From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1750708AbWDSBtE (ORCPT ); Tue, 18 Apr 2006 21:49:04 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1750715AbWDSBtE (ORCPT ); Tue, 18 Apr 2006 21:49:04 -0400 Received: from web36606.mail.mud.yahoo.com ([209.191.85.23]:50575 "HELO web36606.mail.mud.yahoo.com") by vger.kernel.org with SMTP id S1750708AbWDSBtB (ORCPT ); Tue, 18 Apr 2006 21:49:01 -0400 Message-ID: <20060419014857.35628.qmail@web36606.mail.mud.yahoo.com> X-RocketYMMF: rancidfat Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2006 18:48:56 -0700 (PDT) From: Casey Schaufler Reply-To: casey@schaufler-ca.com Subject: Re: [RESEND][RFC][PATCH 2/7] implementation of LSM hooks To: James Morris Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, fireflier-devel@lists.sourceforge.net In-Reply-To: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org --- James Morris wrote: > With pathnames, there is an unbounded and unknown > number of effective > security policies on the system, as there are an > unbounded and unknown > number of ways of viewing the files via pathnames. I agree that for traditional DAC and MAC (including the flavors supported by SELinux) inodes is the only way to go. SELinux is a traditional Trusted OS architecture and addresses the traditional Trusted OS issues. But as someone demonstrated earlier, not everyone believes that an EAL makes them feel secure and that is what LSM is really all about, allowing people who don't care about Protection Profiles but who do care about security to do something about it. How many of you have lambasted me over the years because I bled Orange? If SELinux is the only "secure" Linux haven't the Orange Book/Common Criteria people proven right in the end? Casey Schaufler casey@schaufler-ca.com