From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752381AbXCHSBs (ORCPT ); Thu, 8 Mar 2007 13:01:48 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1752382AbXCHSBs (ORCPT ); Thu, 8 Mar 2007 13:01:48 -0500 Received: from e33.co.us.ibm.com ([32.97.110.151]:50232 "EHLO e33.co.us.ibm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752376AbXCHSBr (ORCPT ); Thu, 8 Mar 2007 13:01:47 -0500 Date: Thu, 8 Mar 2007 12:01:36 -0600 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: Chris Wright Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" , Mimi Zohar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, safford@watson.ibm.com, serue@linux.vnet.ibm.com, kjhall@linux.vnet.ibm.com, zohar@us.ibm.com Subject: Re: [RFC][Patch 2/6] integrity: fs hook placement Message-ID: <20070308180136.GB21099@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> References: <1173369812.5981.2.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20070308164132.GL6602@sequoia.sous-sol.org> <20070308170733.GA21099@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> <20070308174036.GF10574@sequoia.sous-sol.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20070308174036.GF10574@sequoia.sous-sol.org> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.13 (2006-08-11) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Quoting Chris Wright (chrisw@sous-sol.org): > * Serge E. Hallyn (serue@us.ibm.com) wrote: > > Are you objecting only to the duplication at the callsites, so that an > > fsnotify-type of consolidation of security and integrity hooks would be > > ok? Or are you complaining that the security_inode_setxattr and > > integrity_inode_setxattr hooks are too similar anyway, and integrity > > modules should just use some lsm hooks for anything which will be > > authoritative? > > It's duplication of callsites with many identical implementations > that's the problem. Yes it's ugly... But I guess it gets a point across :) > > (I could see an argument that integirty subsystem should be purely for > > measuring and hence its hooks should never return a value. Only hitch > > there is that if integrity subsystem hits ENOMEM it should be able to > > refuse the action...) > > Right, that's what I was expecting to see, just the measurement > infrastructure. So what you are saying is EVM would stay an LSM, with a cooperating integrity subsystem *just* doing measurements? That's kind of what i was expecting too, however that doesn't fit as well with the idea that an integrity subsystem prevents the need for lsm stacking. I think the idea was that evm would still be able to enforce integrity of selinux xattrs without it stack with selinux. So I can see where this approach came from. -serge