From: Sean <seanlkml@sympatico.ca>
To: david@lang.hm
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <from-lsm@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation,pathname matching
Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2007 01:10:22 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20070609011022.ac332fc7.seanlkml@sympatico.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.64.0706082138360.6675@asgard.lang.hm>
On Fri, 8 Jun 2007 21:56:06 -0700 (PDT)
david@lang.hm wrote:
>
> with AA hardlinks are effectivly different labels on the same file
So what? SELinux can be be altered to accept whatever label you generate.
Pass it whatever label you want.
> one of the big problems with SELinux is what label to put on new files
> (including temp files), the AA approach avoids this (frequent) problem
> entirely. In exchange AA picks up the (infrequent) problems of bind-mounts
> and hard-link creation. People have tried to equate these prolems to show
> that AA has just as many problems as SELinux, but you can run systems for
> decades without creating hard-links or bind-mounts
You are thinking about the way SELinux operates today, not how it might
operate to accommodate AA inclusion in the kernel. Instead of SELinux
always obtaining labels from file attributes, it could ask AA for them
and you could generate them however you like.
> also you seriously misunderstand the AA approach
>
> AA does NOT try to create a security policy for every file on the system.
>
> Instead AA policies are based on specific programs, and each policy states
> what files that program is allowed to access.
please read a bit more carefully, I was responding to someone else who
made that claim.
> if you are useing AA to secure all exposed services on a box you don't
> have to try to write a policy to describe what gcc is allowed to access
> (unless through policy you give one of your exposed services permission to
> run gcc, and even then I'm not sure if gcc would inherit restrictions
> from it's parent or just use it's own)
>
> the resulting policy is much easier to understand (and therefor check)
> becouse it is orders of magnatude smaller then any comprehensive SELinux
> policy.
>
> the AA policy is also much easier to understand becouse you can look at it
> in pieces, understand that piece, and then forget it and move on to the
> next piece.
Nobody is asking you to change the AA policy file. It lives in user space.
But i fail to see the problem in translating it into SELinux terms for
the user transparently.
> for example, if you write a policy for apache that limits it's access to
> it's log files, install directories, and document root. then you write a
> policy for your log analysis tool to access it's libraries, report
> directories (under the apache document root) and the apache log files
> (read only), these two policies are independant, you don't have to think
> about one while creating the other (which you would have to do if you had
> to put one label on apache binaries, another on normal web documents, a
> third on the reports, a fourth on the log files, and a fifth on the
> binaries for the log analysis tool. and this is ignoring any overlap in
> libraries!)
Again, try to think outside the box a bit. This isn't about using SELinux
as it exists today. But imagine an SELinux that would ask you to
supply a security label for each file _instead_ of looking up that label
itself. Wouldn't that let you implement everything you wanted while still
using much of the SELinux infrastructure that is already in the kernel?
> AA also lets a sysadmin dip their toe in the water and just write a policy
> for Apache, not for anything else, then write a policy for firefox, then
> write a policy for their mail client, then for bittorrent, etc. there is
> no need or push to try and secure everything all at once, and no need to
> re-label files (and change any policies that used the old labels) when
> you discover a new interaction.
And so it could remain; this is about implementation, not model.
