From: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
To: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Cc: bcrl@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH, V2] i386: instead of poisoning .init zone, change protection bits to force a fault
Date: Sat, 4 Feb 2006 14:41:11 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20060204144111.7e33569f.akpm@osdl.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <43DD2C15.1090800@cosmosbay.com>
Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com> wrote:
>
>
> Chasing some invalid accesses to .init zone, I found that free_init_pages()
> was properly freeing the pages but virtual was still usable.
>
> A poisoning (memset(page, 0xcc, PAGE_SIZE)) was done but this is not reliable.
>
> A new config option DEBUG_INITDATA is introduced to mark this initdata as not
> present at all so that buggy code can trigger a fault.
>
> This option is not meant for production machines because it may split one or
> two huge page (2MB or 4MB) into small pages and thus slow down kernel a bit.
>
> (After that we could map non possible cpu percpu data to the initial
> percpudata that is included in .init and discarded in free_initmem())
>
> ...
>
> --- a/arch/i386/mm/init.c 2006-01-25 10:17:24.000000000 +0100
> +++ b/arch/i386/mm/init.c 2006-01-29 22:38:53.000000000 +0100
> @@ -750,11 +750,18 @@
> for (addr = begin; addr < end; addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
> ClearPageReserved(virt_to_page(addr));
> set_page_count(virt_to_page(addr), 1);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INITDATA
> + change_page_attr(virt_to_page(addr), 1, __pgprot(0));
> +#else
> memset((void *)addr, 0xcc, PAGE_SIZE);
> +#endif
> free_page(addr);
> totalram_pages++;
> }
> printk(KERN_INFO "Freeing %s: %ldk freed\n", what, (end - begin) >> 10);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INITDATA
> + global_flush_tlb();
> +#endif
> }
>
This doesn't seem very pointful.
We unmap the page, then return it to the page allocator. Then someone
reallocates the page, tries to use it and goes oops.
If CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC is also set, the kernel will remap the page when
it's allocated and everything works OK. So this patch requires
CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC.
But if CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC is set, we'll have unmapped that page in
free_page() _anyway_, so why bother using this patch?
The only enhancement I can think of here is to not free the page, so it's
permanently leaked and permanently unmapped.
--- devel/arch/i386/mm/init.c~i386-instead-of-poisoning-init-zone-change-protection-fix 2006-02-04 14:33:33.000000000 -0800
+++ devel-akpm/arch/i386/mm/init.c 2006-02-04 14:34:07.000000000 -0800
@@ -751,11 +751,15 @@ void free_init_pages(char *what, unsigne
ClearPageReserved(virt_to_page(addr));
set_page_count(virt_to_page(addr), 1);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INITDATA
+ /*
+ * Unmap the page, and leak it. So any further accesses will
+ * oops.
+ */
change_page_attr(virt_to_page(addr), 1, __pgprot(0));
#else
memset((void *)addr, 0xcc, PAGE_SIZE);
-#endif
free_page(addr);
+#endif
totalram_pages++;
}
printk(KERN_INFO "Freeing %s: %ldk freed\n", what, (end - begin) >> 10);
_
But is there much point in doing this? Does it offer much more than
CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2006-02-04 22:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2006-01-29 6:26 [PATCH] i386: Add a temporary to make put_user more type safe Eric W. Biederman
2006-01-29 6:39 ` Andrew Morton
2006-01-29 6:49 ` Eric W. Biederman
2006-01-29 7:51 ` Andrew Morton
[not found] ` <200601291620.28291.ioe-lkml@rameria.de>
2006-01-29 19:33 ` Andrew Morton
2006-01-29 20:04 ` [PATCH] i386: instead of poisoning .init zone, change protection bits to force a fault Eric Dumazet
2006-01-29 20:05 ` Benjamin LaHaise
2006-01-29 20:28 ` Eric Dumazet
2006-01-29 20:56 ` [PATCH, V2] " Eric Dumazet
2006-01-30 9:03 ` Questions about alloc_large_system_hash() and TLB entries Eric Dumazet
2006-01-30 9:22 ` David S. Miller
2006-01-30 10:22 ` Eric Dumazet
2006-02-04 22:41 ` Andrew Morton [this message]
2006-02-05 17:03 ` [PATCH, V2] i386: instead of poisoning .init zone, change protection bits to force a fault Eric Dumazet
2006-02-05 19:42 ` Andrew Morton
2006-02-06 8:53 ` Eric Dumazet
2006-02-06 9:02 ` Eric Dumazet
2006-02-06 9:28 ` Andrew Morton
2006-02-06 10:07 ` Eric Dumazet
2006-02-06 10:16 ` Andrew Morton
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