From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S262175AbVGFMKr (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 Jul 2005 08:10:47 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S262118AbVGFMKq (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 Jul 2005 08:10:46 -0400 Received: from gprs189-60.eurotel.cz ([160.218.189.60]:8071 "EHLO amd.ucw.cz") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S262257AbVGFJMm (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 Jul 2005 05:12:42 -0400 Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2005 11:11:57 +0200 From: Pavel Machek To: Andrew Morton Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, ast@domdv.de Subject: Re: [swsusp] encrypt suspend data for easy wiping Message-ID: <20050706091104.GB1301@elf.ucw.cz> References: <20050703213519.GA6750@elf.ucw.cz> <20050706020251.2ba175cc.akpm@osdl.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20050706020251.2ba175cc.akpm@osdl.org> X-Warning: Reading this can be dangerous to your mental health. User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.9i Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi! > > To prevent data gathering from swap after resume you can encrypt the > > suspend image with a temporary key that is deleted on resume. Note > > that the temporary key is stored unencrypted on disk while the system > > is suspended... still it means that saved data are wiped from disk > > during resume by simply overwritting the key. > > hm, how useful is that? swap can still contain sensitive userspace > stuff. At least userspace has chance to mark *really* sensitive stuff as unswappable. Unfortunately that does not work against swsusp :-(. [BTW... I was thinking about just generating random key on swapon, and using it, so that data in swap is garbage after reboot; no userspace changes needed. What do you think?] > Are there any plans to allow the user to type the key in on resume? Plans... ;-). > > +Encrypted suspend image: > > +------------------------ > > +If you want to store your suspend image encrypted with a temporary > > +key to prevent data gathering after resume you must compile > > +crypto and the aes algorithm into the kernel - modules won't work > > +as they cannot be loaded at resume time. > > Why not just `select' the needed symbols in Kconfig? It makes > configuration much easier for the user. > > > + if(!*tfm) { > > + if(sizeof(key) < crypto_tfm_alg_min_keysize(*tfm)) { > > + if (mode) { > > Coding style nit: please use a single space after `if'. > > > +fail: crypto_free_tfm(*tfm); > > +out: return error; > > We conventionally insert a newline directly after labels. > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SWSUSP_ENCRYPT > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SWSUSP_ENCRYPT > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SWSUSP_ENCRYPT > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SWSUSP_ENCRYPT > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SWSUSP_ENCRYPT > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SWSUSP_ENCRYPT > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SWSUSP_ENCRYPT > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SWSUSP_ENCRYPT > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SWSUSP_ENCRYPT > > err, no. Please find a way to reduce the ifdeffery. Andreas, these are yours. Pavel -- teflon -- maybe it is a trademark, but it should not be.