Sean
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-06-09 5:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 240+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2007-05-14 11:06 [AppArmor 00/45] AppArmor security module overview jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 01/45] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 02/45] Pass struct path down to remove_suid and children jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 03/45] Add a vfsmount parameter to notify_change() jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 04/45] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_setattr LSM hook jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 05/45] Add struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_mkdir() jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 06/45] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_mkdir LSM hook jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 07/45] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_mknod() jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 08/45] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_mknod LSM hook jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 09/45] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_symlink() jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 10/45] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_symlink LSM hook jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 11/45] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_readlink " jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 12/45] Add struct vfsmount parameters to vfs_link() jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 13/45] Pass the struct vfsmounts to the inode_link LSM hook jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 14/45] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_rmdir() jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 15/45] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_rmdir LSM hook jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 16/45] Call lsm hook before unhashing dentry in vfs_rmdir() jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 17/45] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_unlink() jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 18/45] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_unlink LSM hook jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 19/45] Add struct vfsmount parameters to vfs_rename() jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 20/45] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_rename LSM hook jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 21/45] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_setxattr() jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 22/45] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_setxattr LSM hook jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 23/45] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_getxattr() jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 24/45] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_getxattr LSM hook jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 25/45] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_listxattr() jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 26/45] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_listxattr LSM hook jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 27/45] Add a struct vfsmount parameter to vfs_removexattr() jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 28/45] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_removexattr LSM hook jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 29/45] Fix __d_path() for lazy unmounts and make it unambiguous jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 30/45] Make d_path() consistent across mount operations jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 31/45] Add d_namespace_path() to compute namespace relative pathnames jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 32/45] Enable LSM hooks to distinguish operations on file descriptors from operations on pathnames jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 33/45] Pass struct file down the inode_*xattr security LSM hooks jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 34/45] Factor out sysctl pathname code jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 35/45] Allow permission functions to tell between parent and leaf checks jjohansen
2007-05-15 9:08 ` Pavel Machek
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 36/45] Export audit subsystem for use by modules jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 37/45] AppArmor: Main Part jjohansen
2007-05-15 9:12 ` Pavel Machek
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 38/45] AppArmor: Module and LSM hooks jjohansen
2007-05-15 9:14 ` Pavel Machek
2007-05-23 16:16 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-06-04 10:55 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-04 11:25 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-06-04 11:35 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-04 11:42 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-06-04 13:12 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-04 14:30 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-06-06 13:09 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-06-10 23:10 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-06-11 14:33 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-06-11 15:55 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-06-11 19:02 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-06-12 13:00 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-06-12 15:34 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-06-12 5:17 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-06-12 19:00 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-06-12 13:13 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-06-12 23:50 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-06-09 12:58 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-09 13:44 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-06-12 13:06 ` Pavel Machek
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching jjohansen
2007-05-15 9:20 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-04 21:03 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-06-06 13:26 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-06-06 17:32 ` Greg KH
2007-06-09 23:47 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-08 22:03 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-06-09 0:17 ` Greg KH
2007-06-09 1:06 ` david
2007-06-09 2:01 ` [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation,pathname matching Tetsuo Handa
2007-06-09 3:25 ` Sean
2007-06-09 4:56 ` david
2007-06-09 5:10 ` Sean [this message]
2007-06-09 5:38 ` david
2007-06-09 5:44 ` Sean
2007-06-09 7:04 ` david
2007-06-09 7:28 ` Sean
2007-06-09 8:03 ` david
2007-06-09 8:37 ` Sean
2007-06-14 17:01 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-09 11:26 ` [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading andmanipulation,pathname matching Tetsuo Handa
2007-06-09 11:35 ` Sean
2007-06-09 13:41 ` david
2007-06-09 18:37 ` [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation,pathname matching Casey Schaufler
