From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932326AbWDRUg6 (ORCPT ); Tue, 18 Apr 2006 16:36:58 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S932329AbWDRUg5 (ORCPT ); Tue, 18 Apr 2006 16:36:57 -0400 Received: from e6.ny.us.ibm.com ([32.97.182.146]:42669 "EHLO e6.ny.us.ibm.com") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932326AbWDRUg4 (ORCPT ); Tue, 18 Apr 2006 16:36:56 -0400 Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2006 15:36:53 -0500 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: Stephen Smalley Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" , Alan Cox , Gerrit Huizenga , Christoph Hellwig , James Morris , casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, fireflier-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: Re: [RESEND][RFC][PATCH 2/7] implementation of LSM hooks Message-ID: <20060418203653.GJ29302@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> References: <1145386009.21723.27.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20060418195956.GH29302@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> <1145391612.16632.236.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1145391612.16632.236.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.11 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Quoting Stephen Smalley (sds@tycho.nsa.gov): > On Tue, 2006-04-18 at 14:59 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > Quoting Alan Cox (alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk): > > > On Maw, 2006-04-18 at 09:50 -0700, Gerrit Huizenga wrote: > > > > or are there places where a "less than perfect, easy to use, good enough" > > > > security policy? I believe there is room for both based on the end > > > > users' needs and desires. But that is just my opinion. > > > > > > Poor security systems lead to less security than no security because it > > > lulls people into a false sense of security. Someone who knows their > > > > Not wanting to make any digs one way or another, but because the culture > > right now refuses to admit it I must point out: > > > > So does "security" which is too complicated and therefore ends up > > misconfigured (or disabled). > > Not sure who refuses to admit it, but there is plenty of work in > progress to improve SELinux useability. But that doesn't require Yes, absolutely, some very good work. I used to think I'd want selinux protecting the TCB, but worried about user customizations threatening the integrity of the TCB policy. But the namespace extension (.) may even allay that fear. -serge