From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1760156AbXG2GyV (ORCPT ); Sun, 29 Jul 2007 02:54:21 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1759711AbXG2GyN (ORCPT ); Sun, 29 Jul 2007 02:54:13 -0400 Received: from styx.suse.cz ([82.119.242.94]:33210 "EHLO mail.suse.cz" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1759709AbXG2GyM (ORCPT ); Sun, 29 Jul 2007 02:54:12 -0400 Date: Sun, 29 Jul 2007 08:53:52 +0200 From: Vojtech Pavlik To: "Rafael J. Wysocki" Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , LKML , Alan Stern , Andrew Morton , "Eric W. Biederman" , "Huang, Ying" , Jeremy Maitin-Shepard , Kyle Moffett , Nigel Cunningham , Pavel Machek , pm list , david@lang.hm, Al Boldi Subject: Re: Hibernation considerations Message-ID: <20070729065352.GB17084@suse.cz> References: <200707151433.34625.rjw@sisk.pl> <20070715125855.GA1737@gallifrey> <200707160038.12943.rjw@sisk.pl> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <200707160038.12943.rjw@sisk.pl> X-Bounce-Cookie: It's a lemon tree, dear Watson! User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.13 (2006-08-11) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Jul 16, 2007 at 12:38:11AM +0200, Rafael J. Wysocki wrote: > > Or the user unplugs their flash drive after hibernation rather than before. > > > > Two things which I think would be nice to consider are: > > 1) Encryption - I'd actually prefer if my luks device did not > > remember the key accross a hibernation; I want to be forced to > > reenter the phrase. However I don't know what the best thing > > to do to partitions/applications using the luks device is. > > Encryption is possible with both the userland hibernation (aka uswsusp) and > TuxOnIce (formerly known as suspend2). Still, I don't consider it as a "must > have" feature for a framework to be generally useful (many users don't use it > anyway). If a user uses an encrypted filesystem, then he also needs an encrypted swap and encrypted hibernation image: Otherwise the fileystem encryption is not very useful. Forgetting the filesystem/swap decryption keys before hibernation is probably harder to do - there may be sensitive data in the kernel memory image that weren't cleared - even if the key itself is not there. In my opinion, encrypted hibernation is what every notebook user should want - that's the only way how to make sure data from the notebook aren't available when the notebook is physically stolen. -- Vojtech Pavlik Director SuSE Labs