2007-06-15 13:36 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-10 8:34 ` [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching Pavel Machek
2007-06-10 9:04 ` david
2007-06-10 20:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-06-10 20:51 ` Crispin Cowan
2007-06-11 6:45 ` david
2007-06-11 8:29 ` Sean
2007-06-11 9:33 ` david
2007-06-11 11:34 ` Sean
2007-06-11 11:00 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-10 21:05 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-11 6:27 ` david
2007-06-14 19:16 ` Jack Stone
2007-06-15 0:18 ` david
2007-06-15 17:01 ` Greg KH
2007-06-12 17:03 ` Lars Marowsky-Bree
2007-06-09 5:18 ` david
2007-06-09 5:46 ` Sean
2007-06-09 7:13 ` david
2007-06-09 7:36 ` Sean
2007-06-09 8:06 ` david
2007-06-09 8:10 ` Sean
2007-06-09 15:17 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-06-09 16:36 ` Sean
2007-06-09 15:33 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-06-09 16:18 ` Kyle Moffett
2007-06-09 16:46 ` david
2007-06-09 17:06 ` Kyle Moffett
2007-06-09 17:32 ` david
2007-06-09 19:50 ` Kyle Moffett
2007-06-09 20:43 ` david
2007-06-10 20:54 ` Crispin Cowan
2007-06-10 21:17 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-06-09 15:05 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-06-10 17:09 ` Crispin Cowan
2007-06-15 16:50 ` Greg KH
2007-06-15 18:01 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-06-15 18:15 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-06-15 20:43 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-06-15 21:14 ` Greg KH
2007-06-15 21:28 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-06-15 21:44 ` Greg KH
2007-06-15 22:24 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-06-18 13:33 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-06-21 15:54 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-06-15 22:37 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-06-18 12:47 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-06-15 20:06 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-15 21:11 ` Greg KH
2007-06-15 21:42 ` James Morris
2007-06-15 23:50 ` Greg KH
2007-06-16 1:21 ` James Morris
2007-06-16 2:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-06-16 3:39 ` James Morris
2007-06-18 1:51 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-06-18 11:29 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-06-16 4:23 ` Greg KH
2007-06-15 23:30 ` Crispin Cowan
2007-06-15 23:49 ` Greg KH
2007-06-16 0:01 ` david
2007-06-16 0:20 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-22 9:59 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-06-16 0:31 ` Greg KH
2007-06-16 8:09 ` david
2007-06-16 16:24 ` Greg KH
2007-06-16 1:41 ` James Morris
2007-06-16 0:18 ` Seth Arnold
2007-06-16 0:29 ` Greg KH
2007-06-16 1:46 ` James Morris
2007-06-16 2:19 ` James Morris
2007-06-18 18:48 ` Crispin Cowan
2007-06-21 16:01 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2007-06-21 17:59 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-16 0:02 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-21 16:08 ` Lars Marowsky-Bree
2007-06-21 18:33 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-21 19:24 ` Lars Marowsky-Bree
2007-06-21 19:42 ` James Morris
2007-06-21 19:54 ` Lars Marowsky-Bree
2007-06-21 20:59 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-06-21 21:17 ` Lars Marowsky-Bree
2007-06-22 0:16 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-06-22 0:19 ` Lars Marowsky-Bree
2007-06-22 0:28 ` david
2007-06-22 3:45 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-06-22 5:07 ` david
2007-06-22 10:49 ` Lars Marowsky-Bree
2007-06-22 11:19 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-06-22 11:34 ` Neil Brown
2007-06-22 11:48 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-06-22 11:37 ` Lars Marowsky-Bree
2007-06-22 12:41 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-06-22 12:54 ` Lars Marowsky-Bree
2007-06-22 13:22 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-06-22 14:49 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-06-22 16:06 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-06-22 0:34 ` Chris Mason
2007-06-22 1:06 ` James Morris
2007-06-22 4:17 ` Crispin Cowan
2007-06-22 12:20 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-06-24 20:45 ` David Wagner
2007-06-22 7:40 ` John Johansen
2007-06-22 12:17 ` Chris Mason
2007-06-22 13:48 ` James Morris
2007-06-22 14:02 ` Chris Mason
2007-06-22 14:23 ` James Morris
2007-06-22 17:30 ` Chris Mason
2007-06-23 0:11 ` Chris Wright
2007-06-24 0:10 ` Toshiharu Harada
2007-06-24 0:40 ` Toshiharu Harada
2007-06-26 21:01 ` Crispin Cowan
2007-06-24 20:43 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-22 18:12 ` david
2007-06-25 15:14 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-25 21:02 ` david
2007-06-26 8:50 ` Lars Marowsky-Bree
2007-06-24 21:16 ` David Wagner
2007-06-24 21:57 ` david
2007-06-28 18:13 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-28 18:19 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-24 21:45 ` David Wagner
2007-06-28 18:31 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-24 21:20 ` David Wagner
2007-06-22 8:06 ` John Johansen
2007-06-22 11:53 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-06-22 12:42 ` Lars Marowsky-Bree
2007-06-22 12:46 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-06-22 18:35 ` david
2007-06-24 20:48 ` David Wagner
2007-06-24 20:35 ` David Wagner
2007-06-21 20:07 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-21 20:21 ` Lars Marowsky-Bree
2007-06-21 23:25 ` John Johansen
2007-06-21 19:30 ` david
2007-06-21 19:35 ` Lars Marowsky-Bree
2007-06-21 19:52 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-16 0:48 ` [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation,pathname matching Tetsuo Handa
2007-06-19 15:25 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-15 23:33 ` [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching Seth Arnold
2007-06-15 23:39 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-16 0:07 ` Seth Arnold
2007-06-16 15:44 ` [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation,pathname matching Tetsuo Handa
2007-06-16 16:26 ` Greg KH
2007-06-16 16:45 ` [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading andmanipulation,pathname matching Tetsuo Handa
2007-06-11 15:16 ` [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching Stephen Smalley
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 40/45] AppArmor: all the rest jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 41/45] Add AppArmor LSM to security/Makefile jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 42/45] AppArmor: add lock subtyping so lockdep does not report false dependencies jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 43/45] Switch to vfs_permission() in do_path_lookup() jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 44/45] Switch to vfs_permission() in sys_fchdir() jjohansen
2007-05-14 11:06 ` [AppArmor 45/45] Fix file_permission() jjohansen
2007-05-14 13:50 ` [AppArmor 00/45] AppArmor security module overview John Johansen
2007-10-26 6:40 jjohansen
2007-10-26 6:41 ` [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching jjohansen
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