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From: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
To: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Cc: bcrl@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH, V2] i386: instead of poisoning .init zone, change protection bits to force a fault
Date: Sat, 4 Feb 2006 14:41:11 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20060204144111.7e33569f.akpm@osdl.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <43DD2C15.1090800@cosmosbay.com>

Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com> wrote:
>
> 
> Chasing some invalid accesses to .init zone, I found that free_init_pages() 
> was properly freeing the pages but virtual was still usable.
> 
> A poisoning (memset(page, 0xcc, PAGE_SIZE)) was done but this is not reliable.
> 
> A new config option DEBUG_INITDATA is introduced to mark this initdata as not 
> present at all so that buggy code can trigger a fault.
> 
> This option is not meant for production machines because it may split one or 
> two huge page (2MB or 4MB) into small pages and thus slow down kernel a bit.
> 
> (After that we could map non possible cpu percpu data to the initial 
> percpudata that is included in .init and discarded in free_initmem())
> 
> ...
>
> --- a/arch/i386/mm/init.c	2006-01-25 10:17:24.000000000 +0100
> +++ b/arch/i386/mm/init.c	2006-01-29 22:38:53.000000000 +0100
> @@ -750,11 +750,18 @@
>  	for (addr = begin; addr < end; addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
>  		ClearPageReserved(virt_to_page(addr));
>  		set_page_count(virt_to_page(addr), 1);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INITDATA
> +		change_page_attr(virt_to_page(addr), 1, __pgprot(0));
> +#else
>  		memset((void *)addr, 0xcc, PAGE_SIZE);
> +#endif
>  		free_page(addr);
>  		totalram_pages++;
>  	}
>  	printk(KERN_INFO "Freeing %s: %ldk freed\n", what, (end - begin) >> 10);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INITDATA
> +	global_flush_tlb();
> +#endif
>  }
>  

This doesn't seem very pointful.

We unmap the page, then return it to the page allocator.  Then someone
reallocates the page, tries to use it and goes oops.

If CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC is also set, the kernel will remap the page when
it's allocated and everything works OK.  So this patch requires
CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC.

But if CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC is set, we'll have unmapped that page in
free_page() _anyway_, so why bother using this patch?

The only enhancement I can think of here is to not free the page, so it's
permanently leaked and permanently unmapped.

--- devel/arch/i386/mm/init.c~i386-instead-of-poisoning-init-zone-change-protection-fix	2006-02-04 14:33:33.000000000 -0800
+++ devel-akpm/arch/i386/mm/init.c	2006-02-04 14:34:07.000000000 -0800
@@ -751,11 +751,15 @@ void free_init_pages(char *what, unsigne
 		ClearPageReserved(virt_to_page(addr));
 		set_page_count(virt_to_page(addr), 1);
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INITDATA
+		/*
+		 * Unmap the page, and leak it.  So any further accesses will
+		 * oops.
+		 */
 		change_page_attr(virt_to_page(addr), 1, __pgprot(0));
 #else
 		memset((void *)addr, 0xcc, PAGE_SIZE);
-#endif
 		free_page(addr);
+#endif
 		totalram_pages++;
 	}
 	printk(KERN_INFO "Freeing %s: %ldk freed\n", what, (end - begin) >> 10);
_

But is there much point in doing this?  Does it offer much more than
CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC?


  parent reply	other threads:[~2006-02-04 22:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2006-01-29  6:26 [PATCH] i386: Add a temporary to make put_user more type safe Eric W. Biederman
2006-01-29  6:39 ` Andrew Morton
2006-01-29  6:49   ` Eric W. Biederman
2006-01-29  7:51     ` Andrew Morton
     [not found]       ` <200601291620.28291.ioe-lkml@rameria.de>
2006-01-29 19:33         ` Andrew Morton
2006-01-29 20:04           ` [PATCH] i386: instead of poisoning .init zone, change protection bits to force a fault Eric Dumazet
2006-01-29 20:05             ` Benjamin LaHaise
2006-01-29 20:28               ` Eric Dumazet
2006-01-29 20:56               ` [PATCH, V2] " Eric Dumazet
2006-01-30  9:03                 ` Questions about alloc_large_system_hash() and TLB entries Eric Dumazet
2006-01-30  9:22                   ` David S. Miller
2006-01-30 10:22                     ` Eric Dumazet
2006-02-04 22:41                 ` Andrew Morton [this message]
2006-02-05 17:03                   ` [PATCH, V2] i386: instead of poisoning .init zone, change protection bits to force a fault Eric Dumazet
2006-02-05 19:42                     ` Andrew Morton
2006-02-06  8:53                       ` Eric Dumazet
2006-02-06  9:02                   ` Eric Dumazet
2006-02-06  9:28                     ` Andrew Morton
2006-02-06 10:07                       ` Eric Dumazet
2006-02-06 10:16                         ` Andrew Morton

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