From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1750795AbWDXN1F (ORCPT ); Mon, 24 Apr 2006 09:27:05 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1750803AbWDXN1E (ORCPT ); Mon, 24 Apr 2006 09:27:04 -0400 Received: from gprs189-60.eurotel.cz ([160.218.189.60]:34192 "EHLO amd.ucw.cz") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750795AbWDXN1C (ORCPT ); Mon, 24 Apr 2006 09:27:02 -0400 Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2006 15:04:07 +0200 From: Pavel Machek To: "Theodore Ts'o" , Neil Brown , Stephen Smalley , Chris Wright , James Morris , Arjan van de Ven , Andi Kleen , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/11] security: AppArmor - Overview Message-ID: <20060424130406.GA1884@elf.ucw.cz> References: <20060419174905.29149.67649.sendpatchset@ermintrude.int.wirex.com> <1145470463.3085.86.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org> <1145522524.3023.12.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org> <20060420192717.GA3828@sorel.sous-sol.org> <1145621926.21749.29.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <20060421173008.GB3061@sorel.sous-sol.org> <1145642853.21749.232.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <17484.20906.122444.964025@cse.unsw.edu.au> <20060424070324.GA14720@thunk.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20060424070324.GA14720@thunk.org> X-Warning: Reading this can be dangerous to your mental health. User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.11+cvs20060126 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > In the security world, there is a huge tradition of the best being the > enemy of the good --- and the best being so painful to use that people > don't want to use it, or the moment it gets in the way (either because > of performance reasons or their application does something that > requires painful configuration of the SELinux policy files), they > deconfigure it. At which point the "best" becomes useless. > > You may or may not agree with the philosophical architecture question, > but that doesn't necessarily make it "broken by design". Choice is > good; if AppArmor forces SELinux to become less painful to use and > configure, then that in the long run will be a good thing. SELinux kernel support can _almost_ do what AA does; with notable exception of labels for new files. That can probably be fixed with patch of reasonable size (or maybe even with LD_PRELOAD library, glibc modification, or stuff like that). (There was post showing that in this long flamewar). That way you can have SELinux that works on AA config files. (I still dislike path-based security, but labeling patch can probably be useful for other stuff, too.) Pavel -- Thanks for all the (sleeping) penguins.