From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S261186AbUENOMM (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 May 2004 10:12:12 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S261184AbUENOML (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 May 2004 10:12:11 -0400 Received: from irulan.endorphin.org ([212.13.208.107]:52996 "EHLO irulan.endorphin.org") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S261186AbUENOKS (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 May 2004 10:10:18 -0400 Date: Fri, 14 May 2004 16:09:58 +0200 To: Jari Ruusu Cc: Michal Ludvig , Andrew Morton , jmorris@redhat.com, davem@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] Support for VIA PadLock crypto engine Message-ID: <20040514140958.GA8645@ghanima.endorphin.org> References: <40A37118.ED58E781@users.sourceforge.net> <20040513113028.085194a3.akpm@osdl.org> <40A3C639.4FD98046@users.sourceforge.net> <40A4CA28.4E575107@users.sourceforge.net> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="M9NhX3UHpAaciwkO" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <40A4CA28.4E575107@users.sourceforge.net> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.6i From: Fruhwirth Clemens X-Delivery-Agent: TMDA/0.92 (Kauai King) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org --M9NhX3UHpAaciwkO Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Fri, May 14, 2004 at 04:31:20PM +0300, Jari Ruusu wrote: > Michal Ludvig wrote: > > On Thu, 13 May 2004, Jari Ruusu wrote: > > > Andrew Morton wrote: > > > > Jari Ruusu wrote: > > > > > The cryptoloop implementation is busted in more than one way, so= it is > > > > > useless for security needs: > > > > > > > > Is dm-crypt any better? > > > > > > Nope. dm-crypt has same exploitable cryptographic flaws. > >=20 > > Could you be more descriptive? >=20 > cryptoloop and dm-crypt on-disk formats are FUBAR: precomputable cipherte= xts > of known plaintext, and weak IV computation. Anything that claims > "cryptoloop compatible", and only that, is completely FUBAR. dm-crypt is > such. IOW, there are now _two_ backdoored device crypto implementations in > mainline. Jari, you're starting to annoy me. You have been campaigning with FUD against cryptoloop/dm-crypt for too long now. There are NO exploitable security holes in neither dm-crypt nor cryptoloop. There is room for improving both IV deducation schemes, but it's a theoretic weakness, one which should be corrected nonetheless. However, modern ciphers are designed to resist known-plaintext attacks. The default setup of loop-aes' initrd is a greater threat to security, but wait for my paper on this. In the meantime, stop spreading FUD, especially stop abusing the term "backdoored"! Clemens --M9NhX3UHpAaciwkO Content-Type: application/pgp-signature Content-Disposition: inline -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.3 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFApNM2W7sr9DEJLk4RAjPKAJ9dXEUrU75EeEIa+29maxA0vvUhdQCbBvvQ f2PGfWfFAssfLR8Kr8BF2S4= =M5Zo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --M9NhX3UHpAaciwkO--