From: "Björn Steinbrink" <B.Steinbrink@gmx.de>
To: Wolfgang Draxinger <Wolfgang.Draxinger@campus.lmu.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: race for /proc/$PID/environ [was: procfs and privacy and a few other questions]
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2006 01:01:52 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20060718230152.GA13303@atjola.homenet> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <200607190020.29684.Wolfgang.Draxinger@campus.lmu.de>
Hi,
On 2006.07.19 00:20:20 +0200, Wolfgang Draxinger wrote:
> Another question, also on procfs is, where exactly does the race
> condition of the recently reported privilege escalation exploit does
> take place. In the few days I was experimenting a bit with the code,
> trying to inject non a.out formats, and eventually the Mono framework
> or the WINE wrapper could allow to inject code through a BINFMT_MISC
> handler, but I'm not through on this. Gladly the thing is fixed, but
> given the fact that there seem to be still a lot of servers on which
> even the sys_prctl exploit isn't fixed yet I'm a bit precarious about
> the whole situation.
The race happens between pid_revalidate() and proc_pid_environ(). When
sys_execve() is called, you get into prepare_binprm() which first checks
the i_mode flags and the owner of the file to be executed and later
tries to read the file.
When a process is set non-dumpable, its files are owned by root:root
while permissions are kept, and the "environ" file also gets non-readable
for everyone.
The owner is basically set by proc_revalidate(), the check whether
"environ" may be read happens in proc_pid_environ() (the call to
ptrace_may_attach() to be exact).
Now prepare_binprm() first gets owner and permissions, which are
root:root and 04755 respectively, permissions were changed regularly,
owner was set to root:root, because the process is non-dumpable.
Later prepare_binprm() actually tries to read /proc/$PID/environ and
usually this would fail, because the process is non-dumpable. Now, if
the syscall gets preempted in between these two, you can change the
process back to be dumpable, the read succeeds and that's it.
HTH
Björn
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2006-07-18 23:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2006-07-18 22:20 procfs and privacy and a few other questions Wolfgang Draxinger
2006-07-18 23:01 ` Björn Steinbrink [this message]
[not found] ` <200607190125.13192.Wolfgang.Draxinger@campus.lmu.de>
[not found] ` <20060718235219.GB6815@martell.zuzino.mipt.ru>
2006-07-19 9:44 ` Wolfgang Draxinger
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