22989@build.pdx.osdl.net> References: <40A417EC.7010604@myrealbox.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.2.5i In-Reply-To: <40A417EC.7010604@myrealbox.com>; from luto@myrealbox.com on Thu, May 13, 2004 at 05:50:52PM -0700 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org * Andy Lutomirski (luto@myrealbox.com) wrote: > Chris Wright wrote: > > What about something that's just simple and generic? This is similar to > > Andrea's disable_cap_mlock patch and the disabling capabilities patch > > that wli produced back in that thread. It would remove the hack, and > > buy us some time to find better solutions. Downside of course (as all > > of these have) is reduced security value. > > I actually like the magic group better. This one means that _anyone_ > can DoS the system. Why not just give Oracle its own LSM if this is > what you want to do (that way the nastiness is completely isolated)? Magic group has better safety property, but it evolved from disable_cap_mlock which for CAP_IPC_LOCK has the identical property to this patch. Agreed it's safer w/out, but the magic group is so special purpose that it feels like a hack. This patch is more contained and IMO is just a hold over until we have something that really works. > My patch (posted a couple hours ago) solves this one > cleanly I'll comment on that separately ;-) thanks, -chris -- Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net