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From: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/6] random: use xor for mixing
Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2007 13:33:58 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20071209133358.1d43e226@the-village.bc.nu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20071209020828.GX17037@thunk.org>

> So my personal take on it is that protecting against backtracking
> attacks is mainly useful in silencing academics who like to come up
> with, well, largely academic and theoretical scenario.  If it doesn't
> take much effort, sure, let's try to protect against it (and I think
> we're OK already).

That problem seems to arise here because we have an interface to add
'real' entropy to the pool but not one to add randomness to be used
solely for urandom. If we had both then the user could choose to add some
degree of randomness solely for urandom usage.

Alan

  reply	other threads:[~2007-12-09 13:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <2.753618428@selenic.com>
     [not found] ` <3.753618428@selenic.com>
2007-12-09  0:01   ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-09  0:40     ` Matt Mackall
2007-12-09  2:08       ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-09 13:33         ` Alan Cox [this message]
2007-12-19 21:09         ` Bill Davidsen
     [not found] ` <4.753618428@selenic.com>
2007-12-09  0:35   ` [PATCH 3/6] random: do extraction before mixing Theodore Tso
2007-12-09  7:12     ` Matt Mackall
     [not found] ` <5.753618428@selenic.com>
2007-12-09  1:45   ` [PATCH 4/6] random: make backtracking attacks harder Theodore Tso
2007-12-09  5:43     ` Matt Mackall
2007-12-09 13:33       ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-09 17:05         ` Matt Mackall
2007-12-10 13:37           ` Theodore Tso
     [not found] ` <6.753618428@selenic.com>
2007-12-09  1:48   ` [PATCH 5/6] random: step more rapidly through the pool when adding and extracting Theodore Tso
2007-12-09  4:00     ` Andrew Morton
2007-12-09  4:22       ` Matt Mackall
2007-12-09 12:55         ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-09 17:08           ` Matt Mackall
     [not found] ` <7.753618428@selenic.com>
2007-12-09  1:51   ` [PATCH 6/6] random: improve variable naming, clear extract buffer Theodore Tso
2007-12-09  5:08     ` Matt Mackall

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