From: Andrey Savochkin <saw@saw.sw.com.sg>
To: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: exec: atomic MAY_EXEC check and SUID/SGID handling
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 2004 11:21:33 +0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20040903112133.A1834@castle.nmd.msu.ru> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20040902133109.H1973@build.pdx.osdl.net>; from "Chris Wright" on Thu, Sep 02, 2004 at 01:31:09PM
On Thu, Sep 02, 2004 at 01:31:09PM -0700, Chris Wright wrote:
> * Andrey Savochkin (saw@saw.sw.com.sg) wrote:
> > There is a time window between permission(MAY_EXEC) check in
> > open_exec() and S_ISUID check plus bprm->e_uid setting in prepare_binprm().
> > And S_ISUID is checked and bprm->e_uid is copied from the inode without
> > any serialization with attribute updates.
> >
> > That means that some executable may have permissions
> > -rwxr-xr-x root disk /bin/file
> > at the moment of MAY_EXEC check and
> > -rwsr-x--- root disk /bin/file
> > at the moment of S_ISUID check, providing lucky users starting /bin/file at
> > the moment of permission change with a setuid-root program.
> >
> > It's arguable whether it's a big security issue, but certainly such behavior
> > is not what administrators may expect.
>
> If you can find a way for a user to exploit this it's an issue. Looks
Exploiting it requires waiting for the administrator to change file
permissions... May be, some social engineering.
But THERE IS a race, which may result in user having more permissions than
he is expected to have.
I'm not comfortable living with such a race.
Instead of
inode->i_mode = attr->ia_mode;
we can write inode_setattr() as
inode->i_mode |= 06777;
inode->i_mode &= attr->ia_mode;
Will it be easily exploitable? I guess, no.
Will I be comfortable if the code is vulnerable in this way? No.
> like it's not, and doesn't warrant such a big change as your patch.
> The fact that you introduce a new field and then almost always supply it
> with NULL is a clue that it's not the right direction IMO. Something
> simple (as you mentioned) that grabs i_sem and rechecks during suid
> setup in binprm_prepare is sufficient. Worth it? Guess I'm not
> convinced.
I explained my arguments against re-checking permissions:
- the locking convention where ->permission() method may be called with or
without i_sem doesn't look suberb;
- it's better to avoid calling permission() with the same arguments for
the second time, especially if it does something complicated in
security_inode_permission(), with ACLs or in case of a remote filesystem.
Andrey
prev parent reply other threads:[~2004-09-03 7:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2004-09-02 13:45 [PATCH] " Andrey Savochkin
2004-09-02 20:31 ` Chris Wright
2004-09-03 7:21 ` Andrey Savochkin [this message]
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