From: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Add a counter in task_struct for skipping permission check. (Was: Should LSM hooks be called by filesystem's requests?)
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2008 13:30:58 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <200807221730.m6MHUwDf004730@agora.fsl.cs.sunysb.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Tue, 22 Jul 2008 19:59:04 +0900." <200807221959.HDJ90154.FFLMOtVOOQJFSH@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
In message <200807221959.HDJ90154.FFLMOtVOOQJFSH@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>, Tetsuo Handa writes:
> Hello.
>
> I have a problem with unionfs and LSM.
> The unionfs causes NULL pointer dereference if copyup_dentry()
> failed by LSM's decision, so I'm searching for a solution.
>
> http://marc.info/?l=linux-security-module&m=121609490418118&w=2
>
> It seems that the unionfs is not handling error paths correctly.
> But since the unionfs's operation is not always atomic,
> there is no guarantee that unionfs can rollback unionfs's internal
> operations properly.
>
> For example, unionfs is trying to create a rw copy of a ro file.
>
> Request by unionfs Decision by LSM
> "I want to create a rw file." "OK. You can create the file."
> "I want to copy the ro file's attribute" "No. You must not."
> "I have to delete the rw file." "No. You must not."
>
> Then, it might be better to completely disable LSM for unionfs's
> internal operations.
> At least, I think we need to disable LSM for rollback operation so that
> the rw file in the above example is properly deleted.
>
> I think this patch can disable LSM checks if vfs_*() and
> notify_change() is called by unionfs's internal operations.
> This patch is just an idea, not tested at all.
>
> Does somebody have a solution?
I think there needs to be a better way for stackable f/s to work with
LSM/Smack, and the VFS. I'd like to do things as cleanly as possible, not
just come up with quick-n-dirty hacks or workarounds. :-)
One possibility I'm looking into is the S_PRIVATE flag. Another is
cap_raise/lower pairs. Ideally there'd be a way to pass security-related
flags to vfs_* methods, but I think that generally such solutions haven't
been received well. (If the LSM folks know of a better/cleaner way in which
Unionfs can utilize LSM, I'd love to hear about it.)
In the end, I believe the solution would be some combination of improved VFS
and changes to Unionfs.
The atomicity issue is a problem for all stackable file systems, yes. Viro
had suggested to me at LSF'08 that perhaps the superblock struct would need
a "want_write" type of interface as has been done struct vfsmount: that'd
allow an upper layer to make multiple ops on a lower superblock, locking it
from any possible interleaving of other callers, and even rolling back
undesired changes.
Cheers,
Erez.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-07-22 17:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <200807142020.BCC17654.SMtQFVFOFOHOJL@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
[not found] ` <487C22A2.9090402@schaufler-ca.com>
2008-07-22 10:59 ` Tetsuo Handa
2008-07-22 15:46 ` hooanon05
2008-07-22 17:30 ` Erez Zadok [this message]
2008-07-23 1:38 ` Peter Dolding
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