From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1750826AbWDXOES (ORCPT ); Mon, 24 Apr 2006 10:04:18 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1750834AbWDXOES (ORCPT ); Mon, 24 Apr 2006 10:04:18 -0400 Received: from e32.co.us.ibm.com ([32.97.110.150]:60369 "EHLO e32.co.us.ibm.com") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750826AbWDXOEQ (ORCPT ); Mon, 24 Apr 2006 10:04:16 -0400 Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2006 09:04:07 -0500 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: Alan Cox Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" , Lars Marowsky-Bree , Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu, Ken Brush , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: Time to remove LSM (was Re: [RESEND][RFC][PATCH 2/7] implementation of LSM hooks) Message-ID: <20060424140407.GD22703@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> References: <4446D378.8050406@novell.com> <200604201527.k3KFRNUC009815@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> <200604211951.k3LJp3Sn014917@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> <200604230945.k3N9jZDW020024@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> <20060424082424.GH440@marowsky-bree.de> <1145882551.29648.23.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20060424125641.GD9311@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> <1145887333.29648.44.camel@localhost.localdomain> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1145887333.29648.44.camel@localhost.localdomain> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.11 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Quoting Alan Cox (alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk): > Thus this sort of stuff needs to be taken seriously. Can SuSE provide a > good reliable policy for AppArmour to people, can Red Hat do the same > with SELinux ? That's a little more than half the question. The other 40% is can users write good policies. I think it will, and already has, become easier for selinux. But in this case I wonder whether some sort of contest could be beneficial. We all know of Russel Coker's open root selinux play machines. That's a powerful statement. Things I'd like to see in addition are a. a similar setup with apparmour b. a similar setup where "mere mortals" set up the selinux policy For the first few rounds, rather than judge one way or the other, we could hopefully publish the results in a way to encourage a flurry of selinux policy tools - one of which may actually be useful. Given that AA is a 'targeted' type of setup, I guess it would need to have a strict sshd policy, and the game would be whether the policy can keep anyone with the root password from escaping the policy. > Note I don't care about whether apparmour is integrated. If the code is > good and it can be shown it works then fine. thanks, -serge